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INTRODUCTION

NDER the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),' liability is

strict,2 joint and several. 3 CERCLA has been interpreted by some

courts as imposing liability on officers, directors and stockholders
of responsible corporations to an extent not usually seen in other
areas of the law. 4 Arguments to justify the relaxation in CERCLA
litigation of the historic limits on the liability of officers, directors
and stockholders try to illustrate that these limits, which have
evolved over years of corporate law, are outdated in this era of
astronomical environmental cleanup costs, and that the existing
common law exceptions to the general rule of limited liability are
inadequate to prevent the frustration of congressional objectives
that underlie CERCLA.5 In place of the traditional rules of limited liability, certain federal courts have substituted new rules of
liability. The new rules are far more aggressive than the traditional rules in reaching beyond responsible corporations to the
individuals or corporations who own or manage them. The
courts that have created the new and aggressive rules have entertained little doubt as to the legitimacy of their right to create such
rules. To balance properly the federal and state interests involved, however, a more thorough treatment is required than has
been displayed thus far in the CERCLA cases. The general thesis
of this Article is that the objectives of Congress can and should be
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988 & Supp. I
1989)), amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(35), 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989)).
2. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (hereinafter NEPACCO I] (rejecting defendant's
argument that negligence should be standard of liability under CERCLA; imposing strict liability as appropriate standard), aff'd part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter NEPACCO II], cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
3. Id. at 844-45 (noting that joint and several liability may be imposed
under CERCLA pursuant to either statutory or common law); United States v. A
& F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (stating that Congress intended for courts to determine scope of liability under CERCLA, and
absence of express statutory authority for imposing joint and several liability
does not preclude such liability); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp. 572 F.
Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining that although CERCLA does not
expressly provide for joint and several liability, it may nevertheless be imposed
in certain circumstances).
4. For a comparison of common law liability to liability under CERCLA, see
infra notes 274-300 and accompanying text.
5. For one commentator's arguments against limiting corporate liability,
see infra notes 497-98 and accompanying text.
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met without the disruption that would result if the traditional
rules of limited liability were eroded.
Part II of this Article examines the rules of liability developed
in the CERCLA cases and compares them to the traditional federal and state common law on the subject. This part demonstrates that the cases introducing the new rules have largely
misread or ignored existing precedent and doctrine. A survey of
the traditional federal and state law of direct liability and piercing
the corporate veil reveals just how far from the traditional law
these new rules have strayed. Specifically, the new CERCLA rules
eliminate a number of safeguards for officers, directors and stockholders that have evolved in the traditional law over the years.
Part III examines whether federal courts should have a role
in making this change in the law. The three-part test articulated
in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.6 is applied to determine

whether federal courts should adopt existing state law rules of
decision to develop the federal law, or whether new uniform federal law is required. The Article concludes that the federal courts
should adopt state law rules of liability for officers, directors and
stockholders to determine liability under CERCLA.
II.

THE CERCLA

LIABILITY RULES AND THE TRADITIONAL

COMMON LAW RULES: HOW THEY DIFFER

CERCLA was enacted in 1980 in the waning days of the
Ninety-Sixth Congress in order to address the nationwide problem of cleaning up hazardous substance disposal sites.7 Liability
under CERCLA is strict, joint and several. 8 The statute identifies
four targets of liability:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged
6. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a discussion of Kimbell Foods, see infra notes
308-16 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the unusual circumstances under which the Congress
approved the legislation, see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J.
ENvrL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982). For a discussion of the purposes and objectives of
CERCLA, see infra notes 458-75 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA, see supra
notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs .... 9
The statute defines "owner or operator" to mean any person
owning, operating, or, in the case of vessels, chartering, a facility
or vessel, but excludes from the definition any person "who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in
the vessel or facility." 10 The term "person" is in turn defined as
"an individual, firm, corporation, associatiori, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
State, or any interstate body."II
Persons falling into any of the four enumerated categories of
"covered persons" are liable for the cleanup costs and damages,
including certain expenses of the United States and others, together with interest. 12 Only three statutory defenses to liability
are permitted: acts of God; acts of war; and acts or omissions of a
third party, under certain limited conditions.1 s
9. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). The statute defines
broadly the term "facility" to include, among other things, buildings, equipment, wells, ponds, landfills, motor vehicles and aircraft, as well as "any site or
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed, or otherwise come to be located." Id. § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
10. Id. § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A).
11. Id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
12. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CERCLA specifies that the covered
persons shall be liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by
the United States Government"; "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person"; "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources"; and "the costs of [certain statutorily authorized] health assessment or health effects stud[ies]." Id. Interest on such amounts accrues from
the later of the date of the expenditure or the date payment of the amount is
demanded in writing. Id.
13. id. § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). The defense for acts or omissions of
a third party applies generally where the defendant has taken due care and precaution with respect to the hazardous substances and the foreseeable actions of
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The President of the United States and his designees are
given broad authority to act in response to a threatened or actual
release of hazardous substances into the environment.' 4 The
cleanup may be carried out by the responsible parties with the
consent of the President, or the federal government may act
either alone or in concert with the state in which the facility is
located.15 The statute contains numerous provisions relating to
the cooperation between federal and state governments in the removal or remediation of hazardous substances, particularly with
respect to apportioning costs.' 8
CERCLA also created a source of money, commonly known
as the "Superfund," to pay for the costs of cleaning up hazardous
the third party. Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). The defense does not
apply to acts and omissions of employees. or agents of the defendant, nor does it
apply to third parties whose acts or omissions occurred in connection with a

contractual relationship with the defendant. Id. "Contractual relationship" includes, among other things, "deeds or other instruments transferring titles or
possession," unless the defendant took title after the release occurred, and can
show either that he did not know and had no reason to know of the hazardous
substance release or that he acquired the facility by certain specified involuntary
transfers. Id § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
14. See id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. The statute authorizes the President to
.act . . . to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial
action" relating to the released substance. Id. § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)(1).
15. Id. § 104(a), (d), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a), (d). The President may authorize
the owner, operator or any other responsible person to "carry out the action" if
he determines they will do so "properly and promptly." Id. § 104(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. 9604(a)(1). Finally, the President may enter into a contract or cooperative agreement with any state or political subdivision, enabling such entity to
carry out any action authorized under § 104. Id. § 104(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(d)(1)(A).
16. Id. § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c). Before the President commits the resources of the United States for remedial actions (other than emergency actions), he is required to obtain certain assurances from the state in which the
release has occurred. The state must assure the President that it will provide:
future maintenance of the necessary removal and remedial actions; an acceptable disposal facility for the hazardous substances; and payment of a portion of
the ,costs equal to 10% of the costs of the remedial action, or, if the release
occurred at a facility that is operated by the state or any of its political subdivisions, 50% (or more) of any amounts spent in response to such release. Id.
§ 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3). In certain instances, the President is required to grant the state a credit, against the state's share of the costs, for
amounts expended by the state. Id. § 104(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(5). In addition, state standards for the cleanup of hazardous substances or other pollutants
or contaminants may be used in some circumstances in lieu of federal standards.
See id. § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d). Other examples of federal and state cooperation include provisions relating to the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of natural resources, id. § II1(i), 42 U.S.C. 9611(i), and
provisions relating to state participation in planning and selecting remedial action on federal facilities. Id. § 120(o, 42 U.S.C. § 9620(0.
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substances. 17 The Superfund is funded mostly by excise taxes on
certain crude oil, petroleum products and chemicals, an "environmental tax" on certain corporate income, and amounts recovered
under CERCLA and other enforcement actions.' 8 The
Superfund may be used for payment of costs incurred by both the
United States and other authorized persons in responding to hazardous substance releases, as well as for other limited purposes.19
To recover from the Superfund, a claimant must follow the claims
procedure set forth in the statute. 20 When controversies arise
under CERCLA, the federal district courts will generally have
original jurisdiction, with proper venue in the district where the
release occurred or where the defendant is located. 2 '
Finally, CERCLA has a notice provision. The statute states
that "any person in charge" of a vessel or facility must immediately give notice to the National Response Center of any release
of a hazardous substance in excess of specified quantities.2 2 Pen17. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). The full name of the Superfund is the "Hazardous Substance Superfund." Id.
18. See id. § 4611 (1988 &Supp. 11989) (imposing tax on oil and petroleum
products); id. § 4661 (1988) (imposing tax on certain chemicals); id. § 4671 (imposing tax on certain imported chemical substances); id. § 59A (imposing tax on
certain corporate income); id. § 9507(b) (appropriating taxes collected under
foregoing sections to Superfund; also appropriating amounts recovered as penalties or punitive damages under CERCLA and amounts recovered on behalf of
CERCLA to Superfund).
19. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). The statute
specifies that the Superfund may be used to pay the costs of the following activities, among others: assessing injury and loss to natural resources caused by hazardous substances; governmental restoration and rehabilitation of natural
resources destroyed by hazardous substances; programs to enforce and investigate hazardous substance releases; health studies; and research and development. hd § 111(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(c).
20. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (1988). Prior to asserting a claim against
the Superfund, a claimant must assert his claim against "the owner, operator, or
guarantor of the vessel or facility from which a hazardous substance has been
released, if known to the claimant, and to any other person known to the claimant who may be liable" under § 107. Id. § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a). If the
claim is not paid within 60 days, the claimant may request payment from the
Superfund. Id. If the President denies payment of all or part of the claim, the
claimant may request an administrative hearing. Id. § 112(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.
9612(b)(2). Any party may appeal the administrative ruling to the specified federal district court. Id. § 112(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. 9612(b)(5). The President must
pay the claimant within 20 days of the expiration of any administrative appeal
period or within 20 days after the final judicial determination. Id. § 112(b)(6),
42 U.S.C. 9612(b)(6).
21. Id. § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b).
22. Id. § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). The National Response Center was
established pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)
(also known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act) [hereinafter WPCA].
CERCLA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1988). Once the National Response
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alties for failure to give the required notice include fines, impris23
onment, or both.
Once Congress had laid the groundwork for dealing with
hazardous substances problems, the federal courts were faced
with the task of determining precisely how liability would be imposed. Beginning with United States v. Wade,24 the courts issued a
series of opinions that created new law concerning the extent to
which officers, directors and stockholders may be held liable
either as owners or operators of facilities, or as persons who arranged for the disposal or transport of, or who accepted for transport, hazardous substances. Despite protestations to the
contrary, the cases decided after Wade have largely abandoned the
traditional rules in favor of new rules that greatly reduce the burden of proof on the United States. The new rules created in the
CERCLA cases may expose officers, directors and stockholders to
liability under the statute, in contravention of traditional concepts
of limited liability, on the basis of activities that may be commonly
25
accepted ways of doing business.
Center has been notified of a hazardous substance release, it must "expedi-

tiously" convey the information to "all appropriate Government agencies, including the Governor of any affected State." Id.
CERCLA also required "any person who owns or operates or who at the
time of disposal owned or operated, or who accepted hazardous substances for
transport and selected, a facility at which hazardous substances... are or have
been stored, treated, or disposed of" to give notice to the Environmental Protection Agency by June 9, 1981 (180 days after the statute was originally enacted). Id. § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
23. CERCLA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988). Failure to report may
result in imprisonment of up to three years for the first offense, and up to five
years for subsequent offenses. Id.
24. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). For a discussion of Wade, see infra
note 42.
25. For a discussion and criticism of expanded liability under the CERCLA
cases, see infra notes 26-178 and accompanying text. Although the facts of each
CERCLA case are crucial to understanding the present state of the law, particularly as it might apply to specific individuals, the discussion in this Article is of
necessity more general. The Article focuses on the rules that the courts have
articulated, rather than on the perhaps narrower holdings that could be construed from a closer look at the facts of each case. The broader focus is essential
to appreciate the sweeping advances in the law that have been announced in
these cases, and the license that they give to federal courts addressing similar
issues in future cases. There are several excellent articles that describe in great
detail the facts of the important CERCLA liability cases. See, e.g., Davidson, Corporate Ownership of Real Estate: The Impact of EnvironmentalLegislation on Shareholder
Liability, 17 REAL EST. LJ. 291 (1989); Tundermann, PersonalLiabilityfor Corporate
Directors, Officers, Employees and ControllingShareholders Under State and FederalEnvironmental Laws, RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., ch. 2 (1985); Wallace, Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers, Directors, and Shareholders Under Superfund: Should
Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14 J. CORP. L. 839 (1989); Comment,
CorporateOfficer Liabilityfor Hazardous Waste Disposal: What Are the Consequences?, 38
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The CERCLA Rules of Liability

The attempts to extend liability of officers, directors and
stockholders under CERCLA beyond the traditional state common law generally fall into two categories: (1) those that attempt
to impose direct liability on such persons by virtue of their actions; 26 and (2) those that attempt to liberalize the doctrine of
disregarding the corporate entity, more commonly known
as "piercing the corporate veil."'2 7 Both of these categories have
three variations.
With respect to direct liability, the first variation is one in
which officers, directors and even stockholders have been held liable for CERCLA damages and cleanup costs as "owners and operators" due to their capacity to control a facility or
corporation. 28 In the second variation, courts and commentators
have found a slightly different form of direct liability based on an
interpretation of the statute itself, which defines the term "person" to include individuals as well as corporations, and does not
exclude officers, directors and employees. 29 The third form of
direct liability relies on a statutory exception to liability for persons who, without participating in management, hold indicia of
ownership primarily to protect their security interests.3 0 Certain
cases have read this exception as a basis for imposing liability on
individuals who own stock in a corporation and who actively parMERCER L. REV. 677 (1987); Comment, Dissolving the CorporateVeil: CorporateOfficer Liabilityfor Response Costs Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 923 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Dissolving the Corporate Veil].
26. For a discussion of attempts to impose direct liability on officers, directors and stockholders beyond the traditional state common law, see infra notes
40-134 and accompanying text. Such liability is direct in the sense that the individual's culpability is established directly under the CERCLA statute, without
reference to any liability of the corporation with which such individual is affiliated. The individual is determined to be within the scope of the terms of the
statute.
27. For a discussion of attempts to extend liability of officers, directors and
stockholders by piercing the corporate veil, see infra notes 135-78 and accompanying text. This form of liability is derivative, in that the liability of the corporation must be established before that of the individual may be considered.
"Disregarding the corporate entity" and "piercing the corporate veil" are hereinafter used interchangeably.

28. For a discussion of officers, directors and stockholders being held liable
under CERCLA as owners and operators, see infra notes 42-96 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of this interpretation of CERCLA, see infra notes 97128 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of the security interest exception to liability, see infra
note 130 and accompanying text.
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3
ticipate in its management. '
The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil," as articulated
in the CERCLA cases, also has three variations. The first variation emerged from United States v. Nicolet, Inc. ,32 which enunciated
a rule that a court may pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary
corporation and impose liability upon its parent if the parent had
substantial financial or ownership interests in the subsidiary and
the parent controlled, at the relevant time, the management and
operations of the subsidiary.33 The second line of cases relies
upon federal corporate veil piercing cases as authority for disregarding the corporate entity in the interests of "public convenience, fairness and equity." 3 4 Finally, the third line of cases draws
upon the federal common law tradition to hold a stockholder liable when the corporation was acting as a "business conduit" for
the stockholder. 35
The creation of the rules concerning officer, director and
stockholder liability has not been without controversy, however.
Criticism of the cases articulating these rules generally focuses on
flaws in the reasoning of the cases. Often, internal inconsistencies exist and numerous citations are made to cases that do not
support the holdings for which they are cited.36 The flaws in the
CERCLA cases demonstrate that the rules of liability articulated
therein do not fit into or follow closely from the larger body of
federal or state common law of either direct liability or piercing
the corporate veil.3 7 Missing from the rules are the protections of

31. For a discussion of cases imposing liability pursuant to the security interest exception, see infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
32. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
33. For a discussion of the ownership interest and control rule articulated
in Nicolt, see infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of cases in which the corporate veil has been pierced to
promote public convenience, fairness and equity, see infra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of stockholder liability when the corporation acts as a
business conduit, see infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
36. For specific criticisms of the CERCLA rules, see infra notes 70-96, 11028, 132-34, 139-50, 160-68, 175-78 and accompanying text.
37. SeeJoslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L.James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, I1IS. Ct. 1017 (1991). The court wrote:
[T]his court holds that the corporate form, including limited liability
for stockholders, is a doctrine firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence that may not be disregarded absent a specific congressional directive. Neither the clear language of CERCLA nor its legislative
history provides authority for imposing individual liability on corporate
officers or direct liability on parent corporations.
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officers, directors and stockholders that have built up over many
years of corporate common law.3 8 This section of the Article will

trace the evolution of these six rules and evaluate the criticism of
the cases in which these rules have been articulated, deferring a
discussion of the missing safeguards until after the examination
39
of federal and state common law.

1. Direct Liability
A number of cases addressing issues of officer, director and
even stockholder liability under CERCLA have held that liability
may be imposed without resort to the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. 40 These cases hold that such individuals may be
directly liable under the terms of CERCLA. Courts have not,
however, clearly articulated the rules they are using to impose direct liability. In fact, courts have often commingled the three
rules for liability in a single finding. 4 1 Nonetheless, each has also
been used as an independent basis for liability.
The three rules of direct liability-capacity to control, statutory liability and indicia of ownership-are products of judicial
reasoning that loosely interprets existing law so as to formulate
new law. The capacity to control rule, for example, begins as a
variation of the traditional common law rule that an officer or director is personally liable for torts or wrongful conduct that
38. For a discussion of common law protection of officers, directors and
stockholders, see infra notes 179-273. For a comparison between the common
law rules and the CERCLA rules, see infra notes 274-300.
39. For a discussion of traditional federal and state common law, see infra
notes 179-273 and accompanying text.
40. The courts have not always been clear about the distinction between
piercing the corporate veil and direct liability. For example, in NEPACCO I,
579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), the district court first determined
that defendant Lee was directly liable under the statute as a person who arranged for the disposal and transport of hazardous substances and as an "owner
and operator." Id. at 849. The court then confused the issue by stating that "to
hold otherwise and allow Lee to be shielded by the corporate veil 'would frustrate congressional purpose by exempting from the operation of the Act a large
class of persons who are uniquely qualified to assume the burden imposed by
[CERCLA].'" Id. (quoting Apex Oil Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976)).
41. See, e.g., NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. at 847-849. In imposing direct liability on defendant Lee, the district court employed all three bases for direct liability: "Defendant Lee is a 'person' within the [statutory] definition .... "; "The
statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in a facility and is actively
participating in its management can be held liable for the disposal of hazardous
waste."; "Defendant Lee had the capacity to control the disposal of hazardous
waste at the NEPACCO plant .... " Id.
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causes a violation of a statute. The other two rules are based
solely on interpretations of the language of CERCLA. In all three
instances, however, there are flaws in the reasoning of the opinions that erode the link between the rule as articulated and the
existing law on which it is purportedly based.
a.

Capacity to Control

The rule of direct liability that has received the most attention focuses on the capacity of an individual to control the release
of hazardous substances. Although early cases focused on the capacity of an individual to control the actual facility where the release occurred, later cases have instead focused on the.
individual's capacity to control the corporation that was responsi42
ble for the release.
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.
(NEPACCO 1) 43 was the first significant case in this line. In
NEPACCO I, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri used the following definition to hold the president and vicepresident of a dissolved corporation, both of whom were major
stockholders of the corporation, liable as owners and operators
under section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA: "The owner-operator of a
vessel or a vacility [sic] has the capacity to make timely discovery
of oil discharges. The owner-operator has power to direct the
activities of persons who control the mechanisms causing the pollution. The owner-operator has the capacity to prevent and abate
damage."44
42. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), which was
handed down less than six weeks before NEPACCO 1, appears to be the earliest
decision concerning liability of corporate officers under CERCLA. Wade dealt
with liability under § 107(a)(4) of CERGLA (accepting hazardous substances for
transport to sites, selected by such person, from which there is a release), and
thus raises somewhat different issues than are found in the "capacity to control"
cases. The Wade court refused to grant summary judgment against the
owner/defendant because insufficient evidence existed that he had personally
participated in the activity that caused the release. 577 F. Supp. at 1341-42. For
a discussion of liability under GERCLA § 107(a)(3) and (4), see infra notes 97128 and accompanying text.
Control of a corporation may not necessarily entail control over a facility
owned by that corporation. Presumably, one could have control over a corporation by managing its administrative and executive functions while leaving management of certain operations, including management of the facility from which
hazardous substances are released, to other officers of the corporation. For a
further discussion of a corporate manager's potential liability for activities he did
not directly control, see infra notes 49-56, 87-96 and accompanying text.
43. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
44. Id. at 848-49 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Apex Oil Co. v. United

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

12

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991]

CERCLA LIABILITY

1379

The court noted that the defendant officers had the capacity

to control the disposal of hazardous substances at the facility, the
power to direct the negotiations concerning the disposal and the
capacity to prevent and abate damage caused by the disposal of
hazardous substances. 45 The court also noted that each defendant was a major stockholder in the corporation and had actively
participated in the management of the corporation. 4 6 Accord-

ingly, the court determined that it was necessary to impose liability on these defendants in order to prevent any frustration of
congressional purpose that would occur through exemption of "a
large class of persons who are uniquely qualified to assume the

47
burden imposed by [CERCLA]."
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision with respect to owner and operator liability
of the two officers on the grounds that neither man owned or operated the "facility" from which the release had occurred (which
was not the site and plant operated by the corporation).48 Nevertheless, the rule adopted by the district court survived and was
subsequently carried forward and even liberalized in later decisions. In United States v. Carolawn Co.,49 the District Court for the
District of South Carolina cited the NEPACCO I opinion as persuasive authority and held:

[T]o the extent that an individual has control or authorStates, 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976)). The
Apex Oil case quoted by the NEPACCO I court had involved not liability under

CERCLA, but rather liability under § 1321 of the WPCA. The Apex Oil opinion,
in turn, had adopted the language used in United States v. Mobil Oil Corp., 464
F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972), which had also discussed liability under the
WPCA.
The quoted portion of the NEPACCO I opinion was addressing liability
under § 107(a)(1) of CERCLA. The court addressed liability under § 107(3)
and (4) separately. For a discussion of the NEPACCO I court's treatment of liability under § 107(3) and (4), see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
45. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 849.
46. ide
47. Id (quoting Apex Oil, 539 F.2d at 1293). According to the court, this
frustration would occur if it were to permit the individual defendant "to be
shielded by the corporate veil." Id This reference to piercing the corporate veil
has added to the confusion in an area of the law not noted for its clarity. For a
further discussion of the problematic aspects of, and confusion inherent in, the
NEPACCO I opinion, see Wallace, supra note 25, at 852-54. For the purposes of
this Article, NEPACCO I will be treated exclusively as a direct liability case.
48. NEPACCO II, 810 F.2d 726, 742-43 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987). Although the circuit court reversed the district court's finding
that both defendants were liable under § 107(a)(1), it affirmed the liability of

one defendant under § 107(a)(3). Id. at 743-44.

49. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984).
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ity over the activities of a facility from which hazardous
substances are released or participates in the management of such a facility, he may be held liable for response costs incurred at the facility notwithstanding the
50
corporate character of the business.
Both NEPACCO I and Carolawnwere cited later in United States
v. Conservation Chemical Co.5 1 Conservation Chemical held that the
chief executive officer of a corporation, who was also its founder
and a majority stockholder, was liable under subsections
107(a)(1) and (2) of CERCLA. 52 The Conservation Chemical opinion contained findings concerning the defendant officer's education and work experience, his involvement in the creation of the
facility and the administration of the corporation, the frequency
of his visits to the facility and his frequent communication with
plant managers. 5 3 The court concluded that liability was appropriate because of the defendant's "high degree of personal involvement in the operation and the decision-making process,"
54
particularly during the early years of the corporation.
Significantly, neither the Carolawn opinion nor the Conservation Chemical opinion contains any findings that the officer defendants actively or directly participated in the activity that led to the
releases of hazardous substances. Nor was it shown in either case
that any of the officer defendants actually had the capacity to discover the release, to direct the activities of the person who did
control the release, or to prevent or abate the release. Instead,
the respective courts took a simpler route by focusing on the active participation by the defendants in the overall management of
the facilities from which the hazardous substances had been re50. Id. at 20,700. The Carolawn court was ruling on the individual defendants' motions to dismiss the United States's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Carolawn thus helped to give the capacity to control rule a life independent
of the NEPACCO I decision. This illustrates the vitality of rules in this area of
law, which may assume an importance far in excess of the facts that gave rise to
them. For a discussion of this Article's focus on the effect of rules enunciated in
cases, rather than the cases' factual settings, see supra note 25.
51. 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985), modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D.
Mo. 1988).
52. Id. at 420. The court delivered its decision on the issue of liability of
the individual defendant in a Supplemental Memorandum Opinion. This opinion was issued after a separate hearing to determine the nature and degree of
the defendant's personal participation in the management of the facility. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court found that the defendant had been personally active in
establishing the layout of the site, as well as supervising its construction. He had
also taken an active role in research, marketing, administration and hiring. Id.
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leased. 5 5 Thus, because neither Carolawn nor Conservation Chemical
rely on (or even contain) findings that the respective defendants

were involved in activities closely related to the releases, they represent a further step in the evolution of the "capacity to control"
rule set out in NEPACCO 1.56
The next step in the expansion of the "capacity to control"
rule was the inclusion of corporate stockholders within the scope
of direct liability. The significance of this step lies in the fact that
corporate stockholders, unlike the individuals who were defendants in the cases previously discussed, are not officers of the corporation that issued the stock. A corporate stockholder thus has
no direct role or participation in the operation or activities of the
corporation whose stock it owns. In Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co.,57 the
District Court for the District of Idaho held that the corporate

parent of a subsidiary found liable under section 107(a)(2) of
55. See id. (noting defendant's "high degree of personal involvement in the
operation and the decision-making process"); Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 20,700 ("CERCLA contemplates personal liability of corporate officials, such as [defendants], who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of
a hazardous waste disposal business"). Since the Carolawn decision was rendered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court made no
specific findings with respect to the extent of the individuals' control. The language of the decision, however, makes clear that a finding of control over the
facility will be sufficient to establish liability. For the relevant language used in
the Carolawn decision, see supra text accompanying note 50.
56. Cf. Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 822, 831-32 (D. Vt. 1988)
(holding individual managing stockholders personally liable "in their respective
executive capacities in the corporate structure"), rescindedin part,vacated in part on
other grounds, Civil No. 86-190, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17341 (D. Vt. Apr. 20,
1989). A slight twist on this step was added by the decision in Kelley ex reL
Natural Resources Commission v. ARCO Industries Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214
(W.D. Mich. 1989), which identified the key element in the liability analysis as
"whether the individual . .. could have prevented or significantly abated the
hazardous waste discharge that is the basis of the claim." Id. at 1219. The court
then stated that to determine liability under this "prevention" test it would look
at evidence of the individual's authority to control waste handling practices, the
distribution of power within the corporation, evidence of responsibility undertaken for disposal practices and affirmative attempts to prevent unlawful disposal or to avoid or abate hazardous waste damage. Id. at 1219-20. Significantly,
the court refused to apply a strict liability standard against the individuals on the
grounds that it was "too harsh and broad-sweeping a standard" to use in all
cases. Id. at 1219.
In Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1539-45 (W.D. Mich.
1989), the author of the ARCO opinion expanded on the "prevention" test, noting that it should also require an analysis of the officer's power and authority
within the corporation, factors not generally considered in the traditional common law. The court reasoned that inclusion of such factors in the test for liability would encourage responsible conduct by high level corporate officers, rather
than giving them an incentive to distance themselves from the corporate facilities that actually handle hazardous substances. Id. at 1544.
57. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
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CERCLA would also be held liable as an owner or operator under
the statute. 58 The court adopted the test of "owner-operator"
used in NEPACCO 1.59 To support its conclusion that the parent
was an "owner or operator," the court cited the same facts it had
used to determine that it had personal jurisdiction over the parent. 60 While not expressly piercing the corporate veil, the court
noted that the parent had reserved the right to approve or make
decisions on almost all matters relating to pollution and capital
expenditures, and that the authorized capital of the subsidiary
was only $1,100.00, while the parent received $27 million in divi61
dends from the subsidiary.
Although the Bunker Hill decision could perhaps be read as a
62
piercing the corporate veil case instead of a direct liability case,
two subsequent decisions contain no such ambiguity and are
clearly based on direct liability under the capacity to control rule.
In United States v. Nicolet, Inc. ,63 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied the defendant parent corporation's motion to dismiss the United States government's first
64
amended complaint, filed under section 107(a)(2) of CERGLA,
stating that:
There is, of course, no basis under CERCLA, to distinguish between the liability of an individual stockholder
who actively participates in the management of a corporation and a corporate stockholder which so participates.
58. Id. at 671-72. The court stopped short, however, of making the corporate parent automatically an owner or operator when only "normal" activities of
a parent and its subsidiary are carried out. Id. at 672.
59. Id. at 671-72. For a discussion of the NEPACCO I test, which was
adopted from Apex Oil and Mobil Oil, see supra note 43-47 and accompanying
text.
60. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671. Although the analysis concerning jurisdiction strongly resembles piercing the corporate veil, the court's discussion
of "owner or operator" liability of the parent corporation appears to be direct
liability, particularly in light of its citation to NEPACCO L See id. But see United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that
Bunker Hill court had adopted rule of federal alter ego liability).
61. 635 F. Supp. at 672. The court also noted that the parent controlled
the subsidiary's board of directors at times, and was continuously informed
about the subsidiary's daily activities. Id.
62. For a discussion of the Nicolet court's view of Bunker Hill as a piercing
the corporate veil case, see infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
63. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
64. Id. at 1199-200. Although it denied the motion to dismiss, the court felt
it necessary to discuss the theories of liability that had been advanced by the
United States, "in an attempt to clarify any existing confusion and expedite the
scheduled trial of this matter." Id. at 1200. This is yet another example of the
importance of rules of liability in this area of the law.
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Both individuals and corporations are included within
the definition of "person" under Section 101(21) of
CERCLA. Accordingly, if an individual stockholder can
be liable under CERCLA for his corporation's disposal, a
corporation which holds stock in another corporation
(e.g., a subsidiary) and actively participates in its management can be held liable for clean-up costs incurred as
a result of that corporation's disposal.6 5
In a later case, liability was extended to include a minority
corporate stockholder. In United States v. McGraw-Edison Co. ,66 the
District Court for the Western District of New York denied a motion for summary judgment by the corporate stockholder. The
stockholder had argued that, as a matter of law, it could not be an
"owner or operator" under section 107(a)(2) because of its minority position. 67 In denying the motion, the court apparently ac65. Id. at 1203. United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp. 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991), affirmed a lower court decision holding
a parent corporation liable as an operator under CERCLA § 107(a)(2) without
regard to piercing the corporate veil. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in Kayser-Roth emphasized that stock ownership alone is not sufficient to impose
direct liability on a parent for its subsidiary's activities: "To be an operator requires more than merely complete ownership and the concomitant general authority or ability to control that comes with ownership. At a minimum it
requires active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary." Kayser-Roth, 910
F.2d at 27. The court did not address the plausibility of a corporate parent's
having complete ownership of and general authority over its subsidiary, yet refraining from active involvement in the subsidiary's activities. See also CPC Int'l,
Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., Nos. G89-10503 CA, G89-961 CA, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12143 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1991) (reasoning that the language of
CERCLA creates "new, middle ground" between traditional limited liability of
corporate stockholders and liability of certain stockholders as "operators" of
facility; also identifying factors to be considered in determining whether parent
is "operator"); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 352-54
(D.N.J. 1991) (reviewing history of capacity to control rule, and denying summary judgment motion by corporate parent); City of New York v. Exxon Corp.,
112 B.R. 540, 546-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying capacity to control rule in suit
concerning disposal of hazardous substances under CERCIA § 107(a)(3) and
(4), but modifying rule to require "active participation in and actual control over
the affairs of the subsidiary"), aff'd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991); Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,578, at 20,579
(D. Colo. 1987) (holding parent liable as operator because it was "intimately
involved in the management" of subsidiary), rev'd, 916 F.2d 1486. (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
66. 718 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
67. Id. at 157. The corporate stockholder in this case owned 49% of the
stock of the corporation that actually owned the facility, and argued that there
was no authority for imposing direct liability on a minority stockholder. Id. at
156. The government countered with two responses: that a minority stockholder could be liable under a direct liability rule, and that the facts of the case
would also justify piercing the corporate veil. Id.
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cepted the government's argument that evidence of the corporate
stockholders' "actual participation in the day-to-day operations of
[the corporation that actually owned the polluting facility] should
not be disregarded as a possible basis for CERCLA liability
merely because of the percentage of shares owned. ' 68 This evidence would also be relevant in determining liability under

69
NEPACCO I and Nicolet.

Thus, the capacity to control rule has undergone significant
expansion since its inception. It has evolved from a rule imposing
liability on individual officer/stockholders who had the capacity to
take specific actions directly related to the release of hazardous
substances to a rule under which even minority corporate stockholders who participated in the operations of a corporation could
be liable for environmental damages at a facility owned and operated by that corporation. The rule allows courts to impose liability on officers, directors and stockholders for actions taken in the
name of the corporation, even if such persons (or, in the case of
corporate stockholders, such entities) did not actively participate
in such actions.
The most fundamental problem with the capacity to control
rule is that it fails to respect the status of a corporation as a separate legal entity. A corporation can own property, act through its
officers and agents, and contract in its own name. 70 Its stockholders have an ownership interest in the corporation, but neither
they nor the corporation's officers or directors have any ownership rights in the corporation's assets. 7 ' Although a corporation
can operate a facility, it is only capable of acting by and through
68. Id. at 157. While the court recited the holdings of NEPACCO I and
Nicolt, it did not expressly adopt these as its rules. In denying the motion for
summary judgment and permitting discovery to proceed on the issue of the corporate stockholder's involvement in the operations of the facility owner, however, the court at least tacitly endorsed those opinions. See id.
69. See id
70. See 1 W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5, 11 (rev. ed. 1990).
71. Id. § 31 (earnings and profits of corporation belong to corporation itself and are not owed to stockholders until dividend declared); see also HENN &
ALEXANDER, LAWs OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 71 (3d
ed. 1983) (stockholders have limited control over assets of corporation, but do
not own such assets). In Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., No. S88-620,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15191 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 12, 1990), the court refused to
hold former stockholders of a corporation liable as "owners" of a facility under
§ 107(a)(2) of CERCLA with respect to property actually owned by the corporation. The court reasoned that nothing in the statute "even remotely suggests a
congressional intent to abrogate the common law of corporations by subjecting
stockholders to liability as the 'owners' of corporate property." Id. at *8.
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its officers. Their acts in performance of the business of the cor72
poration are the acts of the corporation itself.
The capacity to control rule, however, treats the officers as if
they were the operators under CERCLA, rather than individuals
acting on behalf of the corporate operators. This rule makes the
officers liable under section 107(a) of CERGLA without regard to
whether they have actively participated in the actions leading to
the release of hazardous substances. 73 The NEPACCO I court at-

tempted to justify equating employees of a corporate operator
with the corporate operator itself by resorting to language borrowed from another context.7 4 After quoting a passage from Apex
Oil Co. v. United States75 describing various powers and capabilities
of an "owner-operator," the NEPACCO I court reasoned that because the defendant officer/stockholder shared the same powers
and capacities, he must also be an owner or operator. 76
72. Transcontinental & W. Air v. Bank of Am. N. T. & S. A., 46 Cal. App.
2d 708, 713, 116 P.2d 791, 794 (1941) (defendant airline liable for employees'
withholding of proceeds of traveler's check sales); accord Silver Spring Dev.
Corp. v. Guertler, 257 Md. 291, 297, 262 A.2d 749, 753-54 (1970); (corporation
is placed on notice of all acts performed by its agents in furtherance of corporation's affairs); see also United States v. Chicago Express, Inc., 273 F.2d 751, 753
(7th Cir. 1960) (attributing acts of employee acting within scope of his employment to corporation for purposes of Interstate Commerce Commission
violation).
73. For a discussion of the "active participation" concept of direct liability
under federal and state common law, see infra notes 179-202 and accompanying

text.
74. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-49 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (vice-president/stockholder of corporation, with direct responsibility for supervision of
disposal site, equated with corporate operator; adopting language from case
construing WPCA), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
75. 530 F.2d 1291, 1293 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Mobil Oil
Corp. 464 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
76. The text of the quoted passage in NEPACCO I reads:
The owner-operator of a vessel or a vacility [sic] has the capacity to
make timely discovery of oil discharges. The owner-operator has
power to direct the activities of persons who control the mechanisms
causing the pollution. The owner-operator has the capacity to prevent
and abate damage. Accordingly, the owner-operator of a facility governed by the WPCA, such as the Mobil facility here, must be regarded
as a "person in charge" of the facility for the purposes of § 1161. A
more restrictive interpretation would frustrate congressional purpose
by exempting from the operation of the Act a large class of persons
who are uniquely qualified to assume the burden imposed by it.
NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Apey Oil, 530
F.2d at 1293).
The officer in NEPACCO I had the capacity to control disposal of waste at
the plant, the power to direct negotiations concerning disposal and the ability to
prevent and abate damage. Id. at 849. The court treated the term "owner-oper-
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The passage quoted from Apex Oil is taken well out of context. Apex Oil focused on the duty of a "person in charge" to give
notice required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(WPCA). 77 It was not a release liability provision like section
107 (a) of CERCLA. 78 Instead of deciding whether an individual
officer should be treated as an owner or operator, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Apex Oil started with the assumption that an individual officer or employee could be liable as a
"person in charge" for failure to give the required notice. The
issue was whether his or her corporate employer could also be
held liable. 79 Using the description of "owner-operator" referred
to above, the Apex Oil court concluded that an owner-operator is
"in charge" of a facility. Because a corporate owner could be a
"person" under the WPCA, the court held that it could also be a
"person in charge" responsible for giving the required notice.80
It is significant that the passage which the NEPACCO I court
quoted from Apex Oil did not define "owner-operator" under the
WPCA. It merely described some of the qualities that an owneroperator shares with a person who is "in charge" of a facility. 81
Nothing in the Apex Oil opinion suggested that an individual officer or other employee of a corporate owner-operator under the
ator" used in Apex Oil as identical to "owner or operator" in CERCLA. Id at
848-49.
77. 530 F.2d at 1292 (defendant corporation charged with violating WPCA
§ 311 (b)(5)). The Ape Oil court noted that 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (b)(4), referenced
in the Mobil Oil opinion, is the predecessor of WPCA § 311 (b)(5), and that the
language of each provision is identical. Apex Oil, 530 F.2d at 1293 n.3.
78. See Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil, supra note 25, at 963. ("It
should be noted, however, that the Mobil Oil court, in defining owner-operator
broadly, allocated responsibility to a corporation for reporting oil spills in contrast to the NEPACCO I court's imposition of individual liability for response
costs on a corporate officer.").
79. Apex Oil, 530 F.2d at 1292 (issue was whether corporation could be
"person in charge!' under § 311 (b)(5) of WPCA). It can be inferred, from one
of the Apex Oil court's arguments, that the individual employees were liable
under this part of the WPCA. The court noted that a separate provision of the
WPCA dealt with liability for prohibited discharges of oil and clearly covered
corporations. Id. at 1292-93. The court's goal was to prevent, by holding employer corporations directly liable for failure to give the required notice of any
such prohibited discharges, giving such corporations an incentive to discourage
individual employees from giving the required notice. Id. at 1293. Thus, the
Apex Oil court was trying to eliminate an inconsistency that would result within
the statute if individual employees, but not their corporate employers, were held
liable for failure to report discharges. Id.
80. Id. at 1293. But see United States v. Skil Corp., 351 F. Supp. 295, 299
(N.D. I1. 1972) (holding that only individual or natural person can be "person in
charge").
81. For the text of the quoted passage, see supra note 76.
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WPCA must be considered an owner-operator if he is "in charge"
of a facility. Yet the NEPACCO I court drew that precise
82
inference.
CERCLA draws a distinction between notice provisions and
liability provisions. Section 107 of CERCLA imposes liability on
certain persons, including owners and operators.85 Separate provisions in section 103 set forth the various notice requirements.8 4
The notice provisions expressly state that "any person in charge"
of a vessel or facility must notify the National Response Center as
soon as he has knowledge of any release of a hazardous substance
from such vessel or facility.8 5 A different notice was required,
within 180 days after the enactment of CERCLA on December 11,
1980, from "any person who owns or operates" a facility at which
hazardous substances were or had been located.8 6 This notice
has less immediacy than that required from "any person in
charge." The use of the terms "person in charge" and "owner
and operator" for separate notices suggests that Congress recognized a distinction between them. If Congress had intended
"owner and operator" to include both individual officers of a corporation as well as the corporation itself, it would have had no
reason to use the separate term "person in charge" for the more
pressing notice. Thus, it would be entirely consistent with the
statutory language to hold that the term "person in charge" includes corporations and their officers and employees, but that the
term "owner or operator" excludes such officers and employees.
The next major criticism of the "capacity to control" cases
focuses on the limited relationship required between the individual and the harm in order to establish liability for that harm.
Under the NEPACCO I test, an individual defendant was held liable because of his capacity to control disposal, direct negotiations
and prevent and abate damage, as well as his participation in the
management of the corporation.8 7 Later cases such as Carolawn
and Conservation Chemical relaxed this test even further by elimi82. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 848-49 (concluding that because defendant officer/stockholder had capacity to control and prevent corporation's hazardous waste disposal, he was liable under CERCLA § 107(a)(1) as owner and
operator). For a further discussion of the NEPACCO I court's definition of
owner-operator, see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
83. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
84. Id. § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603.
85. Id. § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
86. Id. § 103(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
87. NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. at 849 (defendant liable as "owner and operator" under § 107(a) of CERCLA).
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nating the requirement that the particular harm in question have
any relation to areas within such person's capacity to control.
These cases focused on the defendant's general participation in
the management of the facility, or even the management of the
corporation.8 8 By restricting the focus to the individual's relationship to overall management, however, this line of cases exposes to liability an extraordinary number of individuals who
would not ordinarily be thought culpable.8 9 Management of a
corporation, or even a facility, often keeps an officer busy with
numerous duties far removed from the precise activity that proximately caused the harmful release. Thus, a senior executive who
was diligent in managing a corporation, establishing sound and
cautious policies with respect to environmental matters and selecting capable subordinates for implementing those policies,
could still be held liable under this test. The executive's liability
would even extend to acts taken by subordinates without his
knowledge and in contravention of his policies. Carolawnand Conservation Chemical made no attempt to limit the liability of such persons. Yet it clearly seems unreasonable to expose a person in that
situation to the enormous liability of CERCLA cleanup costs. 9 0
88. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 416-17
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (focusing solely on number of visits defendant made to plant),
modified, 681 F. Supp. 1394 (W.D. Mo. 1988); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, at 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984) (utilizing operator test that solely noted defendant's responsibility for day-to-day operations,
not his participation in area of specific violations). Similarly, the "prevention"
test articulated in Kelley ex rel Natural Resources Commission v. ARGO Industries Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-20 (W.D. Mich. 1989) and Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1539-45 (W.D. Mich. 1989) requires an
examination of the defendant's position within the corporation with respect to
hazardous waste handling practices generally. By focusing on the defendant's
power and authority within the corporation, the court shifts attention away from
the relationship between the defendant and the harm that actually took place.
89. Cf Davidson, supra note 25, at 303 (Conservation Chemical "decision was
based on the actions of the owner that were no different than those of an owner
normally conducting the affairs of his business, such as supervision of construction, hiring and firing of employees, and generally running the business of his
corporation.").
90. But see Wallace, supra note 25, at 857. Professor Wallace argues that
there may be some justification for holding "non-participatory, but controlling,
officers, directors, and stockholders" liable for CERCLA violations under a direct liability theory on the grounds that
one of the most central features of their status within the corporation's
control involves the right and duty to actually operate the corporate
facilities. The statute's plain language, therefore, would appear to fix
liability on individuals for controlling and managing corporate operations generally rather than only for specific, active participation in tortious activities.
Id. (footnote omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

22

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991)

CERCLA LIABILITY

1389

The courts do not always appear conscious of the new

ground they are breaking by extending the liability of officers, directors and stockholders. For example, the court in Carolawn
cited both the holding in NEPACCO I that "a person who owns
interest in a facility and is actively participating in its management" may be liable under section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA and the
holding in United States v. Wadeg' that "[a] corporate officer may
be held liable if he personally participates in the wrongful, injuryproducing act." 9 2 In the next sentence, however, the Carolawn
court attempted to summarize the two holdings, and in the pro-

cess broke new ground in this area of law:
Thus, to the extent that an individual has control or authority over the activities of a facility from which hazardous substances are released or participates in the
management of such a facility, he may be held liable for
response costs incurred at the facility notwithstanding
93
the corporate character of the business.
Completely lost in the Carolawn court's restatement of the
NEPACCO I and Wade rules are the concepts of active participation in the management of the facility or personal participation in
the wrongful act that caused the damage. 9 4 Similarly, the court in
Conservation Chemical devoted a great deal of its opinion to establishing rules for direct liability derived from contemporary
CERCLA cases, 95 yet went through an analysis that in effect paralleled piercing the corporate veil. The court focused on the in91. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
92. Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700 (quoting
NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 848 and Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1341).
93. Id. Pursuant to its summary of the law, the Carolawn court denied judgment on the pleadings to two corporate officials without any proof of a connection between the defendants and the specific acts in question. Id.
94. See Wallace, supra note 25, at 860. Professor Wallace takes a harsher
view of the Carolawnopinion, treating the Carolawn court's decision as a restatement of the Wade opinion alone. Id. The Carolawn restatement is in fact much
closer to the NEPACCO I rule than it is to the holding in Wade, arguably extending liability to employees with general authority, and not necessarily requiring participation in the act that caused the harm. See Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700; see also United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739
F. Supp. 1030, 1038 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (stating rule that corporate officers may be
individually liable for corporate torts in which they have actively participated,
followed by list of factors allegedly indicative of such "activity": capacity to discover releases in reasonable time; power to direct mechanisms causing release;
and capacity to prevent and abate damages).
95. 628 F. Supp. at 419 (citing United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56
(D.N.H. 1984) and United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) to
establish CERCLA direct liability rule).
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volvement of the officer/majority stockholder in the operation
and decision making processes of the corporation, rather than on
his connection with the facility from which the hazardous substances were released. 96 These cases, which extend the liability of
individual officers, directors and stockholders while not always
recognizing the full consequences of this extension, have had a
significant impact.
b. Statutory Liability
The second rule of direct liability under CERCLA relies on
two points. First, subsections 107(a)(3) and (4) of CERCLA impose liability on any "person" who arranged for disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance or accepted a hazardous substance
for transport. 97 Second, the term "owner and operator" used in
subsections 107(a)(1) and (2) is defined elsewhere in the statute
to include "any person" who owns or operates a facility or vessel. 98 Since the definition of "person" in the statute includes individuals as well as corporations and other entities, 99 the
statutory liability rule affirms that officers, directors and stockholders are included within the scope of CERCLA liability.100
96. Id at 420; see Davidson, supra note 25, at 303-04. Mr. Davidson argued
that:
The focus of the [Conservation Chemical] court on these actions, as opposed to the issue of whether the actions of the owner were tortious,
provides a precedent that in essence equates the personal participation
in operating a corporation that owns contaminated property to conduct
sufficient to pierce the corporate veil when focusing on liability under
CERCLA, notwithstanding the fact that the court expressly disavowed
that it was basing liability on this theory.
Davidson, supra note 25, at 303-04. For a further discussion of liability based on
general control as opposed to liability based on participation in the specific act
that caused the harm, see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
97. CERCLA § 107(a)(3)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1988) (emphasis
added).
98. See id. § 107(a)(I)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(2) (imposing liability on
owners and operators of certain vessels and facilities); id. § 101(20)(A), 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A) (defining "owner or operator").
99. Id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). The definition of "person" covers
any "individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality,
commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id.
100. The statutory liability rule was articulated in substantially similar form
in the Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring to Assistant Administrator for Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, Associate Enforcement Counsel for Waste,
Regional Administrators and Regional Counsels (June 13, 1984), reprintedin AcQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD COMPANY 377 (PLI 1989) [hereinafter
EPA Memo]. The EPA Memo dealt only with the liability of stockholders, and for
some reason omitted reference to § 107(a)(l). Courts have adopted the statu-
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Under this rule, in its purest form, no showing of capacity to control, active participation in management or capacity to prevent
damage is required to impose liability. If the statutory liability
rule were carried to its logical conclusion, few officers, directors
or stockholders would escape liability once a hazardous substance
release was associated with their corporation. Perhaps in an effort to avoid such extensive liability, the CERCLA cases have not
attempted to predicate liability of individuals purely on the definition. 10 1 The Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring for the EPA, however, in a 1984 internal
memorandum (EPA Memo), did advocate extensive liability based
on the definition. Nevertheless, the EPA Memo remains the sole
02
advocate of the statutory liability rule in its strong form.'
The district court in NEPACCO I used a weaker version of this
rule to impose liability on one of the managing stockholders
under CERCLA section 107(a)(3) for arranging the disposal and
transport of hazardous substances.' 0 3 The court first noted that
the individual was a "person" as defined in the statute, and then,
to show that the term "person" could be applied to both the cortory liability rule, although not in the precise form advocated by the EPA Memo.
See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding owning stockholder liable as owner and operator); United States v.
Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, at 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984)
(holding individuals who were stockholders and officers liable as owners or
operators).
101. The Carolawn opinion combined the statutory rule of liability with the
holdings of NEPACCO I and Wade, resulting in a rule that imposes liability for
control or authority over activity of a facility from which a release has occurred,
or for participation in the management of such facility. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 20,700.
The Shore Realty court used a combination of the "indicia of ownership" rule
and the statutory rule. See 759 F.2d at 1052. For a discussion of the indicia of
ownership rule, see infra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
102. The EPA Memo recognized that courts often attempt to preserve some
part of the doctrine of limited liability. EPA Memo, supra note 100, at 379-80.
Nevertheless, the memo concluded:
The (Environmental Protection] Agency should rely upon the statutory language of the Act as the basis for imposing liability on any person who controlled or directed the activities of a hazardous waste
facility immediately prior to abandonment, or on any person who is a
generator or transporter, notwithstanding the fact that that individual is
a stockholder.
Id. at 386.
103. 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). The NEPACCO I
court treated liability under CERCLA § 107(a)(3) as distinct from liability under
§ 107(a)(1), which was based on the capacity to control rule. For a further discussion of the NEPACCO I decision, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
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poration and its individual employees, borrowed the definition of
"person-in-charge" previously adopted in Apex Oil Co. v. United
States I0 4 in connection with the WPCA. 05 Although the
NEPACCO I court noted that the Apex Oil case dealt with a different issue, it concluded that the analysis in Apex Oil was relevant,
and that section 107 of CERCLA should be liberally interpreted
to include both the corporation and an employee. 06 The defendant vice-president was responsible for arranging, and did arrange,
the disposal of hazardous substances. He was therefore held
liable.107
The EPA Memo and NEPACCO I both rely on expansive readings of key terms defined and used in CERCLA to extend the
reach of the statute. This kind of attempt to impose direct liability on officers, directors and stockholders by broadly interpreting
the language of a statute is of course not a new development in
the law. 108 Statutory interpretation takes place against a back104. 530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). TheApex Oil
decision concerned the liability of a corporation under WPCA § 311(b)(5),
which required that "any person in charge" of certain facilities give notice of oil
spills to the federal government. 530 F.2d at 1292-95.
105. NEPA CCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 847-49. The Apex Oil court had determined that corporations, as well as individuals, can be "persons in charge" and
therefore be held liable for failure to give the requisite notice. Apex Oil, 530 F.2d
at 1293.
106. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 848. In Apex Oil, the issue was whether
the WPCA, which was acknowledged to apply to individuals, also applied to corporate employers of those individuals. Apex Oil, 530 F.2d at 1292. NEPA CCO I
dealt with the opposite, but still similar, issue: whether § 107(a) of CERCLA,
which clearly applied to corporations, also applied to individual employees of
those corporations. NEPACCO 1, 579 F. Supp. at 848.
107. 579 F. Supp. at 848; cf. United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 894
(E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that "[a] corporate officer of a company who exercises
authority for the company's operations and participates in arranging for the disposal of hazardous wastes is liable under § 107(a)(3) for cleanup costs").
108. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-65 (1944) (interpreting provisions of National Bank Act regarding "double liability" of bank stockholders to apply to stockholders of bank holding company as well). Broad
statutory interpretation also serves to impose criminal liability on individual corporate officers for corporate, violations under certain statutes regulating the
processing and distribution of food or drugs, where such officers had a "responsible relation" to the act or acts constituting the violation. A "responsible relation" is established if the defendant, by reason of his position, had the
responsibility and authority either to prevent the instance, or later correct it.
The fact that such officers had no awareness of wrong doing does not exonerate
them. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (defendant who was generally responsible for sanitation and had received warning letter from Federal
Drug Administration found liable); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
281 (1943) (president and general manager liable for misbranding drugs);
United States v. New England Grocers Supply Co., 488 F. Supp. 230, 232-37 (D.
Mass. 1980) (defendant was not liable solely because of position, but rather because of "responsible relation"). For a general discussion of statutory interpre-
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ground of state laws, however, including the laws of limited liability. Although Congress has the authority to override state laws if
it wishes, state laws remain controlling in the absence of congressional action.109 In the case of CERCLA, however, the interpretations in the EPA Memo and NEPACCO I distort beyond recognition
traditional notions of corporate law in areas in which Congress
has elected to remain silent.
It is true that CERCLA imposes liability on any "person"
who has committed certain specified acts or who is an "owner or
operator" as defined in the statute. It is also true that the term
"person" is defined to include individuals as well as corporations.110 From these two propositions, the EPA Memo and
NEPACCO I each conclude that CERCLA liability may be fixed on
individual officers, directors and stockholders. The more logical
inference from these propositions, however, is that liability will be
imposed on the owners and operators of vessels and facilities and
the other perpetrators of the proscribed acts, regardless of
whether such owners and operators or perpetrators are individuals or corporations. This inference would be consistent with
traditional corporate law, under which a corporation, even
though acting through its officers, is still a distinct entity in whose
name the acts are done."' The interpretations suggested in the
EPA Memo and NEPACCO I, on the other hand, ignore the separate entity structure of the corporation developed in the corporate common law. Instead, these interpretations sweep in
persons who were acting for and at the direction of an employer.
tation as a basis for imposing liability on officers, directors and stockholders, see

P.

BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS OF PARENT AND SUB-

SIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAw

OF

GENERAL APPLICATION

(1989).

109. DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877, 880 (1st Cir.
1987) ("TIThe principle of limited liability for corporate debts is longstanding
enough and important enough to be considered a background norm, against
which Congress may act of course, but which is controlling in the absence of
such action."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1064 (1988); see also Mishkin, The Variousness
of "FederalLaw " Competence and Discretionin the Choice of Nationaland State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 810-14 (1957) ("Congress legislates against a
background of existing state law"). But see Note, Piercing the CorporateLaw Veil:
The Alter Ego Doctrine Under FederalCommon Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1982)
(arguing that "automatic application of state law in the absence of express statutory guidelines ignores legal realities," because, despite presumptions to the
contrary, Congress may not fully comprehend overall relationship between federal and state law when it passes new legislation).
110. For a further discussion of the scope of CERCLA liability, see supra
notes 9-13 and accompanying text. For a statutory definition of"person" under
CERCLA, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
111. For a further discussion of corporate liability under CERCLA, see
supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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Yet nothing in the CERCLA statute or its legislative history indicates any congressional intent to override the well-established
2
common law separation of the corporation and its agents."
There is no evidence of any federal policy concerning the liability
3
of officers, directors or stockholders under CERCLA."
A closely analogous argument to that offered in the EPA
112. One commentator has suggested that certain language in the
CERCLA statute indicates that Congress drew a distinction between "persons"

and officers. Quoting from 49 U.S.C. § 11901(h) (1976), which refers to "a person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II... of this
title, or an officer, agent or employee of that person," the commentator concludes that "[t]his language suggests that Congress in drafting CERCLA may
have viewed a person as not necessarily including an officer." Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil, supra note 25, at 956.
113. In this respect, the cases concerning liability under banking and food
and drug statutes are distinguishable. For a further discussion of these cases,
see supra note 108. The statute in Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944),
specifically imposed liability on stockholders of banks in an amount equal to the
par or stated value of the stock held by such stockholders. 12 U.S.C. §§ 63-64
(1935), repealed by Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-230, § 7, 73 Stat. 457.
The issue in Anderson was whether stockholders of a holding company, which was
the actual owner of the bank's stock, should be liable for this "double liability."
321 U.S. at 361-65. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, holding that "(tlo allow this holding company device to succeed would be to put the policy of double liability at the mercy of
corporation finance." Id. at 363. The Court held that while state laws of limited
liability were enforceable in federal courts, state law would not be permitted to
defeat the federal policy concerning national banks that Congress had announced. Id. at 365.
Unlike the statute in Anderson, CERCLA contains no provision that expressly
purports to hold any stockholders liable. Since no federal policy concerning the
liability of officers, directors or stockholders has been announced in the
CERCLA statute, the holding in Anderson is inapposite. Cf Seymour v. Hull &
Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing Anderson on grounds that federal labor laws in question did not expressly mandate
individual liability like statute in Anderson).
Similarly, the statute under which liability was imposed in United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), had, prior to amendment in 1938, specifically
provided for liability of "any officer, agent, or other person acting for or employed by any corporation." 21 U.S.C. § 4, repealed by Act ofJune 25, 1938, ch.
675, § 9 02 (a), 52 Stat. 1059. The Supreme Court noted this fact, stating that the
later legislation was intended to tighten the existing law, rather than to weaken
it. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281-82. On the basis of this historical review of the
statute, together with consideration of "safeguarding the public welfare," the
Court reversed the Second Circuit and upheld the conviction of the president of
the corporation. Id. at 285.
In contrast, CERCLA has no comparable legislative history. Because the
statute in Dotterweich was a criminal statute, its general force in matters of civil
liability is questionable. Because it had an ascertainable federal policy concerning the liability of corporate officers, its impact on CERCLA liability is negligible. But see Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil, supra note 25, at 954-57
(arguing that Dollerweich strongly supports the expansive definition of "person"
in NEPACCO I, because Dotterweich interpreted criminal statute, which requires
higher demand for specificity regarding liability than civil statute).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

28

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1395

CERCLA LIABILITY

1991]

Memo has been raised and rejected in several cases concerning
liability under Title 1 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 114 Section 515 of ERISA imposes liability for contributions
to multi-employer plans on an
''
"temployer.

In several cases, plaintiffs attempting to recover

from officers and stockholders of corporations for delinquent
contributions have pointed to the definition of "employer" in the
ERISA statute. "Employer" is defined as "any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer,
in relation to an employee benefit plan." 11 6 The plaintiffs have
then argued that because the word "person" is defined to include
both individuals and corporations, Congress intended that any officer or stockholder who was involved in corporate decisions regarding payment of pension contributions fall within the scope of
employer liability for delinquent contributions. 11 7 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in InternationalBrotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Union v. George A. Kracher, Inc.118
rejected this argument squarely:
Only the corporation, as signatory to the agreement, fits
within the parameters of Section 515 as the "employer
who is obligated to make contributions .

.

. under the

terms of" either the plan or the agreement. Nor do the
statutory definitions of "employer" and "person" supply
the necessary link between liability and Kracher individually. It cannot be said that a corporate official is a "person acting directly as an employer." It is hornbook law
that a corporate employee functioning purely as such
acts not as but solelyfor the corporate employer; the corporation acts as the employer it is, though it can do so
only through the agency of the employee or someone
else.119
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
115. Id § 1145 (1988).

116. Id. § 1002(5).
117. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1989)
(granting sole stockholder's motion for summary judgment by rejecting argument that corporate officers were liable for delinquent contributions); International Bd. of Painters and Allied Trades Union v. George A. Kracher, Inc., 856
F.2d 1546, 1547 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (arguing that chief corporate officer/sole
stockholder should be held personally liable as employer; court held that only
corporation could be "employer").
118. 856 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

119. Id. at 1548.
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The court went on to explain that under the plaintiff's interpretation of the statute, which included within the definition of "employer" any person who acted indirectly on behalf of the
corporation, "every employee or other agent who discharges
some responsibility in regard to a corporation's employee benefit
plan would be swept within the definition and thereby become an
'employer' subject to liability for delinquent contributions. Obvi1 20
ously Congress did not contemplate that."
The Kracherholding is consistent with and has been followed
by numerous decisions in other circuits. 121 Rather than create a
new, extensive form of liability for officers, directors and stockholders, the courts have (notwithstanding the remedial nature of
ERISA) restricted the liability of such individuals under ERISA to
22
the more traditional avenues. 1
The attempt to hold a corporate official liable under
CERCLA simply on the basis of the definition of the term "per120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Plumbers' Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d
1297, 1301-02 (7th Cir. 1989) (former president and secretary held not personally liable for corporation's failure to make contribution), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
2169 (1990); Scarbrough, 870 F.2d 1079 at 1083-84 (sole stockholder/chief executive of parent corporation could not be held personally liable for bankrupt subsidiary's unpaid contribution); Massachusetts Laborers' Health & Welfare Fund
v. Starrett Paving Corp., 845 F.2d 23, 24-26 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Although Starrett's
corporation may have been 'obligated' to make the contributions, Starrett personally was not."); Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d 352, 353-55 (3d Cir. 1985)
("There is no indication that Congress intended to expose corporate officers to
liability .... ); Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust v. Reed, 726 F.2d 513, 515 (9th
Cir. 1984) (by incorporating business, majority stockholder/chief executive officer avoids liability for trust fund contribution obligations). But see Massachusetts State Carpenters Pension Fund v. Atlantic Diving Co., 635 F. Supp. 9, 1314 (D. Mass. 1984) (relying on interpretation of Fair Labor Standards Act in
holding that controlling stockholder or officer may be liable as "employer"); cf.
Dardaganis v. Grace Capital Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming liability of individual who was pres.ident and chief executive officer of
corporation engaged as investment advisor for pension fund, where he violated
terms of written agreement by investing more than 507 of assets of benefit plan
in common stock).
122. See, e.g., Niedrich, 891 F.2d at 1302. The Niedrich court stated: "Corporate officers who are not parties to a pension plan or a collective bargaining
agreement requiring contributions to a pension plan are personally liable for
pension contributions only to the extent they are liable for general corporate
debts under state corporate law." Id.
Unlike the CERCLA cases, in which the liability of the officers and directors
is usually under a tort theory, ERISA cases are usually framed as an action on a
debt. Because the doctrine that imposes liability on corporate officers for torts
in which they actually participated has no application to actions on debts, corporate officers who were not liable for ERISA contributions under this "person"
theory completely escaped liability. Even though the courts had even more incentive to hold the individual officer liable under ERISA in order to make the
statute work, they declined to make new federal law in this area.
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son" in the statute is just as inappropriate as it would be under
ERISA. By creating such an expansive reading of the liability provisions of CERCLA, a broad range of officers, directors and employees could be swept within the definition and subjected to
liability for cleanup costs. In the absence of any standards for
singling out those individuals who might have some significant
relationship to the harm that was done, the statutory rule would
apply to many individuals who were only remotely connected with
the release of hazardous substances but who otherwise were able
to act on behalf of the corporation. Congress gave no indication
that it contemplated creating such a broad range of liability.
A second argument against the EPA interpretation takes the
form of a reductio ad absurdum. The term "person," as defined in
CERCLA, refers not only to individuals and corporations, but
also to, inter alia, the United States government, the fifty states
and all political subdivisions of the states. 125 Under the EPA
Memo, it follows that if a troubled facility were federal property,
direct liability could be imposed on the President of the United

States (or perhaps his designee at the Environmental Protection
Agency) as easily as it could be imposed on the president of a
responsible corporation.12 4 Likewise, the governor of a state or
the mayor of a city could be liable for releases on property owned
by the "person" under his control. These public officials are certainly individuals, and therefore fall within the definition of "person." Yet the idea of holding such individuals personally liable
for releases of hazardous substances on public land seems preposterous. 125 Such liability would follow, however, under the
123. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988).
124. For the purposes of this hypothetical, it is assumed that sovereign immunity and other similar defenses would not be applicable. It should be noted
that CERCLA contains express provisions applicable to both federal facilities
and states. See, e.g., id. § 120(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) ("Each department
agency and instrumentality of the United States ...shall be subject to and comply with, this Act... as any nongovernmental entity ....");id. § 104(c)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (outlining actions required of states before President provides remedial actions); see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 42-44
(1989) (holding that state could be liable for monetary damages under § 107(a)
of CERCLA and that defense of sovereign immunity does not bar such claims);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985) (noting that
while United States Army could not be both plaintiff and defendant in CERCLA
lawsuit, it could be liable under subsections 107(a) and (g)).
125. Of course, if such individuals personally participated in actions leading to the release of hazardous substances, personal liability is far less outrageous. In that case, however, traditional rules of tort liability for corporate
officers would apply. For a further discussion of the traditional rules of direct
liability for corporate officers, see infra notes 179-202 and accompanying text.
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logic of the EPA Memo.
The NEPACCO I court attempted to establish the link between "person" and individual officers, directors and stockholders by appealing to the definition of "person-in-charge" used by
the Eighth Circuit in Apex Oil.126 As discussed in the context of
the capacity to control rule, however, the Apex Oil decision is factually distinguishable from CERCLA liability cases.' 127 Thus, Apex
Oil does not provide persuasive authority for imposing CERCLA
or
on
individual
officers,
directors
release
liability

stockholders. 128
Reliance on the definition of the term "person" to impose
liability on officers, directors and stockholders, as suggested in
the EPA Memo and in NEPACCO I, would turn traditional state
corporate law on its head, and would capture within the nets of
CERCLA liability a great number of persons who do not belong
there. Similar attempts have been consistently rejected in ERISA
actions, for reasons that are also persuasive in the CERCLA context. Therefore, the statutory rule of liability appears to be an
unwarranted and unwise invention of the federal courts in the
CERCLA cases, without foundation in the statute or other common law precedent.
c.

Indicia of Ownership

The third variation of direct liability in environmental cases
is, like the statutory liability rule, based on language in the statutory definition of "owner or operator." This rule is most clearly
stated in New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 129 After first mentioning
126. NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aft'd in part,

rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
127. For a discussion of the factual dissimilarity between NEPACCO I and
Apex Oil, see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
128. But see Comment, Dissolving the CorporateVeil, supra note 25, at 955. The
commentator argued that in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), which imposed criminal
liability on a corporate officer under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, "there is
strong support for the broad interpretation of the CERCLA definition of 'person' made by the NEPACCO court particularly in light of Congress' obvious intent to use CERCLA as a device to expand the 'web' of liability for hazardous
waste problems." Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil, supra note 25, at 955.
129. 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985). This theory is also mentioned in
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I. 1989), aft'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); United States v.
Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, at 20,700 (D.S.C. 1984);
NEPA CCO I, 579 F. Supp. at 848.
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the statutory theory just discussed, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reasoned as follows:
More important, the definition of "owner or operator"
excludes "a person who, without participating in the
management of a... facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect his security interest in the facility."
The use of the exception implies that an owning stockholder who manages the corporation, such as [the defendant], is liable under CERCLA as an "owner or
130
operator."
Under this rule, the existence of an exception to liability for those
who hold liens or security interests in troubled facilities without
participating in management creates the possibility of liability for
other individuals who are involved in the management of the cor31
poration that owns the facility.'
The "indicia of ownership" rule of direct liability has been
criticized for seemingly transforming an express statutory exception to liability for lenders into a new avenue of liability. The provision in question excludes from the definition of "owner or
operator" those persons who hold an "indicia of ownership" in a
facility implicated in hazardous substance damage primarily to
protect a security interest therein, but who do not participate in
the management of such facility.' 3 2 As several commentators
point out, this exception was created for the purpose of exempting from liability lenders who hold liens on property.' 3 3
By deriving from the express terms of this exception a hold130. 759 F.2d at 1052 (citation omitted) (quoting CERCLA § 101(20)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988)). Similarly, the NEPACCO I court, after citing

the same statutory definition, stated that "[t]he statute literally reads that a person who owns interest in a facility and is actively participating in its management
can be held liable for the disposal of hazardous waste." 579 F. Supp. at 848.
131. Courts have generally concluded that the exemption from liability
(found in Section 101(20) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)] gives rise

to an inference that an individual who owns stock in a cororation and
who actively participates in its management can be held liable for
cleanup costs incurred as a result of improper disposal by the
corporation.
United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Mirabile, No. 842280, slip op. at 4-5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)).

132. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1988).
133. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 25, at 853. One commentator identified a
committee report as support for criticism of the "indicia of ownership" rule:
Language in a committee report that accompanied proposed legislation
that gave rise to CERCLA suggests the exclusionary language was inserted to protect certain financial institutions and, consequently, it
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ing that a stockholder who manages the corporation that owns
such a facility is liable for cleanup damages on that property,
courts have made a serious logical error. They have mistakenly
concluded that because the statute exempts a person who does
not participate in management, it must therefore include all persons who do so participate regardless of whether they are in fact
owners or operators or otherwise actively involved in the release
of hazardous substances.1 3 4 CERCLA specifies that persons who
own or operate facilities may be liable under certain conditions.
The fact that the statute contains an exception for certain nonparticipating persons who have a recognized legal interest in such
property is not evidence that persons who have no recognized
legal interests in such properties, but who do participate in the
management thereof, should be made liable.
2.

Indirect Liability: Disregardingthe CorporateEntity

In addition to direct liability, stockholders of corporations
face CERCLA liability under one or more theories loosely
grouped under the heading of "piercing the corporate veil." Not
surprisingly, courts imposing derivative liability under CERCLA
have established several different variations of piercing the corporate veil. Despite this diversity, each of the rules has been alleged
to be an accurate reflection of the modem federal common law
practice of piercing the corporate veil.
a.

Ownership Interest and Control

One rule for the liability of parent corporations' 35 under
CERCLA was created in United States v. Nicolet, Inc. 136 After determining that federal law, rather than state law, governed the issue,
could be viewed as having no applicability to determination of individual liability.
Comment, Dissolving the Corporate Veil, supra note 25, at 966 (footnote omitted).

134. "The language should be construed as a simple statement that a certain category of persons shall be excluded from liability under the statute. It
should not be tortured into a sweeping, general rule merely because of
CERCLA's fundamentally expansive policy regarding who should be included."
Wallace, supra note 25, at 853.
135. For the most part, piercing the corporate veil under CERCLA has occurred in parent-subsidiary cases, rather than in instances involving individual
stockholders. One explanation may be that it is easier to impose liability on
individual stockholders under direct liability rules. In any event, there is nothing in any of the corporate veil cases to suggest that an individual stockholder
could not be held liable under a piercing the corporate veil rule.
136. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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the district court drew the following rule from its understanding
of the federal common law on piercing the corporate veil:
Where a subsidiary is or was at the relevant time a member of one of the classes of persons potentially liable
under CERCLA; and the parent had a substantial financial or ownership interest in the subsidiary; and the parent corporation controls or at the relevant time
controlled the management and operations of the subsidiary, the parent's separate corporate existence may be
disregarded.137

The court then used this rule to reject the defendant's motion to
dismiss the United States' claim, noting that: the defendant corporate parent was the sole stockholder of the corporation that
owned the waste disposal site from which the hazardous substance had been released; the parent had actively participated in
the management of the operation of the site; it was familiar with
the waste disposal practices at the site and had the capacity to
control the disposal and resulting releases and to abate the damage from such releases; and finally, it had benefitted from the
waste disposal practices.' 38
Despite claims in the Nicolet opinion that piercing the corporate veil was consistent with and followed from existing federal
common law, the rule set forth in that opinion was in fact a departure from existing law. 139 The court claimed that the rule it was
establishing with respect to piercing the corporate veil was
"[biased upon federal common law regarding alter ego liability."' 40 A review of the cases cited by the court, however, reveals
only one case that even remotely supports the Nicolet holding:
137. Id. at 1202. The court opined that it was possible to develop such a
rule: "There are a sufficient number of federal holdings dealing with alter ego
liability that one can decipher a 'sort of generalized federal substantive law on
disregard of corporate entity.'" Id. (quoting Seymour v. Hull & Moreland
Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979)). The court then reasoned that such
federal common law is derived from the general principle that "the appropriate
occasion for disregarding the corporate existence occurs when the court must
prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a crime." Id.
(quoting American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886
(3d Cir. 1984)).
138. Id. The court noted that these allegations would meet the criteria of
the federal rule on piercing the corporate veil that the court had adopted. Id.
139. For a discussion of the existing federal common law in non-CERGLA
contexts, see infra notes 203-73 and accompanying text.
140. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202.
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Berkowitz v. Allied Stores of Penn-Ohio, Inc. t41 Berkowitz was authored
by the same judge who wrote the Nicolet opinion.1 42 The other

cited cases generally require a much higher degree of control by
the parent or stockholder over the subsidiary before the veil may
14 3
be pierced.
The Nicolet court also stated that a similar rule had been
adopted in Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co. 144 A close look at Bunker Hill,
however, reveals some startling differences. First, the court in
Bunker Hill does not appear to have even attempted to pierce the
corporate veil. It imposed liability on a corporate parent as an
operator under section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA, using language
that strongly suggests direct liability, not liability based on disregarding the corporate entity.145 In fact, the court in Bunker Hill
used alternative bases for establishing that the corporate parent
was an owner or operator under CERCLA. In the first instance, it
referred to the analysis used by the court in establishing personal
jurisdiction over the parent, and ruled that the same facts supported the conclusion that the parent was an owner or operator
under CERCLA. 14 6 The Bunker Hill court then found sufficient

evidence to support liability of the parent under the definition of
141. 541 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Berkowitz held that where the parent and subsidiary have acted jointly or where the subsidiary has acted as an
extension of the parent, subject to its knowledge and involvement, the court may
disregard the parent's separate corporate existence. Id. at 1215. In addition to
Berkowitz and American Bell, the Nicolet court cited Parker v. Bell Asbestos Mines,
Ltd., 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1399 (E.D. Pa. 1985), vacated, 838 F.2d 462 (3d Cir.
1987) and Publicker Industries v. Roman Ceramics, 603 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir.
1979).
142. Raymond J. Broderick, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, authored both Berkowitz and Nicolet.
143. American Bell, 736 F.2d at 886-87 (requirements for piercing the corporate veil are "demanding ones" requiring "specific, unusual circumstances";
"[t]here is no policy of federal labor law, either legislative or judge-made, that a
parent corporation is bound by its subsidiary's labor contracts simply because it
controls the subsidiary's stock and participates in the subsidiary's management"); PublickerIndus., 603 F.2d at 1069-70 (vacating judgment of district court
on piercing the corporate veil issue for lack of findings on perpetration of fraud,
illegality or injustice; not discussing issue of control); Parker, 607 F. Supp. at
1399 (that corporate entity has essentially no mind of its own is not enough
alone; "must also be showing that corporate entity is being used to 'defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime'" (quoting Sams v.
Redev. Auth., 431 Pa. 240, 244, 244 A.2d 779, 781 (1968)).
144. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202 (citing Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986)).
145. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 671-72 ("Defendant Gulf was in a position
to be, and was, intimately familiar with hazardous waste disposal and releases at
the Bunker Hill facility ....").
146. Id. at 671. The court agreed that the analysis with respect to the parent corporation's involvement in the management and operations of the subsidi-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

36

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991]

CERCLA

LIABILIY

1403

"9owner or operator" in NEPACCO 1.147 Both of these bases, however, relate to direct liability and are significantly different from
148
piercing the corporate veil.
Bunker Hill is also distinguishable from Nicolet in a more significant way. The court in Bunker Hill relied heavily on the parent's domination over the subsidiary to justify imposing liability
on the parent. Among other things, the Bunker Hill court noted
the tight limits established by the parent on pollution expenditures; the great disparity between the subsidiary's capitalization
and the amount the parent received in dividends; the required
approval by the parent of the subsidiary's capital expenditures;
and the parent's right to veto all of the subsidiary's management

decisions. 149
The kind of control and domination of a subsidiary by the
parent found in Bunker Hill is in stark contrast to Nicolet's requirements for ignoring the parent's corporate existence. Nicolet's requirements were that the subsidiary at the relevant time have
been a member of the class of persons potentially liable under
CERCLA, that the parent have a substantial financial or ownership interest in the subsidiary and that the parent control the
management and operations of the subsidiary.15 0 To the extent
that Bunker Hill supports any rule of liability, it would be a far
more narrowly limited rule than that articulated in Nicolet.
ary supported the conclusion that the parent was an owner or operator for
purposes of CERCLA liability. Id.

147. Id. at 671-72. The court stated that the parent was intimately familiar
with hazardous waste disposal and releases at the subsidiary; had the capacity to
control such disposal and releases; and had the capacity to make decisions and
implement actions and mechanisms to prevent and abate the damage caused by
the disposal and releases of hazardous wastes at the subsidiary's facility. Id. at
672. For a further discussion of the NEPACCO I court's definition of owner or
operator, see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
148. The Bunker Hill court never explicitly stated that it was applying a direct liability theory rather than piercing the corporate veil. Such intent may be
inferred, however, from the court's reliance upon the "more precise definition
of owner or operator" that it utilized from the NEPACCO I opinion. Id. at 671.
The Bunker Hill court adopted and applied the NEPACCO I test, thus making the
language relating to control factors (on which the Nicolet court later relied) dicta,
at best.
149. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 672. The Bunker Hill court did add a caveat
to its holding: "[I]n adopting the above test, care must taken so that 'normal'
activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically warrant
finding the parent an owner or operator." Id. The court held that in the case at
bar, however, allowing the parent to escape liability would frustrate the purpose
of CERCLA. Id.
150. United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa.
1989).
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The Nicolet opinion thus represents a broadening of the traditional federal law of piercing the corporate veil. It puts at risk a
large number of corporate stockholders that had not engaged in
the type of control or domination that previous decisions in other
areas of the federal common law had required.
b.

Public Convenience, Fairness and Equity

A second variation on piercing the corporate veil in CERCLA
cases is based on the general principle that "a corporate entity
may be disregarded in the interests of public convenience, fairness and equity."' 5 1 The District Court for the District of Massachusetts in In re Acushnet River & New Bedford HarborProceedings re
Alleged PCB Pollution' 5 2 (In re Acushnet River) noted that this principle was not much help in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in a particular case.15 3 Accordingly, the court
described the various factors articulated by other courts in piercing decisions:
The factors include, in approximate descending order of
importance, (1) inadequate capitalization in light of the
purposes for which the corporation was organized,
(2) extensive or pervasive control by the shareholder or
shareholders, (3) intermingling of the corporation's
properties or accounts with those of its owner, (4) failure to observe corporate formalities and separateness,
(5) siphoning of funds from the corporation, (6) absence of corporate records, and (7) non-functioning of15 4
ficers or directors.
The court also observed that no single factor was either necessary
or sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, and added that the policies underlying CERCLA would be important in determining the
emphasis that a court should place on each of the various
151. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987) (hereinafter In re Acushnet
River] (quoting Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir.
1981)). This rule, like the rule developed in Nicolet concerning ownership, arises
from the "sort of generalized federal substantive law on disregard of corporate
entity." Id. at 33; see also EPA Memo, supra note 100, at 9.

152. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
153. Id. at 33.
154. Id- Courts had developed these factors to give some guidance about
what level of interest in public convenience, fairness and equity would suffice to
pierce the corporate veil. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

38

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991]

CERCLA LIABILITY

1405

factors. 155
156
The district court in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.
adopted the general rule and the seven factors described in In re
Acushnet River. The Kayser-Roth court then increased the likelihood that stockholders would be held liable by concluding that
"CERCLA places no special importance upon the corporate
structure."' 5 7 Focusing on the purposes of the statute, the court
held that an expansive reading of CERCLA was necessary to
avoid frustrating the twin goals of providing for a prompt and
effective response to hazardous substance disposal, and forcing
58
those responsible for releases to bear the costs of the cleanup.'
Having thus liberalized the standard, the Kayser-Roth court held
the defendant's corporate parent liable on the basis of the "overwhelming pervasive control" it had exerted over its subsidiary. 59
The general principle that the corporate entity may be disre-

155. Id. In the case at bar, the court expressly rejected the government's
contention that every sole stockholder who incorporated for the purpose of limiting liability should be held liable under CERCLA. The court instead looked at
the facts of the case in light of the rule and factors it had articulated. It concluded that although the parent and subsidiary had a centralized cash management system, there was sufficient evidence that the parent "respected the
separateness" of the subsidiary to preclude piercing the corporate veil. Id. at
34-35.
156. 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), aft'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), crt.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
157. Id. at 23-24. The court began with the proposition that "federal
courts will look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to determine
whether the statute places importance on the corporate form ...an inquiry that
usually gives less respect to the corporate form than does the strict common law
alter ego doctrine ...." Id. at 23 (quoting Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1986)).
158. Id. at 23-24. The court in United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615
(D.N.H. 1988), Jad earlier reached a similar conclusion. The Mottolo court held
that the goal of making those responsible for the hazardous substance release
problems bear the responsibility for and cost of the cleanup would not be carried out effectively if liability could be avoided merely through incorporation.
Id. at 624.
Furthermore, the absence of explicit statutory language addressing the
effect of incorporation, the Act's strict liability scheme, and the broad
and encompassing categories of potentially responsible parties ineluctably lead the Court to the conclusion that CERCLA places no importance on the corporate form.
Id.
159. 724 F. Supp. at 24. The court cited the parent's control over environmental matters of the subsidiary, its policy of requiring prior approval for capital
expenditures in excess of $5,000, its tight control over the subsidiary's income
and expenses, the presence of the parent's personnel on the subsidiary's board
of directors, its limitation on the decision-making authority of the subsidiary's
executives and its "overwhelming" control over the subsidiary's financial and
operational structure. Id.
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garded in the interest of public convenience, fairness and equity,
in contrast to the Nicolet rule, has a respectable tradition in federal
common law. 160 The origin of this tradition, however, is not consistent with the way in which the rule was used in Kayser-Roth.
In Kayser-Roth, the court saw this rule as a way to lower the
standards that might otherwise be required for piercing the corporate veil. 161 The court quoted the First Circuit: "[F]ederal
courts will look closely at the purpose of the federal statute to
determine whether the statute places importance on the corporate form... an inquiry that usually gives less respect to the corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine
.....

162

The ultimate authority for this quote is CapitalTelephone

Co. v. FCC. 163 A look at Capital Telephone, however, shows that the
court was engaged in an entirely different type of analysis.
Capital Telephone involved an. appeal from a decision by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which had denied
the plaintiff's application for authority to construct and operate a
radio paging station. 64 Of the four applicants for the two available channels, one was a corporation that was wholly owned by an

individual who was an applicant for the other channel. The FCC
treated the individual and his wholly-owned corporation as a single applicant, and granted the individual's application while deny160. This general principle is of limited usefulness, however, unless it is
supplemented by a summary of factors "which, when viewed together, sharpen
the focus of the inquiry." In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass.
1987). Unfortunately, not all courts have been so circumspect. The court in
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910
F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991), found that it did not
need to give a great deal of respect to strict common law alter ego doctrine
because of the remedial purposes that underlie CERCLA. Id. at 22-23. The
obvious problem with the Kayser-Roth reasoning, however, is that CERCIA's remedial purposes can be used to justify liability in almost any situation. By speaking in vague terms, and by emphasizing the remedial purposes of the statute,
courts can easily twist this test to pierce the veil regardless of how much control
the parent or stockholder had over the subsidiary. For a further discussion of
the federal common law rule of ignoring the corporate entity in the interest of
fairness, convenience and equity, see infra notes 207, 211, 213, 217 and accompanying text.
161. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23-24 (stating that CERCLA provisions
should be viewed expansively, to avoid frustrating the congressional purposes,
and concluding that "CERCLA places no special importance upon the corporate
structure"); accord United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H.
1988); EPA Memo, supra note 100, at 9.
162. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23 (quoting Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1986)).
163. 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
164. Id. at 735.
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ing that of the wholly-owned corporation. 165 The plaintiff argued
that there had not been a sufficient showing to justify piercing the
corporate veil. 166 The appellate court responded that the traditional piercing the corporate veil analysis was not applicable in
this case:
[W]e need not pause to consider whether [the corporation] would be [the individual owner's] alter ego under
the strict standards of the common law alter ego doctrine which would apply in a tort or contract action. The
contest in this case is over a license in a regulated industry and the applicable standard appears in the statute,
1 67
not in court decisions involving civil suits.
Thus, Capital Telephone does not stand for the broad proposition that federal courts should routinely give less respect to the
corporate form. The court was not concerned with liability under
a federal statute, but instead with an application for a license
under a federal regulatory statute. The statute in Capital Telephone
gave "less respect to the corporate form" not because it was a
remedial statute like CERGLA, but because it involved the granting of government license privileges. Courts have long recognized that regulatory agencies have greater discretion in
fashioning policies and granting licenses than they do in imposing
liability for violations of statutes or regulations.16 The Capital
Telephone decision, read in that context, simply illustrates judicial
deference to the FCC's discretion in refusing to grant a license. It
does not evidence a general decline in the standards for piercing
the corporate veil in federal question cases.
The two CERCLA cases employing the "public convenience,
fairness and equity" rule thus illustrate two very different approaches to piercing the corporate veil. The court in In re
165. Id at 736-37 ("We believe that it would not be either fair or realistic if
we were to close our eyes to the relationship between the [individual owner's]
and [the corporation's] applications.").
166. Id. at 738 (arguing that strict standards of common law should apply).
167. Id.
168. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 379 F.2d
153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967); accord Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 739, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Niagara Mohawk, 379 F.2d at 159). But see Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986);
Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981). Both Alman
and Brookline used the Capital Telephone language to reduce the standards for
piercing the corporate veil. To this extent, the tradition of disregarding the corporate entity to promote public convenience, fairness and equity was distorted
even before it appeared in a CERCLA case.
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Acushnet River stated the principle and then, in effect, discarded it
in favor of a collection of factors distilled from a number of other
federal decisions. In contrast, the court in United States v. KayserRoth Corp. invoked the rule to make piercing the corporate veil
easier than under traditional federal or state law. Therefore, to
the extent this rule has been employed in CERCLA cases, it was
used to depart from the traditional federal common law.
c.

Business Conduit
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a third rule of derivative liability under CERCLA. InJoslyn Corp. v. T.L. James & Co.,169 the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana applied a rule for
disregarding the corporate entity that had been previously described by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc. 170 This rule, as described by theJoslyn district court, allows a parent corporation to be held liable for
the obligations of a subsidiary only where the parent has misused
the subsidiary by "treating it, and by using it, as a mere business
conduit for the purposes of the dominant corporation." 17 1 Such
misuse may be shown by proving that "[f]irst, the dominant corporation must have controlled the subservient corporation, and
second, the dominant corporation must have proximately caused
plaintiff harm through misuse of this control."1 72 TheJoslyn court
169. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Joslyn Mfg. Co. v.
T.L.James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
170. 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014
(1986).
171. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 226-27 (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973)). Unlike
the "generalized federal substantive law" from which the other rules were derived, the business conduit rule comes from a specific Fifth Circuit case which,
theJoslyn court stated, set forth a combined federal and state common law test
for disregarding the corporate entity. Id. at 226-27. Compare Wehner v. Syntex
Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (applying hornbook law of
piercing the corporate veil in holding that court did not have jurisdiction over
corporate parent of defendant subsidiary).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit expressly declined to follow the capacity to control rule, observing that there was nothing in the statute or its legislative history
to indicate that Congress intended to impose direct liability on corporate parents. Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82-83. The court also commented that "[i]f Congress wanted to extend liability to parent corporations it could have done so,
and it remains free to do so." Id. at 83. The holding inJoslyn Mfg. has been
narrowly construed and distinguished by other courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that injoslyn Mfg.,
parent had not participated in the activities of its subsidiary).
172. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 227 (citing Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973)). The court
termed these two elements "essential." Id.
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made clear that the control element of this rule "amounts to total
domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the
subservient corporation manifests no separate corporate interests
of its own and functions solely to achieve the purposes of the
dominant corporation." 17 3 Finally, the court set out an exhaustive list of twelve factors to be considered in determining whether
the parent corporation has exercised the requisite control, making clear that 100% ownership of the subsidiary, and even having
common officers and directors, is insufficient to support a finding
1 74
of such control.
The business conduit rule is one that not only rests squarely
within the federal common law tradition, but also has been applied to CERCLA liability in a manner consistent with that tradition. Nonetheless,Joslyn has sown the seeds of inconsistent future
applications. TheJoslyn court, citing the Fifth Circuit decision in
Jon-T Chemicals,175 ruled that federal and state law in the Fifth Circuit are "essentially the same" with respect to the alter ego
test. 7 6 While theJoslyn court acknowledged that theJon-T Chemicals court was comparing federal law to Texas law, and that Louisiana law governed the issues inJoslyn, the court stated that it was
"satisfied that the principles utilized in this opinion would control
whether Louisiana or federal common law governs."'

77

TheJoslyn holding is problematic in that it gives no guidance
as to what test a court should follow if it discerns a difference
between the federal and applicable state law. TheJon-T Chemicals
court had reasoned that it need not decide whether federal and
Texas alter ego doctrines were equivalent in all respects, because
they "overlap at least with regard to the principles involved in the
present case."' 78 This leaves open the question of which law a
173. Id. (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem.
Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)).
174. ld at 227, 230. The court discounted other facts cited by the plaintiff
to the effect that the parent corporation had made substantial loans to the subsidiary, it had caused the hiring and firing of certain executive officers of the
subsidiary and certain individuals who were officers of both the parent and the
subsidiary worked out of the offices of the parent. The court decided that these
facts were not sufficient, either individually or in the aggregate, to justify piercing the corporate veil. Id. at 231.
175. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 n.6 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
176. Joslyn, 696 F. Supp. at 226 ("[We] find no need to determine whether a
uniform federal alter ego is required, since the federal and state alter ego tests
are essentially the same.").
177. Id. n.8.
178. Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 690 n.6.
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court should apply in the event that a state in the Fifth Circuit
other than Texas is involved, especially if the laws of that state are
not as compatible with federal law as was the law of Texas. In
addition, it leaves open the question of what law would apply if
Texas law should change and become less compatible with federal law. Finally, what are the "principles" that overlap between
state and federal law in theJon-T Chemicals case? Are they present
in environmental cases? Because theJoslyn opinion leaves these
questions unanswered, the Fifth Circuit has created a business
conduit rule that can be used in the future to enforce a standard
of liability that is far different from the standard used injoslyn and
Jon-T Chemicals.
In summary, the CERCLA cases articulating the various rules
of both direct and indirect liability have consistently tried to harmonize their holdings with existing law, making it appear that
these rules are supported by and follow from the authority of the
statute itself and the common law arising in other environmental
and non-environmental contexts. The cited authority does not,
however, support the rules. Although this critique has not attempted to prove that the rules themselves are defective, it does
establish that there has been an enormous amount ofjudicial lawmaking in the area. Part III of this Article will examine, in detail,
the power of the federal courts to engage in such lawmaking. Preceding that examination, the remainder of Part II will show how
far apart the CERCLA rules of direct liability and piercing the
corporate veil have strayed from their counterparts in traditional
federal and state common law.
B.

Traditional Common Law Rules of Liability

Federal and state courts are familiar with the issue of officer,
director and stockholder liability. Long before CERCLA was enacted, the courts grappled with the problem of how to reconcile
the recognition of a corporation as a legal entity separate from
the individuals who owned or managed it with the desire to hold
such individuals liable in certain cases where their actions merited
liability. To resolve the issue as to officers and directors, the
courts borrowed a rule from agency law-an officer or director
will be liable for torts in which he actively participated. Rules
concerning stockholder liability, on the other hand, developed in
the equity jurisdiction of state and federal courts. The equity
courts were attempting to achieve a just result in cases where liable corporations were unable to satisfy judgments against them.
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To achieve justice, the equity courts developed new rules. Courts

imposing traditional direct liability and piercing the corporate
veil observed significant limitations on their use. These limitations most often required the establishment of a nexus between
the conduct of an individual being sued and the harm that formed
the basis of the lawsuit.
The remainder of Part II will take a closer look at the federal
and state law dealing with direct liability and piercing the corporate veil. Only after this analysis can the true distance between
the CERCLA rules and the traditional common law rules be
measured.
1. Direct Liability
The doctrine that officers and directors are personally liable
for torts in which they have personally and actively participated is
firmly embedded in both federal and state common law. Both
also have developed certain exceptions to liability to protect
those persons not directly connected to the tortious harm.
a.

Federal Law

Under traditional federal common law, officers of a corporation can be held personally liable for tortious conduct of the corporation "if they personally took part in the commission of the
tort or specifically directed other officers, agents, or employees of
the corporation to commit the tortious act." 1 79 Similarly, a director who actually voted for the commission of a tort can be personally liable to the damaged party even if the act was performed in
18 0
the name of his corporation.

Two cases help illustrate the nature of the activity required to
179. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding president and two directors who were directly responsible for design and production of infringing goods to be liable); see also Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16, 25 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App.) (rule of personal liability applies not only to tort but also to instances
where wrongful conduct of individual has caused violation of a statute; held
president/director/major stockholder liable for exceeding domestic controls on
overseas sales), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp.,
587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding president of corporation "central

figure" in corporation); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428, 435 (1st Cir.
1956) (officer and part owner of small family corporation was held liable as
"moving, active conscious force" behind patent infringement by corporation),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957).
180. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1144
(4th Cir. 1975) (directors held liable for violation of Civil Rights Acts of 1866
and 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982, 2000a, by unlawful discrimination against
black applicants for membership in community swimming pool association, even
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hold an officer or director liable. In Marks v. PolaroidCorp.,1 8 1 the
officer in question was the "guiding spirit" behind the corporation's infringement upon a patent. 8 2 In so finding, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit focused on his supervision and direction of the building of the machines and equipment used in manufacturing the infringing product, his intimate familiarity with
details of the process and his status as the holder of the patent
under which the corporation operated. 8 3 The court found these
facts sufficient to establish his liability because they "certainly
show that the [officer] was more than merely an officer of an infringing corporation. They show that he, individually was the
moving, active conscious force behind [the corporation's]
8 4
infringement."
In Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp.,' 85 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit imposed liability on a corporate officer on the basis
of a finding that he was "the central figure" in a corporation that
had engaged in unfair competition.1 6 The officer, as president of
the corporation, was responsible for arranging marketing services
and distributing the corporation's product. In addition, the district court found that the officer knew and personally approved
87
the acts of unfair competition that caused harm to the plaintiff.
The court distinguished the liability it imposed from piercing the
corporate veil, ruling that the officer was liable as a result of his
88
actions, rather than on the basis of his status as an owner.
though directors were ignorant of illegality of their acts due to lawyer's misguided advice).
181. 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956).

182. Id. at 435.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978).

186. Id at 606.
187. Id. Among other things, the defendant officer gave the designer of the
corporation's sales materials a "certificate of authenticity" to be enclosed with
each product sold, even though he knew that the plaintiff competitor was the
only manufacturer of the product licensed to use that certificate of authenticity.

Id.
188. Id. The opinion in United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526
takes a more conservative position with respect to liability under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403
(1988). The court stated that a corporate officer could not be held liable under
the statute unless either the statute itself authorized such liability or it was possible to pierce the corporate veil. 526 F.2d at 1300. Because the court could find
no evidence in the language of the statute that an officer of a corporation that
had violated the Rivers and Harbors Act would be personally liable, and because
facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil had been neither alleged nor proven,
the judgment against the former president of the corporation was reversed. Id.
F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1976),
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Marks and Donsco illustrate the type of actual participation
that is required under the traditional federal common law to impose liability on a corporate officer for activities of a corporation.
In each case, the corporate officer not only occupied a high position of authority within the corporation, but was also an active,
knowledgeable and responsible participant in the precise act that
created the harm. In each case, liability was predicated on the
officer's actions, rather than his capacity to take actions.
Although courts have in numerous cases imposed personal
liability on officers and directors under the federal common law,
there are significant limitations on such liability. First, personal
liability cannot be imposed on an officer of a corporation simply
because of his official position. The plaintiff must allege that such
officer has actively participated in the act giving rise to the corporation's liability.18 9 Second, an officer will not be liable for the
mere omission to perform a duty that is owed to the corporation
rather than to the plaintiff. 190 These two important safeguards
are built into the traditional federal common law of direct liability
to protect corporate officers in cases where they have acted on
behalf of the corporation.
b.

State Law

The discussion of state law concerning the liability of officers
and directors will summarize the relevant law in California, New
York and Texas. These states represent a geographical cross-section of the United States, and generally reflect the existing state
law of the remaining states on officer and director liability.191
at 1300-01; see also United States v.Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306, 1310
(5th Cir. 1976) (Rivers and Harbors Act does not impose personal liability for
violations). But see United States v. Pollution Abatement Servs. of Oswego, Inc.,
763 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing Sexton and Moretti as cases concerning derivative liability, and instead holding corporate officers liable under
analogous statute on basis of their personal involvement in illegal dumping and
storage activities, not merely their corporate position), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037
(1985).
189. See, e.g., Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 753 (7th Cir. 1985)
(court held that incorporator/chief executive officer/major stockholder of corporation that allegedly violated federal discrimination laws was not liable merely
because of his position); see also Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 260 (1st
Cir. 1962) (mere identification of defendant as "an officer" does not adequately
allege personal involvement sufficient to support cause of action).
190. Morefield v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 27 F.2d 890, 891 (N.D. Okla.
1928) (holding that foreman who neglected to perform his duties as employee of
corporation with respect to inspections and engine repairs was not liable to
widow and family of man killed in industrial accident at corporation's facility).
191. While this Article discusses state laws of California, New York and

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1991

47

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 6 [1991], Art. 2

1414

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36: p. 1367

The common law of California, New York and Texas imposes
liability on officers and directors for wrongs of the corporation in
which they actively participated. In Frances T. v. Village Green OwnTexas with regard to direct liability of officers and directors, comparable law
exists in all of the 47 remaining states as well as in Puerto Rico. See Escude Cruz
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying Puerto Rico law); Ex parte Charles Bell Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac-GMC, Inc. (Traylor
v. Bell), 496 So. 2d 774, 775 (Ala. 1986) (per curiam); Klondike Indus. Corp. v.
Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161, 1171 (Alaska 1987); Bischofshausen, Vasbinder, &
Luckie v. D.W.Jaquays Mining & Equip. Contractors Co., 145 Ariz. 204, 210-11,
700 P.2d 902, 908-09 (Ct. App. 1985); Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 383,'438
S.W.2d 313, 317 (1969); Sanford v. Kobey Bros. Constr. Corp., 689 P.2d 724,
725 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc., 169 Conn. 389, 404, 363
A.2d 160, 168 (1975); T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Wilson, 584 A.2d 523, 530
(Del. Super. Ct. 1990); Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 821 (D.C. 1984); Powerhouse, Inc. v. Walton, 557 So. 2d 186, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Jones v.
Shafer, 196 Ga. App. 254, 254, 395 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1990); Eastern Star, Inc. v.
Union Bldg. Materials Corp., 6 Haw. App. 125, 134-35, 712 P.2d 1148, 1155
(1985); Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 278, 561 P.2d 1299, 1311
(1977); Mannion v. Stallings & Co., 204 111. App. 3d 179, 191, 561 N.E.2d 1134,
1141 (1990); Roake v. Christensen, 528 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988);
Briggs Transp. Co. v. Starr Sales Co., 262 N.W.2d 805, 808 (Iowa 1978); Kansas
Comm'n on Civil Rights v. Service Envelope Co., 233 Kan. 20, 27, 660 P.2d 549,
555 (1983); Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 913-14 (Ky. 1989); Texas Indus. v.
Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, 227 So. 2d 265, 268 (La. App. 1969); Precision
Communications, Inc. v. Rodrigue, 451 A.2d 300, 302 (Me. 1982); Tedrow v.
Deskin, 265 Md. 546, 550, 290 A.2d 799, 802 (1972); LaClair v. Silberline Mfg.
Co., 379 Mass. 21, 29, 393 N.E.2d 867, 872 (1979);Joy Management Co. v. City
of Detroit, 183 Mich. App. 334, 340, 455 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1990); Universal Lending Corp. v. Wirth Co., 392 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Wilson v.
South Cent. Miss. Farmers, Inc., 494 So. 2d 358, 361 (Miss. 1986); Honigmann
v. Hunter Group, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Little v. Grizzly Mfg., 195 Mont. 419, 424, 636 P.2d 839, 842 (1981); Hecker v. Ravenna
Bank, 237 Neb. 810, 815, 468 N.W.2d 88, 95 (1991); Nev-Tex Oil & Gas v.
Precision Rolled Prods., 105 Nev. 685, 686, 782 P.2d 1311, 1311 (1989); Pacific
& Ad. Shippers, Inc. v. Schier, 109 N.H. 551, 553, 258 A.2d 351, 354 (1969);
Van Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 199 N.J. Super. 452, 457, 489 A.2d
1209, 1211 (App. Div. 1985); Taylor v. Alston, 79 N.M. 643, 644, 447 P.2d 523,
524 (Ct. App. 1968); Air Traffic Conference v. Marina Travel, Inc., 69 N.C. App.
179, 182, 316 S.E.2d 642, 644 (1984); Wills v. Schroeder, 390 N.W.2d 544, 547
(N.D. 1986); Nabakowski v. 5400 Corp., 29 Ohio App. 3d 82, 86, 503 N.E.2d
218, 223 (1986); Preston-Thomas Constr. Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518
P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973); Osborne v. Hay, 284 Or. 133, 145-46,
585 P.2d 674, 681 (1978); Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 503 Pa. 614, 621, 470
A.2d 86, 90 (1983); Gray v. Wood, 75 R.I. 123, 127, 64 A.2d 191, 192 (1949);
Hunt v. Rabon, 275 S.C. 475, 477, 272 S.E.2d 643, 644 (1980); Cooper v. Hileman, 88 S.D. 516, 521, 222 N.W.2d 299, 301 (1974); Brungard v. Caprice
Records, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 585, 590-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); FMA Acceptance
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979); Economou v. Carpenter, 124 Vt. 451,'455, 207 A.2d 241, 244 (1965); McLean v. Nelson, 232 Va.
420, 427, 350 S.E.2d 651, 656 (1986); Betchard-Clayton, Inc. v. King, 41 Wash.
App. 887, 893, 707 P.2d 1361, 1365, review denied, 104 Wash. 2d 1027 (1985);
Mullins v. Venable, 297 S.E.2d 866, 870 (W. Va. 1982); Hanner v. State Dep't of
Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 92 Wis. 2d 90, 97, 298 N.W.2d 587, 590
(1979); Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 727 (Wyo. 1979).
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ers Association,1 92 the California Supreme Court analyzed the liability of officers and directors for the torts of a corporation. In this

case, the plaintiff, who owned a condominium unit, sued the condominium owners' association and individual members of its

board of directors for injuries sustained in an attack in her condominium
plaintiff
plex. 19 3
veloped

unit. This attack followed numerous attempts by the
to have adequate security lights installed in the comIn addressing the liability of the directors, the court dea two-prong test:

To maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her
personal capacity, a plaintiff must first show that the director specifically authorized, directed or participated in
the allegedly tortious conduct; or that although they specifically knew or reasonably should have known that
some hazardous condition or activity under their control
could injure plaintiff, they negligently failed to take or
order appropriate action to avoid the harm. The plaintiff must also allege and prove that an ordinary prudent
person, knowing what the director knew at that time,

would

not

circumstances.

have

94

acted

similarly

under

the

The law in New York is similar. Corporate officers can be
held "personally liable for those torts they personally commit, or
which they inspire or participate in, even though performed by an
artificial body." 19 5 The court in Michaels v. Lispenard Holding
192. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 299 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (en banc).
193. Id. at 497-98, 723 P.2d at 574-76, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457-59 (plaintiff
submitted complaint to be published in condominium newsletter, made formal
requests for lighting to manager of premises and installed lighting on her own
only to be ordered by condominium management to remove it). .
194. Id. at 508-09, 723 P.2d at 583-84, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 466 (footnote omitted); see also United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586,
595, 463 P.2d 770, 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1970) (president of insurance
agency found not personally liable for recommending poor insurance risk to
insurance company where defendant agency found to be negligent); Thomsen v.
Culver City Motor Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 639, 645, 41 P.2d 597,600 (1935) (directors of automobile agency who did not participate in alleged acts of conversion
of bank's security were held not personally liable).
195. Michaels v. Lispenard Holding Corp., 11 A.D.2d 12, 14, 201 N.Y.S.2d
611, 614 (1960) (citing 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 70, § 1135) (individual managing agents of corporate defendant not liable for damage to plaintiff's property
allegedly resulting from negligent repairs that they did not personally make);
accord Lutz Feed Co. v. Aradet & Co., 72 Misc. 2d 28, 31, 337 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (corporate officer of defendant insurance agent held not personally liable for failure to timely renew plaintiff's insurance plan because negligence was nonfeasance); see also Marine Midland Bank v.John E. Russo Produce
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Corp. 1 96 declared that in order to hold a corporate officer liable in
an individual capacity for torts of the corporation, "it must appear
that the acts were other than the ordinary acts of corporate agents
acting for their principal or that they were in exclusive and complete control of the management and operation of the building"
97
in which the tortious damage occurred.1

Under Texas law, active participation in a tort by a corporate
officer or director will lead to liability for such officer or director:
Knowing participation in a tortious act will render the
corporate agent personally liable, while the mere breach
of a corporate contractual obligation will not. It is not
necessary that the "corporate veil" be pierced in order
to impose personal liability, as long as it is shown that
the corporate officer knowingly participated in the
wrongdoing198
In Barclay v. Johlnson,' 99 for example, the Texas appellate court imposed liability on a corporate officer who had personally signed
the brochure in which a false representation of a material fact had
been made and upon which the plaintiff had relied to his detri20 0
ment when signing an earnest money contract.
Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 44, 405 N.E.2d 205, 212 (1980) ("As a general proposition,
corporate officers and directors are not liable for fraud unless they personally

participate in the misrepresentation or have actual knowledge of it. Mere negligent failure to acquire knowledge of the falsehood is insufficient." (footnotes
omitted)).
196. 11 A.D.2d 12, 201 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1960).
197. Id. at 14, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 614 (footnotes omitted) (in holding that liability did not arise from nonfeasance, court held that liability may have arisen if
defendants had personally performed work).
198. Barclay v. Johnson, 686 S.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985)
(footnotes omitted); accord Grierson v. Parker Energy Partners, 737 S.W.2d 375,
377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also Permian Petroleum Co. v. Barrow, 484 S.W.2d
631, 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) ("An officer or any other agent of a corporation
may be personally as responsible as the corporation itself for tortious acts when
partipating in the wrongdoing."); Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Stephens, 345 S.W.2d
786, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (declining to hold liable corporate officers who
were present at construction site and "generally knew what was going on," because there was no evidence that they had knowledge of specific problem or that
they gave direction to engineer or independent contractor on site).
199. 686 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).
200. Id. at 335-38 ("[Ihe directors of a corporation are personally liable
for false representations made by them to an injured party, whether they know
they are false or not." (quoting Dollar v. Lockney Supply Co., 164 S.W. 1076,
1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914))).
Under Texas law, officers and directors who participate in the torts of a
company by "instigating, aiding or abetting the company" in the commission of
such torts are liable, along with the company. Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526
S.W.2d 192, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (corporate officers who participated in
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Like the federal common law, the common law of each of the
three states under discussion limits the liability of officers and directors in two ways. The first significant limitation is that neither
officers nor directors are liable solely by virtue of their office. 20 '
The second exception to liability under the states' common law is
similar to the nonfeasance exception in federal law. This requires
a finding that the officer or director breached a duty that he or she
owed to the injured third party, not merely to the corporation, in
order to impose personal liability. 202
conversion may be found personally liable); Permian Petroleum Co., 484 S.W.2d at
634 (holding corporate officer personally liable for debt where he committed
conversion). Similarly, officers may be liable for acts of employees where the
employees acted upon the direct orders of such officer, who knew that the act
was wrong. Norton Refrigerated Express, Inc. v. Ritter Bros. Co., 552 S.W.2d
910, 912 (rex. Civ. App. 1977) (president of corporation held liable for conversion where evidence showed that he had personally ordered employees of the
corporation to convert items when he knew or reasonably should have known
that property belonged to another).
201. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 503, 723 P.2d at 580, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 463
("Their liability, if any, stems from their own tortious conduct, not from their
status as directors or officers of the enterprise."); Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.,
24 Cal. 3d 773, 785, 598 P.2d 45, 52, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 399 (1979) ("Directors
and officers of a corporation are not rendered liable for its torts merely because
of their official positions .... "); United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes,
Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 595, 463 P.2d 770, 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1970) ("Directors or officers of a corporation do not incur personal liability for torts of the
corporation merely by reason of their official position, unless they participate in
the wrong or authorize or direct it be done."); see also People v. Toomey, 157
Cal. App. 3d 1, 14, 203 Cal. Rptr. 642, 651 (1984) (acknowledging that liability
cannot be imposed on defendant merely by virtue of his status as business
owner, but holding defendant who had control over operation of business was
personally liable for acts of subordinates done in normal course of business).
New York law is similar. Compare Clark v. Pine Hill Homes, Inc., 112 A.D.2d
755, 755, 492 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (1985) (corporate officer held liable for failure
to construct plaintiff's home in workmanlike manner, where he personally supervised and participated in negligent construction) with Haefeli v. Woodrich
Eng'g Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 450-51, 175 N.E. 123, 126 (1931) (declining to hold
president of corporation liable where design and construction of defective cesspool were committed under personal supervision of superintendent in charge,
and president neither knew nor had arny reason to know of any defects in plan or
construction).
Texas law is in general agreement with California and New York. K &G Oil
Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 611, 314 S.W.2d
782, 793 ("The cases are agreed that a director or officer of a corporation is not
liable merely because of his official character for [illegal acts] of the other officers or agents of the corporation or for [acts] attributable to the corporation, if
such director or officer is not personally connected with the wrong and does not
participate in it."), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); see also Earthman 's, 526
S.W.2d at 206 ("An officer who actively participates with the corporation in the
[illegal act] may be held personally responsible, not solely by reason of his corporate office, but because of his active participation in a tortious act.").
202. Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 497-98, 723 P.2d at 581, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
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2. Indirect Liability: Disregardingthe Corporate Entity

Federal and state rules for disregarding the corporate entity
have less in common with each other than do the various direct
liability rules. Because piercing the corporate veil is an equitable
remedy, statements of applicable rules have been notoriously difficult to formulate. 20 The purpose of this survey is not to analyze
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, but to show the simiThe court emphasized that the presence of a duty toward the third parties was
critical:
"More must be shown than breach of the officer's duty to his corporation
to impose personal liability to a thirdperson upon him." In other words,
a distinction must be made between the director's fiduciary duty to the
corporation (and its beneficiaries) and the director's ordinary duty to
take care not to injure third parties.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Haidinger-Hayes, 1 Cal. 3d at 595, 463 P.2d at
775, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 418). This exception to liability has previously been stated
in terms of holding directors or officers personally liable for acts of misfeasance
or malfeasance, but not for mere acts of nonfeasance. See Haidinger-Hayes,1 Cal.
3d at 595, 463 P.2d at 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423; Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124
Cal. App. 3d 558, 574, 177 Cal. Rptr. 495, 505 (1981); Towt v. Pope, 168 Cal.
App. 2d 520, 530, 336 P.2d 276, 282 (1959). Frances T. stated, however, that
officers and directors may be held liable for negligent nonfeasance "where they
knew that a condition or instrumentality under their control posed an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff, but then failed to take action to prevent it."
Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 468, 723 P.2d at 585, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458; see Dwyer v.
Lanan & Snow Lumber Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841, 297 P.2d 490, 493
(1956) (president of lumber company held personally liable for negligent failure
to prevent fall of steel wire).
Under New York law it has been held that negligence in actually performing
duties is misfeasance rather than nonfeasance. Michaels, 11 A.D.2d at 14, 201
N.Y.S.2d at 614 (citing 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 70, § 1161). The Michaels
court limited the nonfeasance liability exception to breaches of duty owed by the
officer to the corporation, and stated that the exception "has no application
where there is a breach of duty owing by the agent himself to third persons." Id.
(quoting 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 70, § 1135).
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is also noted in
Texas law. In Mayflower Investment Co. v. Stephens, 345 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960), the appellate court rejected the imposition of liability on individual
officers for trespass. The court noted that there was no evidence that either of
the individuals knew that the work being done was on plaintiff's land or knew
what the effects of such work would be on plaintiff's land. Id. at 795. It ruled
that the president and vice-president of a corporation could not be held liable
for a wrong in which they had not participated. The court then stated that "an
agent is personally liable to third persons for his own misfeasance and positive
wrong, but is not generally liable for his nonfeasance or omission of duty in
course of his employment." Id. (quoting Seismic Explorations v. Dobray, 169
S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943)); see also Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Lubbock, 507 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. 1974) ("Directors or officers of a corporation
... are not responsible to third persons for negligence amounting merely to
nonfeasance, to a breach of duty owing to the corporation alone, the act must
also constitute a breach of a duty owed to the third person.").
203. For a further discussion of the role of equity in piercing the corporate
veil, see infra notes 222, 235, 240, 246-48 and accompanying text.
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larities and differences among the various jurisdictions on certain
20 4
key issues affecting the doctrine.
a.

Federal Law

The difficulty in formulating rules applicable to piercing the
corporate veil can be illustrated by a brief survey of federal law on
the subject. Five principal categories identified from recent case
law will be discussed below. 205 These categories include the Seymour rule, the DeWitt rule, the Milwaukee Refrigeratorrule, theJon-T
rule and the Zubik rule.
i. The Seymour Rule

In a case frequently cited by federal courts in numerous areas
of law, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Seymour v.
Hull & Moreland Engineering20 devised its own rule from numer-

ous sources. The Seymour court stated that the federal common
law on piercing the corporate veil "concentrates on three general
factors: the amount of respect given to the separate identity of
the corporation by its stockholders, the degree of injustice visited
on the litigants by recognition of the corporate entity, and the
'
fraudulent intent of the incorporators.

20 7

204. For an excellent contemporary analysis of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil, see Krendl &Krendl, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: Focusingthe Inquiry,
55 DEN. LJ. 1 (1978). For a somewhat more historical perspective, see Dodd,
The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HARV. L.
REv. 1351 (1948), and Douglas & Shanks, Insulationfrom Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE LJ. 193 (1929).
205. There are, no doubt, numerous other rules and variations of rules in
the opinions handed down by the federal courts. In order to give the reader a
taste of the diversity of federal opinion on the subject, I have selected five rules
that have been popular in recent federal cases.
206. 605 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979).
207. Id. at 1111; accord Laborers' Pension Trust Fund v. Sidney Weinberger
Homes, Inc., 872 F.2d 702, 704 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that three-prong test
was violated where defendant loaned money to corporation with no formalized
agreement, paid corporate expenses with his own money, operation of corporation was for defendant's sole benefit, records of expenses were inadequate and
defendant withdrew funds when entity ended while there were outstanding
debts of corporation); Orloffv. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no liability under Seymour test where adequate records were kept, no intermingling of personal and corporate funds occurred, no evidence of fraud was
present when incorporation occurred and no evidence of undercapitalization);
Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1987) (reflecting
upon Seymour factors and finding sufficient evidence to justify liability since record indicated intermingling of funds, undercapitalization, failure to file corporate tax returns, failure to pay dividends and lack of company bank account);
Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (disregarding corporate identity
based on Seymour factors); Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters and Eng'rs Health
& Welfare Plan v. Hroch, 757 F.2d 184, 190 (8th Cir. 1985) (disregarding corpo-
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The DeWitt Rule

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in DeWitt Truck
Brokers v. W. Ray Flemming FruitCo. 20 8 declined "the mere incanta-

tion of the term 'instrumentality' " in favor of a recitation of the
factual basis for its conclusion in a piercing the corporate veil
case.20 9 It instead cited the following factors as significant in its
analysis of the issue: gross undercapitalization; failure to observe
corporate formalities; nonpayment of dividends; insolvency of the
corporation at the relevant time; siphoning of corporate funds by
the dominant stockholder; nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; absence of corporate records; and use of the corporation
210
as a mere facade for the operation of dominant stockholders.
The court made clear that, in order to pierce the corporate veil, a
number of these factors must be found, and further, that there
must be "present an element. of injustice or fundamental
2
unfairness.", '

rate identity using alter ego analysis based on Seymour factors); Laborers' CleanUp Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte Clean-Up Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516,
524 (9th Cir. 1984) (court applied Seymour three-prong test in reaching its determination); Trustees of UIU Health & Welfare Fund v. New York Flame Proofing
Co., 649 F. Supp. 843, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (considering Seymour factors as reasons for piercing the corporate veil), rev 'd on othergrounds, 828 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1987).
208. 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
209. Id at 685 (quoting Kirvo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers &
Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th Cir. 1973)).
210. Id. at 685-87. In formulating the factors to be considered, the court
combined various situations set forth in previous case law and structured a
guideline for courts to use in their analyses. Id.
211. Id. at 687. Although the DeWitt decision involved a diversity case decided under South Carolina law, it has been cited by numerous federal courts in
federal question cases. See, e.g., Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 65 (4th
Cir. 1989) (case brought against parent and wholly-owned subsidiary under Labor Relations Act of 1947, 27 U.S.C. § 185 and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001);
Solomon v. Klein, 770 F.2d 352, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1985) (case involving ERISA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1000 where court referenced the factors, noting that issue did not
involve inquiry into alter ego but involved statutory construction); American
Bell, Inc. v. Federation of Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing
DeWitt as one possible approach in piercing the corporate veil); Carpenter's
Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir.
1983) (court found alter ego theory for piercing the corporate veil not applicable under § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 where individuals
used personal assets for corporation's survival and acted in interests of corporation rather than utilizing corporate assets for their own benefit); United States v.
Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 1981) (utilizing factors in DeWitt to pierce corporate veil and hold physician personally liable for Medicare overpayment made to
physician's solely-owned corporation); United States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp.
1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (doctor violated most of factors set forth in DeWitt
rule, and corporate veil was pierced rendering him personally liable for overpayments of Medicare funds under 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1974)).
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The Milwaukee Refrigerator Rule

The rule articulated by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in 1905 in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator
Transit Co. 21 2 has been resurrected in a number of contemporary
decisions. Unlike the DeWitt rule and the Seymour rule, this rule
takes a rather abstract approach to the matter:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a
general rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary
appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as
21 3
an association of persons.
iv.

The Jon-T Rule

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Jon-T Chemicals, Inc.,214 which focused on the parent-subsidiary
context, despaired of finding any single formula for piercing the
corporate veil. Instead, the court elected to take an approach not
unlike that found in the DeWitt rule:
In lieu of articulating a coherent doctrinal basis for
the alter ego theory, we have instead developed a laundry list of factors to be used in determining whether a
subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent. These include
whether:
(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common
stock ownership;
(2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers;
(3) the parent and the subsidiary have common
business departments;
212. 142 F. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905).
213. Id. at 255; accord Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(utilizing same quote in determining whether corporation came under control of
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499 (1970)); Capital Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (allowing FCC to pierce corporate veil in evaluating license applications); In re Gibraltar Amusements, Ltd.,
291 F.2d 22, 24 (2d Cir.) (refusing to pierce corporate veil where subsidiary had
honored corporate form), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (1961); Francis 0. Day Co. v.
Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (piercing corporate veil where de-

fendant misused corporate form to avoid contract liability).
214. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
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(4) the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated
financial statements and tax returns;
(5) the parent finances the subsidiary;
(6) the parent caused the incorporation of the
subsidiary;
(7) the subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate
capital;
(8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses
of the subsidiary;
(9) the subsidiary receives no business except that
given to it by the parent;
(10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as its
own;
(11) the daily operations of the two corporations
are not kept separate; and
(12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities, such as keeping separate
books and records and holding shareholder
215
and board meetings.
v.

The Zubik Rule

In Zubik v. Zubik, 216 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "the appropriate occasion for disregarding the corporate existence occurs when the court must prevent fraud,
illegality or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity
would defeat public policy or shield someone from liability for a
crime." 21 7 The Zubik court added that the corporate entity should
not be disregarded "unless specific, unusual circumstances call
for an exception." 218
Despite the number and diversity of the federal rules, there
215. Id. at 691-92; accordJoslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80,
83 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1096 (1989).
216. 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
217. Id. at 272. Although similar to the Milwaukee Refrigerator rule, the Zubik
rule incorporates the concepts of preventing illegality and injustice. Id These
were not clearly present in the older rule. For a further discussion of the Milwaukee Refrigerator rule, see supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
218. Zubik, 384 F.2d at 273; see also Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramic
Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir. 1979). Other cases have cited the Zubik rule
and the rules referred to earlier. See, e.g., American Bell, Inc. v. Federation of
Tel. Workers, 736 F.2d 879, 886 (3d Cir. 1984); Carpenter's Health & Welfare
Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Thomas, 515 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
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seems to be general agreement on the fact-intensive nature of
piercing the corporate veil. For example, the court of appeals in
Valley Finance, Inc. v. United States 2 19 stated that "[gliven the diversity of corporate structures and the range of factual settings in
which unjust or inequitable results are alleged, it is not surprising
that no uniform standard exists for determining whether a corporation is simply the alter ego of its owners. ' 220 Similarly, in United
States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, Inc. ,221 the federal appellate
court noted that "[w]hether the corporate veil should be pierced
depends on the innumerable individual equities of each case.
'Only general rules may be laid down for guidance.'"222
Of the large assortment of factors identified in the rules for
piercing the corporate veil, it is generally true that no one factor
alone is determinative. Thus, undercapitalization, 2 23 sole ownership of the stock, 2 24 identity of officers and directors of parent
and subsidiary, 22 5 and the right of the parent or stockholder to
choose directors and set policy 2 26 are not sufficient by themselves
to justify disregarding the corporate entity and holding the stockholders liable.
While most of the rules articulated above contain a requirement that some element of fraud or inequitable result appear, the
level of fraud required has not been fixed with any great precision. For example, several cases have held that actual fraud is not
a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil, 2 27 especially where
219. 629 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981).

220. Id. at 172. The court also stated that sole ownership would not by
itself be sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil, although it would be
relevant. Id. Similarly, the court thought that "plain fraud," while helpful, is not
a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil. Id221. 561 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1977).
222. Id. at 777 (quoting Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 846, 129 P.2d 390,
392 (1942)).
223. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960).
224. Selser v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 770 F.2d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir.
1985);Jon-TChemicals, 768 F.2d at 691; Valley Finance, 629 F.2d at 172; El Salto,

S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477, 483 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
225. Jon-T Chemicals, 768 F.2d at 691.
226. Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 1987);

Selser, 770 F.2d at 555.
227. United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960, 964-65 (10th Cir. 1987)
(generally applying Seymour rule);Jon-TChemicals, 768 F.2d at 692 (applyingJon-

T rule and holding that fraud is not essential in tort cases, as opposed to contract cases); Valley Finance, 629 F.2d at 172 (applying rule that permits piercing
"whenever an individual so dominates his organization 'as in reality to negate its
separate personality'" (quoting Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 (D.C. Cir.
1978))); National Marine Serv., Inc. v. C. J. Thibodeaux & Co., 501 F.2d 940,
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gross undercapitalization or complete domination exist.228 Similarly, it has been held that one can infer fraudulent intent and
inequitable result from the failure of the stockholder to capitalize
the corporation adequately.2 29 On the other hand, it has also
been held that "the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating
that some injustice or inequity will result from recognition of the
corporate entity. ' 2 0
b. State Law
Once again, California, New York and Texas law will be surveyed to provide a representative sample of state law on disregarding the corporate entity. 23 ' California law is reputed to be
among the most liberal in permitting piercing the corporate veil,
while New York law has traditionally been considered among the
most conservative in this regard. 23 2 Texas law is instructive because recent changes in its common law demonstrate the volatile
nature of the subject. The other states take approaches comparable to those of New York and California in defining what is
needed to pierce the corporate veil. 23 3
942 (5th Cir. 1974) (not identifying any particular rule or test for piercing corporate veil).
228. NationalMarine Service, 501 F.2d at 942.
229. See Laborers Clean-Up Contract Admin. Trust Fund v. Uriarte CleanUp Serv., Inc., 736 F.2d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying Seymour rule).

The court found that the failure to infuse the company's non-liquid assets with
any working capital rendered its initial capitalization inadequate and, thus,
found evidence of fraudulent intent. Id.
230. See Van Diviner, 822 F.2d at 965. The court noted that in balancing the
various equities regarding the determination of whether there is an injustice, it
would give weight to the officers' and stockholders' respect of the corporate entity. Id
231. For the rationale behind selecting these three states, see supra text accompanying note 191.
232. Note, Piercingthe Corporate Veil in FederalCourts: Is Circumvention ofa Statute Enough?, 13 PAc. LJ. 1245, 1251-53 (1982).
233. While this Article discusses the state laws of California, New York and
Texas, comparable law with regard to piercing the corporate veil exists in many
other jurisdictions in the United States and Puerto Rico. See CCMS Publishing
Co. v. Dooley-Maloof, Inc., 645 F.2d 33, 37 (10th Cir. 1981) (interpreting
Oklahoma law) (citing Robertson v. Roy L. Morgan Prod. Co., 411 F.2d 1041,
1043 (10th Cir. 1969)); Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d
902, 905 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying Puerto Rico law) (citing Miguel Fertilizer
Corp. v. P.R. Drydock & Marine Terminals, 94 P.R.R. 403, 409 (1967)); Messick
v. Moring, 514 So. 2d 892, 894-95 (Ala. 1987); Uchitel Co. v. Telephone Co.,
646 P.2d 229, 234 (Alaska 1982); Norman v. Del Elia, 111 Ariz. 480, 482, 533
P.2d 537, 539 (1975); Fausett Co. v. Rand, 2 Ark. App. 216, 221, 619 S.W.2d
683, 686 (1981); Reader v. Dertina & Assocs. Mktg., Inc., 693 P.2d 398, 399
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc.,
187 Conn. 544, 553, 447 A.2d 406, 410 (1982); Gebelein v. Perma-Dry Water-
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The modem rule in California for piercing the corporate veil
was set forth in Automotriz Del Golfo de Californiav. Resnick. 23 4 The

California Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for determining whether the corporate entity may be disregarded in a particular case:
proofing Co., No. 6210 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1982), reprinted in 7 DEL. J. CORP. L.
309, 312 (1982); Vuitch v. Furr, 482 A.2d 811, 815-16 (D.C. 1984); DaniaJaiAlai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 450 So. 2d 1114, 1117-20 (Fla. 1984); Earnest v.
Merck, 183 Ga. App. 271, 273-74, 358 S.E.2d 661, 663-64 (1987); Evanston Ins.
Co. v. Luko, 7 Haw. App. 520, 525, 783 P.2d 293, 297 (1989); Minich v. Gem
State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 917, 591 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1979); Main
Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 86 Il. 2d 188, 205, 427 N.E.2d 94, 101 (1981); Extra

Energy Coal Co. v. Diamond Energy & Resources, Inc., 467 N.E.2d 439, 441
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Adam v. Mt. Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.W.2d 868,
872 (Iowa 1984); Amoco Chem. Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 594-95, 576 P.2d
1337, 1342 (1977); American Collectors Exch., Inc. v. Kentucky State Democratic Cent. Executive Comm., 566 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Noe v.
Roussel, 310 So. 2d 806, 826 (La. 1975); McCain Foods, Inc. v. St. Pierre, 463
A.2d 785, 787 (Me. 1983); Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv.
Corp., 295 Md. 693, 714, 458 A.2d 805, 816 (1983); My Bread Baking Co. v.
Cumberland Farms, Inc., 353 Mass. 614, 618-20, 233 N.E.2d 748, 751-52
(1968); Action Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jared Builders, Inc., 368 Mich. 626,
629, 118 N.W.2d 956, 958 (1962); White v. Jorgenson, 322 N.W.2d 607, 608
(Minn. 1982); T.C.L., Inc. v. Lacoste, 431 So. 2d 918, 922 (Miss. 1983); Lopp v.
Peerless Serum Co., 382 S.W.2d 620, 625-26 (Mo. 1964); Meridian Minerals Co.
v. Nicor Minerals, Inc., 228 Mont. 274, 284-85, 742 P.2d 456, 462 (1987);
Slusarski v. American Confinement Sys., Inc., 218 Neb. 576, 578, 357 N.W.2d
450, 452-53 (1984); Rowland v. Lepire, 99 Nev. 308, 316-17, 662 P.2d 1332,
1337 (1983); New Hampshire Wholesale Beverage Ass'n v. New Hampshire
State Liquor Comm'n, 100 N.H. 5, 7, 116 A.2d 885, 886 (1955); State v. Ventron Corp., 94 NJ. 473, 500-01, 468 A.2d 150, 164 (1983); Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc., 107 N.M. 118, 121-22, 753 P.2d 897, 900-01 (1988); State ex rel.
Utilities Comm'n v. Nantahala Power & Light Co., 313 N.C. 614, 727-30, 332
S.E.2d 397, 462-64 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 953 (1986); Fire Ass'n
of Philadelphia v. Vantine Paint & Glass Co., 133 N.W.2d 426, 431-32 (N.D.
1965); Ohio Edison Co. v. Warner Coal Corp., 79 Ohio App. 437, 72 N.E.2d
487, 488 (1946); Amfac Foods, Inc. v. International Sys. & Controls Corp., 294
Or. 94, 105-06, 654 P.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (1982); Lezzer Cash & Carry, Inc. v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 371 Pa. Super. 137, 142-44, 537 A.2d 857, 860-61 (1988); R & B
Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1354 (R.I. 1984); Sturkie v. Sifly,
280 S.C. 453, 457, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984); Farmers Feed & Seed,
Inc. v. Magnum Enters., Inc., 344 N.W.2d 699, 701 (S.D. 1984); Continental
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625, 632-33 (Tenn. 1979);
Chatterley v. Omnico, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 88, 91-92, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (197 1);Jack
C. Kier, Inc. v. Robinson & Keir Partnership, 151 Vt. 358, 360-61, 560 A.2d 957,
958-59 (1989); Cheatle v. Rudd's Swimming Pool Supply Co., 234 Va. 207, 212,
360 S.E.2d 828, 831 (1987); Morgan v. Burks, 93 Wash. 2d 580, 585, 611 P.2d
751,755 (1980); Southern States Coop., Inc. v. Dailey, 167 W. Va. 920, 930, 280
S.E.2d 821, 827 (1981); Consumer's Co-op v. Olsen, 142 Wis. 2d 465, 474-86,
419 N.W.2d 211, 213-18 (1988); Kloefkorn-Ballard Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. North
Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 683 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Wyo. 1984). See generally S.
PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL (1991) (summarizing law of each of fifty
states concerning piercing corporate veil).
234. 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957).
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[T]he two requirements for application of this doctrine
are (1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the individual no longer exist and (2) that, if the
acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow. 23 5
Subsequent cases have made clear that both of these elements
must be present before the corporate entity will be
disregarded. 236
The principal rule found in New York common law for disregarding the corporate entity dates back to the historic case of
Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R. Co. 23 7 Drawing from a number of

contemporary cases and one esteemed commentator, the court
identified the following three factors that must be present in order to pierce the corporate veil:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances
but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to
this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will

or existence of its own; and
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant
to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or a
dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained
23

of.

8

The court added that "[s]uch improper fraudulent activity will not
be presumed, nor can it be based merely on suspicion, conjecture, or doubtful inference. Fraud here, as elsewhere, must be
235. Id. (citations omitted); accord Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386,
394, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 781 (1972); Auer v. Frank, 227 Cal. App. 2d 396, 408,
38 Cal. Rptr. 684, 691 (1964); Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.,
210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 837, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1962).
236. Auer, 227 Cal. App. 2d at 408, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 691; Associated Vendors,
210 Cal. App. at 837, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
237. 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, aft'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
According to one pair of commentators, this case is one of the most frequently
cited in the area of piercing the corporate veil and has had a wide influence.
Krendl & Krendl, supra note 204, at 13.
238. Lowendahl, 247 A.D. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76.
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established by clear and convincing factual proof."23 9
Unlike the law in California, where courts appear to have rallied around a single state supreme court formulation, New York
law is similar to federal law in recognizing competing rules for
piercing the corporate veil. One frequently cited rule in New
York holds that the corporate entity may be disregarded whenever necessary "to prevent fraud or to achieve equity." 240 A more
specific formulation of this rule mandates piercing the veil where
the stockholder has used the corporation for the transaction of
the stockholder's personal business, as opposed to the corporation's business. 241 New York's highest state court has created another variation of that rule, holding that courts are entitled to
disregard the corporate entity of a subsidiary corporation if the
parent has intervened in the subsidiary's management "to such an
extent that 'the subsidiary's paraphernalia of incorporation, direc242
tors and officers' are completely ignored."
The Texas Supreme Court has in recent years taken a somewhat novel position on disregarding the corporate entity. The
opinion of the supreme court in Castleberry v. Branscum 243 identified six separate circumstances under which it would recognize
the piercing of the corporate veil:
(1) When the fiction is used as a means of perpetrating
fraud;
(2) Where a corporation is organized and operated as a
mere tool or business conduit of another
corporation;
(3) Where the corporate fiction is resorted to as a means
of evading an existing legal obligation;
239. Id. at 158, 287 N.Y.S. at 76.

240. Port Chester Elec. & Constr. Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 656, 357
N.E.2d 983, 986, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 331 (1976) (quoting International Aircraft
Trading Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292, 71 N.E.2d 249, 252
(1948)).
241. Id at 656-57, 357 N.E.2d at 986, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 331; accord Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7-8, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 587
(1966); Total Care Health Indus. v. Department of Social Servs., 144 A.D.2d
678, 679, 535 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (1988).
242. Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 163, 412
N.E.2d 934, 941, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 886 (1980) (quoting Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 155, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 73-74, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6
N.E.2d 56 (1936)). The court added that "such liability can never be predicated
solely upon the fact of a parent corporation's ownership of a controlling interest
in the shares of its subsidiary." Id.; accord Dempsey v. Intercontinental Hotel
Corp., 126 A.D.2d 477, 478, 511 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1987).
243. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
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(4) Where the corporate fiction is employed to achieve
or perpetrate monopoly;
(5) Where the corporate fiction is used to circumvent a
statute; and
(6) Where the corporate fiction is relied upon as a pro2 44
tection of crime or to justify wrong.

The court made clear that the alter ego theory is merely one of
several alternative theories that can be used to pierce the corpo24 5
rate veil.

Numerous decisions in each of the three jurisdictions have
given judicial recognition to the equitable nature of piercing the
corporate veil. The California Supreme Court described the matter in this way:
The conditions under which the corporate entity may be
disregarded, or the corporation be regarded as the alter
ego of the stockholders, necessarily vary according to the
circumstances in each case inasmuch as the doctrine is
essentially an equitable one and for that reason is particularly within the province of the trial court. Only gen246
eral rules may be laid down for guidance.
A lower California court reiterated the thought, stating that the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is "essentially one of equity which rests largely upon the facts peculiar to each case." 247
This emphasis on the fact specific nature of piercing the corporate veil and the difficulty of formulating any helpful general rules
248
is repeated in New York and Texas law.

244. Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted).
245. Id. Because Castlebery permits piercing the corporate veil under any of
the six "circumstances," some of which do not require any showing as to domination or control by the stockholder, it immediately gave rise to concerns in the
business community. The Texas legislature therefore amended the Texas Business Corporation Act to restrict the effects of Castleberny in contract claims, but
not in tort claims. For an excellent discussion of Castleberry, its ramifications, the
legislative response and the resulting state of the law in Texas, see Hamilton, A
New Turn in the Texas Law of "Piercingthe Corporate Veil," 8 CORP. CouNs. REv. 1
(1989).
246. Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 846, 129 P.2d 390, 394 (1942); see also
Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d at 796, 306 P.2d at 3 (reiterating two-prong test set forth in
Stark and Watson as guideline to be followed in determining whether to pierce
corporate veil).
247. Platt v. Billingsley, 234 Cal. App. 2d 557, 586, 44 Cal. Rptr. 476, 483
(1965).
248. A federal district court best summarized the understanding of New
York courts with respect to the equitable nature of piercing the corporate veil,
stating: "The circumstances under which the court should disregard the corpo-
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Although all three states' laws agree that no single factor may
be conclusive in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil,
there is no general agreement as to what factors are relevant. Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co.249 compiled an exhaustive
list of the factors cited by California cases in considering whether
to disregard the corporate entity.2 50 After setting out this list, the
rate fiction are not always clear and it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a

precise and categorical definition applicable to all situations, each case being sui
generis." Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(citations omitted), aff'd, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979).
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court, noting that piercing the corporate veil
is an equitable doctrine, stated that a "flexible fact specific approach focusing on
equity" was to be used in Texas. Caseberry,721 S.W.2d at 273. To illustrate the
fact-specific approach of disregarding the corporate veil, the court cited piercing
the veil when adherence to the fiction of the corporation would produce injustice or an inequitable result. Id. The court further stated that the time to pierce
the corporate veil "is a question of fact and common sense. The court must
weigh the facts and consequences in each case carefully, and common sense and
justice must determine [its] decision." Id. (quoting 1 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS
CORPORATIONS

§ 5, at 42 (1942)).

249. 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 26 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1962).
250. Id at 838-40, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813-15. The court cited the following
factors:
Commingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of
the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate
funds or assets to other than corporate uses; the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own; the failure to obtain
authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same; the holding
out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the
corporation; the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate
records, and the confusion of the records of the separate entities; the
identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the identification of
the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the
two entities; identification of the directors and officers of the two entities and responsible supervision and management; sole ownership of all
of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a
family; the use of the same office or business location; the employment
of the same employees and/or attorney; the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization; the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality,
or conduit for a single venture for the business of an individual or another corporation; the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest,
or concealment of personal business activities; the disregard of legal
formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships
among related entities; the use of the corporate entity to procure labor,
services or merchandise for another person or entity; the diversion of
assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or
entity to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and
liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the
liabilities in another; the contracting with another with intent to avoid
performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal
liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions; and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the
existing liability of another person or entity.
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court rejected the appellant's contention that inadequate capitalization was itself sufficient to justify piercing the corporate veil.
The court reasoned that while inadequate capitalization was an
important factor to consider, it did not, standing alone, require
the intervention of equity. 25 ' Other California cases have held, as
a matter of law, that disregarding the corporate entity will not be
justified solely by virtue of the corporation's failure to issue stock
or apply for a stock permit,252 or the sole ownership of the stock
of the corporation by a parent or stockholder. 253
Although numerous New York cases have identified factors
to be considered in piercing the corporate veil, no single case has
collected the relevant factors for that state. It has been held that
neither sole ownership of the stock,2 54 nor a common board of
directors, 255 nor the failure to observe corporate formalities 256
will by itselfjustify the imposition of liability on the stockholders.
It has been held under Texas law that mere ownership of
stock, 257 duplication of some or all of the directors or officers,258
Id. (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 841-42, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 816; accord Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App.
3d 837, 841-43, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-19 (1970) (concluding that individuals
were not corporation's alter ego and declining to pierce corporate veil where
there was no fraud, misconduct or overreaching and only factor present was
underfinancing); cf. Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 580, 364 P.2d 473, 475,
15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961) (piercing corporate veil where individual was secretary, treasurer and director, where court determined he was equitable owner
of corporation, where defendant actively participated in conduct of business
and, most importantly, where there was no attempt to provide adequate
capitalization).
252. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d at 796, 306 P.2d at 4 (failure to issue stock or apply
for stock permit indicates that corporation is doing business for individual's benefit but does not amount to conclusive evidence).
253. Shafford v. Otto Sales Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 849, 260 P.2d 269, 27677 (1953) (other factors such as confusion of corporate and individual affairs,
failure to disclose to third parties existence of two entities and abuse or bad faith
in exercise of corporate control must be present with sole ownership to disregard corporate veil).
254. Billy v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp. 51 N.Y.2d 152, 163, 412
N.E.2d 934, 941, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 886 (1980); Lowendahl, 247 A.D. at 156, 287
N.Y.S. at 74-75.
255. Total Care Health Indus., Inc. v. Department of Social Servs., 144
A.D.2d 678, 679, 535 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (App. Div. 1988); see also Lowendahl, 247
A.D. at 156, 287 N.Y.S. at 74-75 (recognizing that entire concept of corporation
as separate legal entity could be destroyed by piercing corporate veil because
parent exercised control over subsidiary through stock ownership, identity of
stockholders or common directors).
256. Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1230-31 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979).
257. Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1975).
258. Id.
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exercise of control by the stockholders 259 or undercapitalization, 26 0 while relevant to the inquiry, will not be sufficient to

pierce the corporate veil. Under the sham theory, however, the
plaintiff need not prove that any element of control exists. Mere
26 1
constructive fraud is sufficient.
The presence of "inequitable result" is required for disregarding the corporate entity in California. 262 Several cases have
attempted to give substance to this requirement by clarifying that
actual fraud is not required. 263 The California appellate court in
Platt v. Billingskey264 made clear that piercing the corporate veil
could be used to "prevent that which would result in fraud or an
injustice. ' 26 5 The court in Associated Vendors went even further:
Certainly, it is not sufficient to merely show that a creditor will remain unsatisfied if the corporate veil is not
pierced, and thus set up an unhappy circumstance as a
proof of an "inequitable result." ... The purpose of the

doctrine is not to protect every unsatisfied creditor, but
rather to afford him protection, where some conduct
amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable under the
applicable rule above cited, for the equitable owner of a
26 6
corporation to hide behind its corporate veil.

Thus, under California law, equitable concerns are of considerable importance in every piercing the corporate veil case.
The precise extent to which inequitable result is required
under New York law to pierce the corporate veil is not clear. At
one extreme, the Lowendahl case expressly stated that a plaintiff
must prove actual or constructive fraud, or "other legal wrong to
259. Id.
260. Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803, 804-05 (Tex. 1980).
261. Castleberny, 721 S.W.2d at 273. The court distinguished between actual
and constructive fraud, noting that in actual fraud there is an intent to deceive,
whereas in constructive fraud there is a breach of a legal or equitable duty that
involves deception, a violation of confidence or an injury to the public. Id.
262. For a discussion of the inequitable result requirement, see supra notes
235-36 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 488, 202 P. 673, 676 (1921).
The court stated: "It is not necessary ... that the complaint allege actual fraud;
it is sufficient if the facts set forth disclose that the dealings were in form with a
corporation but in reality with an individual and that a refusal to recognize this
fact will bring about an inequitable result." Id.
264. 234 Cal. App. 2d 557, 44 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1965).
265. Id. at 586, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
266. 210 Cal. App. 2d at 842, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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plaintiff's rights" in order to pierce the corporate veil. 2 67 The
court in Majestic Factors Corp. v. Latino,2 68 on the other hand, held
that the question of fraud was not essential where the individuals
had so dominated the corporation that they were deemed to be
the principals of the transaction. The court held that their actions
269
created liability under "the general rules of agency."
According to the Texas Supreme Court, the requisite level of
fraud necessary in Texas to pierce the corporate veil depends
upon which of the six bases for piercing the corporate veil is being applied. Under the alter ego theory, it must be shown that
"there is such unity between corporation and individual that the
separateness of the corporation has ceased and holding only the
corporation liable would result in injustice." 2 70 Under the sham
basis, however, the emphasis is solely upon showing some kind of
fraud. 27 1 The Castleberry court made clear, however, that actual or
intentional fraud is not required, stating that it "is sufficient if recognizing the separate existence would bring about an inequitable
result." 2 72 The court went on to hold that the sham basis may be
established on a showing of constructive fraud, which it had previously defined as "the breach of some legal or equitable duty
which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or
' 27
to injure public interests." "
267. Lowendahl, 247 A.D. at 158, 287 N.Y.S. at 76; see also Bartle v. Home
Owners Coop., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955) (noting that
underlying purpose of piercing corporate veil is to prevent fraud and achieve
equity); Marino v. Dwyer-Berry Constr. Corp., 146 A.D.2d 750, 750-51, 537
N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (App. Div. 1989) (noting that there is requirement of fraud,
illegality or wrongdoing even when corporation is controlled by single
stockholder).
268. 15 Misc. 2d 329, 184 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
269. Id. at 330-31, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 660. Several factors were present that
illustrated the defendants' domination of the corporation: failure to have a separate bank account for the corporation; failure of the corporation to have any
assets of its own; defendants and corporation occupied and used the same premises; orders of the corporation were turned over to the defendants; all payments
made to corporation were turned over to defendants; failure of corporation to
issue stock; failure to hold stockholder and director meetings; failure to elect
officers or directors; and failure to file tax returns with appropriate governmental agencies. Id.
270. Castleberry, 721 S.W.2d at 272.
271. Id. at 272-73.
272. Id. (citations omitted).
273. Id. at 273 (quoting Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex.
1964)).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

66

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991]

CERCLA

LIABILITY

1433

C. DistinguishingCERCIA Liability Rules from Traditional Common
Law

As the preceding discussion of the traditional federal and
state common law regarding direct liability and piercing the cor-

porate veil suggests, the traditional federal and state common law
rules have more in common with each other than they do with the
rules articulated in the CERCLA cases. This section of the Article
will explore the ways in which the direct liability and the piercing
the corporate veil liability rules articulated in the environmental
cases differ from their counterparts under traditional common
law.
1. Direct Liability

The most obvious distinction between the traditional direct
liability cases and the CERCLA direct liability cases is that federal
and state cases adhering to the traditional doctrine require that
the officer or director being held liable have personally participated in or authorized and approved the act causing the damage
at issue. 27 4 These traditional cases make clear that such persons
are not liable solely by virtue of their offices. 275 In this regard,
the capacity to control rule set forth in NEPACCO I and its progeny is quite different. 276 The early environmental cases focused
on the capacity of the officer or director to control hazardous substance disposal, rather than on the individual's acts. The later
cases in this line have relaxed the requirement even further. Instead of focusing on the individual's relationship to the hazardous
substances, the cases now focus on the individual's management
of the relevant facility, or even the individual's management of
the corporation. 27 7 Similarly, the "indicia of ownership" line of
274. For a further discussion of the traditional requirement of personal
participation, see supra notes 179-89, 194-95, 198 and accompanying text.
275. For a further discussion regarding liability relating to various corporate offices, see supra notes 189, 201 and accompanying text.
276. For a discussion of the capacity to control rule implemented in the
environmental cases, see supra notes 42-96 and accompanying text.
277. This shift in focus permits courts to hold a parent corporation directly
liable as an "operator" of its subsidiary, without requiring evidence of how such
parent, which is not an officer or director, was able to influence the actions of the
subsidiary. For example, in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24,
27-28 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991), the circuit court upheld
the lower court's finding that the parent was an operator of a facility from which

a release of hazardous substances had issued. The appellate court quoted with
approval the lower court's summary of the evidence showing control by KayserRoth, the parent, over the activities of Stamina Mills, its subsidiary:
Kayser-Roth exercised pervasive control over Stamina Mills through,
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environmental cases focuses on the ownership of stock in, and the
active participation in the management of, the corporation as a
whole. Little attention is paid to the individual's ownership or
management of the facility from which the hazardous substance
has been released. 2 78 By diverting attention away from the actions

of the officers and directors, and turning it instead toward their
functions within the corporation and their capacity to make things
happen, the CERCLA cases have, in essence, held officers and di-

rectors liable solely by virtue of their offices. This directly contravenes the traditional common law.

Traditional direct liability is also distinguishable from
CERCLA direct liability in that the former contains an exception

for nonfeasance. This exception protects an individual who
breached a duty to the corporation arising from his employment,
but who has neither breached any duty owed to a third party, nor
allowed a condition under his control to pose an unreasonable

risk to third parties. 279 An officer or director cannot be held liable under the traditional common law for a tort committed in the
name of the corporation unless the existence of a duty towards
among other things: 1) its total monetary control including collection
of accounts payable; 2) its restriction on Stamina Mills' financial
budget; 3) its directive that subsidiary-governmental contact, including environmental matters, be funneled directly through Kayser-Roth;
4) its requirement that Stamina Mills' leasing, buying or selling of real
estate first be approved by Kayser-Roth; 5) its policy that Kayser-Roth
approve any capital transfer or expenditures greater than $5000; and
finally, its placement of Kayser-Roth personnel in almost all Stamina
Mills' director and officer positions, as a means of totally ensuring that
Kayser-Roth corporate policy was exactly implemented and precisely
carried out.
Id. at 27. What is missing from this summary is evidence showing how KayserRoth was able to effect such control. Certainly a corporate parent can vote its
shares to elect directors who are likely to act in accordance with the parent's
wishes. The court in this case did state that Kayser-Roth had placed its personnel in substantially all of the officer and director positions at Stamina Mills. Id.
At best, this evidence suggests that the Kayser-Roth personnel who were officers
and directors of Stamina Mills may be liable operators under CERCLA. Conspicuous by its absence is any link between Kayser-Roth, as a corporation, and
the release of hazardous substances at Stamina Mills.
For a discussion relating to the role of management of a facility or corporation and corresponding liability, see supra notes 49-56, 87-96 and accompanying

text.

278. For a further discussion of the "indicia of ownership" line of cases, see
supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. "The use of the exception implies
that an owning stockholder who manages the corporation

. . .

is liable under

CERCLA as an 'owner or operator.'" New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985).
279. For a further discussion of the nonfeasance exception, see supra notes
190, 202 and accompanying text.
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the injured third party is first proved. 2 80 None of the CERCLA
liability rules have required such a finding as a condition to imposing liability. The CERCLA rules focus entirely on the position
of the person in management of the facility or the corporation,
and his capacity to prevent certain kinds of damage. 28 ' While it
may be generally supposed that even under the traditional common law there exists a duty to avoid exposing innocent third parties to hazardous conditions, it is not clear by any means that this
duty rests equally on all persons who participate in the manage-

ment of a corporation or a facility. Under the traditional common
law, an officer or director could be held liable for damages to
third parties due to a release of hazardous substances if it were
shown that he in fact had a duty to prevent the condition.2 8 2 Establishing the existence of such a duty would presumably involve
a thorough analysis of the individual's specific activities at the facility, a determination of whether he was generally aware of the
conditions at the facility, and a determination concerning his
knowledge of the specific condition that posed an immediate risk

of injury to the third parties.2 83 Under the CERCLA cases, however, there is an implicit premise that some senior officers have a
duty to prevent all harm. 2 84 Given this premise, the exception for

nonfeasance disappears.
In summary, the traditional common law created a mecha280. For a discussion of the duty owed to a third party and its role in determining liability, see supra notes 190, 202 and accompanying text.

281. For a further discussion concerning ability to prevent damage and an
individual's position within the corporation in relation to CERCLA liability, see
supra notes 49-56, 87-96 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490,
510, 723 P.2d 573, 585, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 468 (1986) (en banc) (basis for
potential liability regarding hazardous condition rests upon officer's or director's unreasonable failure to prevent harm when they are only persons in position to prevent it).
283. Haefeli v. Woodridge Eng'g Co., 255 N.Y. 442,451, 175 N.E. 123, 126
(1931) (declining to hold president of corporation liable where design and construction of defective cesspool were committed to and under personal supervision of superintendent in charge, and president neither knew nor had reason to
know of defects in plan or construction); cf. Mayflower Inv. Co. v. Stephens, 345
S.W.2d 786, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (declining to hold liable corporate officers who are present at construction site and "generally knew what was going
on" because there was no evidence that they knew about specific problem or that
they gave directions to engineer or independent contractor).
284. See, e.g., NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). Even
though the corporate president was more than 1,000 miles from the release of
the hazardous substances, he was still held liable based on his "capacity and
general responsibility as president to control the disposal of hazardous waste."
Id. at 849.
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nism under which courts could determine the potential liability of
an individual officer or director by analyzing his actual participation in the activity leading to the tort or breach of statute, and
then looking at whether this activity breached a duty to any third
party. The federal courts that have articulated the capacity to
control rule in CERCLA cases have substantially modified this
mechanism by focusing not on what an individual did or how his
or her actions affected the injured third party, but on whether the
individual occupied a position of authority within the corporation.
This shift in focus eliminates the plaintiff's need to present evidence linking the defendant with the third party and the harm,
allowing the plaintiff to substitute evidence linking the defendant
with the corporation. As the preceding discussion has shown, this
shift has no basis in the language or legislative history of
CERCLA, or in prior common law, yet it drastically enlarges the
scope of the statute.
2. Indirect Liability: Disregardingthe Corporate Entity
The CERCLA rules under which the corporate veil may be
pierced, like the CERCLA rules providing for direct liability, ignore certain qualifications and limitations that form an essential
part of the traditional common law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Most of the federal and state rules on disregarding
the corporate entity in non-CERCLA contexts require a finding
either of complete unity of interest between stockholder and corporation or complete domination of the corporation by its stockholders, such that the corporation has no separate "mind" of its
own.2 85 Under the CERCLA rules, however, it is not necessary to

show unity of interest or domination. The "ownership interest
and control" rule established in United States v. Nicolet, Inc.286 requires only that the stockholder have a "substantial financial or
ownership interest" in the corporation and that the stockholder
control the management and operations of the corporation.2 87 In
reality, in the normal course of operations a corporate parent will
have both an ownership interest in the subsidiary and effective
control over the management and operations of the subsidiary.
285. For a further discussion of the traditional requirements for piercing

the corporate veil, seesupra notes 206-18, 234-45 and accompanying text. For a
contrasting view, in which the plaintiff did not have to show control, see supra

note 261 and accompanying text.
286. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
287. Id. at 1202-03. For a discussion of veil piercing under Nicolet, see supra
notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
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Thus, under the Nicolet rule, routine shareholder activity constitutes grounds for liability, notwithstanding that incorporation of a

subsidiary in order to avoid or limit liability has long been recog288
nized as a completely legitimate activity.
The "public convenience, fairness and equity" rule used in
CERCLA cases also does not appear to require any finding of
domination or unity of interest.289 The district courts in In re
Acushnet River 2 90 and United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.29 1 identified
a number of factors that could be used to determine that such

domination or unity of interest existed. 292 The Kayser-Roth opinion based its holding on the determination that CERCLA puts
"no special importance" on the corporate form and that the
"public convenience, fairness and equity" rule should be applied

with that in mind. The court thus made clear that a finding of
domination is only an alternative basis for its holding that the corporate veil can be pierced. 293 This leaves open the possibility that
normal shareholder behavior arising from routine ownership and
control of a corporation can be punished with personal liability
294
for environmental damages.
288. See Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 672 (D. Idaho 1986)
(in applying test for "owner or operator," "care must be taken so that 'normal'
activities of a parent with respect to its subsidiary do not automatically warrant
finding the parent is owner or operator").
289. For a complete discussion of the public convenience, fairness and equity test, see supra notes 151-68 and accompanying text.
290. 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987).
291. 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991).
292. For a discussion of the factors identified by the In re Acushnet River and
Kayser-Roth courts, see supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
293. Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp. at 23-24 (holding that subsidiary's corporate
veil should be pierced to impose liability on corporate parent "not only because
public convenience, fairness, and equity dictate such a result, but also due to the
all encompassing control which [the parent] had over [the subsidiary] as, in fact
and deed, an owner").
294. The same concern can be raised with respect to the "business conduit" rule. For a further discussion of the "business conduit" rule, see supra
notes 169-78 and accompanying text. The court inJoslyn Corp. v. T.L.James &
Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 n.8 (W.D. La. 1988), aff'd sub nom.Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1017 (1991), followed the Fifth Circuit's lead from United States v.Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 104 (1986). Both
courts stated that federal and state law on piercing the corporate veil were essentially the same, despite the fact thatJon-T referred to Texas law andJoslyn to
Louisiana law. After the changes in Texas law brought about by the decision in
Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986), it is unclear whether a
federal court hearing a CERCLA case in Texas should apply: (1) the "business
conduit rule," which is in fact theJon-T rule; (2) the Castleberny rule, which looks
very much like the "public convenience and equity" rule; or (3) some new stan-
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In addition to domination or unity of interest, most federal
and state rules require that some element of injustice or inequitable result be present to merit piercing the corporate veil. 295
While actual fraud is not usually required, some kind of wrongdoing is almost always found in traditional piercing the corporate
veil cases. Typically, there is an attempt to link such wrongdoing
to the harm visited on the third party.29 6 The ownership interest
and control rule used in the CERCLA cases does not contain any
requirement of wrongdoing. 297 The public convenience, fairness
and equity rule, as the phrase implies, does appear to incorporate
some aspect of this requirement. The In re Acushnet River case did
not make any specific findings, however, about inequity or unjust
result. 298 Moreover, the public convenience, fairness and equity
rule does not require that the stockholder being held liable have
done something wrong; the "fairness" or "equity" consideration
could arise from the acts of others. For example, one can agree
that it is fair and equitable for an innocent third party victim of a
release of hazardous substances to receive compensation, without
also agreeing that equity automatically demands the personal liability of the stockholders of the corporation from whose premises
the release occurred. 299 Under the traditional piercing the corporate veil doctrine, equity may side with the stockholders. The inquiry under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is whether
dard. It is also unclear whether the applicable rule should change for the rest of
the Fifth Circuit. For a further discussion of the Castleberry decision and the resultant ambiguities, see supra notes 243-45, 270-73 and accompanying text.
295. For a further discussion regarding injustice or inequitable result in the
context of piercing the corporate veil, see supra notes 219-22, 235, 240, 246-48,
262-73 and accompanying text.
296. See, e.g., Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 158-59, 287
N.Y.S. 62, 77 (finding that there was not domination and control by corporate
defendants during transaction with plaintiff, where defendants acted in manner

that was normal and usual for majority stockholders with large investment in
enterprise), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
297. For a further discussion of the ownership interest and control rule, see
supra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
298. In In reAcushnet River, the discussion focused on the amount of control
that the parent corporation had over the subsidiary. The government had argued "more on the general principle that corporate separateness will be ignored
to prevent injustice than on the specific factors" listed in the opinion, but the
court found that the requisite amount of control was not present. The lack of
control by the parent over the subsidiary precluded piercing the corporate veil.
In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 34 (D. Mass. 1987).
299. It is difficult to see the injustice or inequity in not imposing liability on
a sole stockholder who established sound policies and hired competent employees, only to have a release of hazardous substances occur by virtue of something
he neither knew nor should have known about, even though an innocent third
party was injured.
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the stockholders have done something to deserve such liability.300
Thus, the traditional common law doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil provided a way for courts to impose liability on
stockholders where the stockholders' actions or inaction could be
linked to the harm suffered by third parties, much like the way in
which traditional direct liability was used to impose liability on
officers and directors. In the case of piercing the corporate veil,
the new CERCLA rules of liability minimize or entirely dispense
with the linkage that was required under traditional common law.
As with direct liability, neither the language of the CERCLA statute nor legal precedent support this change in the law.
The preceding discussion has not attempted to show that the
traditional federal and state common law rules of liability are better than the rules developed in the CERCLA cases, or that they
are more beneficial for the economy or for the law in general.
The rules and exceptions contained in the traditional common
law have been subjected to a great deal of criticism, particularly in
the parent-subsidiary context.30 ' Much of that criticism is justified, although perhaps not conclusive.302 What the preceding discussion has shown, however, is that the CERGLA rules are
considerably different from the existing traditional law, and that
there is a lack of authority in the form of legal precedent or doctrine to bridge the gulf between the two. Even the traditional federal common law in non-environmental cases for the most part
stops short of the rules adopted in the CERCLA cases.
300. See, e.g., Lowendahl, 247 A.D. at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76 (focusing on individual's control of finances, policy and business practice relating to transaction
as well as utilization of such control).
301. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1987); Dobbyn, A PracticalApproach to Consistency

in Veil-PiercingCases, 19 U.

KAN.

L. REV. 185 (1971) (discussing so-called liberal-

conservative conflict between New York and California law on piercing corporate veil); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in
Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589 (1975) (discussing piercing corporate veil to
reach assets of parent when subsidiary has declared bankruptcy); Note, Liability
of Parent Corporationsfor Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV. L. REV.
986 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Parent Liability] (general discussion on economic
and legal ramifications of holding parent company liable under CERCLA); Note,
Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 YALE
LJ. 1190 (1967) (analyzing and critiquing of holding stockholders liable for
torts committed by their corporation).

302. For a discussion relating to validity of criticism of traditional common
law rules in the subsidiary context, see infra notes 516-20 and accompanying
text.
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Limited liability and its exceptions remain an important part

of the corporate law in this country, and influence countless business decisions every day. Although distinguished commentators
have criticized the traditional rules, the existing rules have survived and evolved slowly. Thus, .the issue arises as to whether the
federal courts should be permitted to impose new rules of limited
liability in areas of law like CERCLA, or whether they should exercise restraint in deference to the general common law. What is
the proper role of the federal courts in the development of the
law of limited liability? May the federal courts create special liability rules for CERCLA or are they relegated to applying rules
developed over time in the state courts? It is to these questions
that we turn our attention in Part III.
III.

FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE COMMON LAW RULES: THE
CASE FOR ADOPTING STATE LAW

After seeing the extent to which the CERCLA rules of direct
liability and piercing the corporate veil represent a departure
from their traditional common law counterparts, the next issue to
explore concerns whether the federal courts that are interpreting
and applying the CERCLA statute have the power and authority
to move beyond the established state law. At first glance, it would
seem the question can be easily answered in the affirmative. The
landmark case of Cleatfield Trust Co. v. United States 30 3 clearly established the right of the federal judiciary to make federal common
law when deciding federal question cases. Clearfield Trust involved
a check drawn on the Treasury of the United States.3 0 4 The Untied States Supreme Court held that because the authority of the
federal government to issue the check was rooted in the Constitution and federal statutes, federal law, not state law, should govern
the rights and duties of the United States relating to the check. 30 5
The Court noted that it had occasionally applied state law to federal questions, but declared that this case was much different because of the significant, adverse effects that state law would have
303. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
304. Id. at 364-65.

305. Id. at 366-67. The Court reasoned that the authority to issue checks
was simply one example of federal power that required federal protection:
The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the
laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state .... In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.
Id. (citations omitted).
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both on the rights and duties of the United States and on the
large volume of transactions involving commercial paper of the
306
United States.
Clearfield Trust did not close the door on the use of state law in
interpreting federal statutes, however. Some thirty-six years
later, the Supreme Court, after numerous opportunities to revisit
3 08
the issue,3 0 7 finally set forth in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.
various factors for determining what role state law should have in
federal questions.3 09 As an initial matter, the Court noted that
"[t]his Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs." 3 10 The Court then decided that
federal law would govern the priority of liens in the instant case
created in favor of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and
the Farmers Home Administration (FHA).3 1 1 Having settled that
issue, the Court then held that state law still had a role to play:
Controversies directly affecting the operations of federal
programs, although governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.
Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide
federal rule is a matter of judicial policy "dependent
upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the
306. Id at 367. The Court stated that the United States issued commercial
paper "on a vast scale" that would normally involve several states subjecting
"the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty." Id. The
Court also believed that application of state law "would lead to great diversity in
results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states." Id.
307. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29 &
nn.20-24 (1979) (citing cases in which Court had been presented with opportunity to revisit issue).
308. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
309. Id. at 728-29. In an opinion handed down a little over one month after
Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court articulated a slightly different test for determining whether state law rules would govern the authority of independent directors to decide whether a stockholder derivative suit could be pursued on the
corporation's behalf. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979). The Court
determined that the issue was not one that required uniformity, and then stated
that the federal statutes in question "do not require that federal law displace
state laws governing the powers of directors unless the state laws permit action
prohibited by the Acts, or unless 'their application would be inconsistent with
the federal policy underlying the cause of action.'" Id. at 478-79 (quotingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S: 454, 465 (1975)).
310. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726.
311. Id. at 726-27 (determining that "federal interests are sufficiently implicated to warrant the protection of federal law").
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effects upon them of applying state law." 31 2
The Court next enunciated the relevant considerations. To
determine whether a court can adopt existing state law as the rule
of decision for a given issue that is otherwise governed by federal
law, a court must weigh three factors: whether a need for uniformity exists; whether adoption of state law would frustrate the
specific objectives of the federal statute or program; and whether
the creation of a new uniform federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships built on state law. 31 3 The Supreme Court applied this test to the facts of the Kimbell Foods case, and decided

that nondiscriminatory state laws regarding priority should be
3 14
adopted rather than a new uniform federal rule.

The test created in Kimbell Foods has been used in a vast
number of cases in numerous areas of law.3 15 At the most fundamental level, the test is actually about control: should the federal
courts surrender a portion of their power to influence the growth
and development of a federal statute or program, in order to accommodate the interests represented in existing state law? The
first two elements of the Kimbell Foods test measure the extent of
the federal interests that are at stake. The final element gauges
the possible disruption to the state interests. In essence, the
question is whether the federal judiciary will allow the development of state law to dictate the direction that the federal statute
or program will take, at least with respect to the issue in
question. 316
312. Id. at 727-28 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)).
313. Id. at 727-29.

314. Id. at 727-40.
315. For a discussion of some of the many cases utilizing the Kimbell Foods
analysis, see infra notes 320-610 and accompanying text.
316. The federal courts can surrender their control for one issue, rather
than an entire case or controversy. "[A] decision to apply state lAw as a matter
of federal judicial incorporation may frequently be made as to a single issue at a
time." Mishkin, supra note 109, at 804-05.
The issue of whether a court should adopt a state rule of decision to give
content to federal law is distinguishable from the issue of whether federal law
preempts state law. Determining whether federal law preempts state law is a
matter of ascertaining the intent of Congress:
Federal law may supersede state law in several different ways. First,
when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to
pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms. Second, congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred
where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to
make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for sup-

plementary or state regulation ....
As a third alternative, in those areas where Congress has not com-
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Despite the critical importance of resolving whether federal
or state law will apply, early CERCLA cases managed to ignore
the issue entirely.31 7 The later CERCLA cases that have addressed the Kimbell Foods test have consistently argued that a federal rule must be applied to determine liability of officers,
directors and stockholders under CERCLA.3 18 The following
pletely displaced state regulation, federal law may nonetheless preempt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a
conflict occurs either because "compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility," or because the state law stands
"as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987) (citations omitted).
As one commentator has stated:
(Tihe adoption issue doctrine arises not when there are both federal
and state laws on the issue in question, but when a state law of general
applicability is considered as a means of determining an issue on which
Congress is silent. While the presence of congressional intent to occupy the area of law is one ground for preemption, the absence of any
congressional intent is one of the prerequisites for the existence of the
adoption issue.
Note, Adopting State Law as the FederalRule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHi.
L. REV. 823, 827 n.28 (1976), quoted in United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons,
Inc., 800 F.2d 1232, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., concurring). But see Boyle
v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988) (stating that "displacement of state law" and "displacement of federal law's incorporation of
state law" are not different in the instant case, if ever). Preemption arguments
have not been raised in the CERCLA liability cases or commentaries, and therefore will not be considered in the analysis that follows. It is submitted that the
analysis of federal preemption of state law by CERCLA would be substantially
similar to the analysis presented here.
317. The statutory rule and the indicia of ownership rule are both creatures
of statutory interpretation by federal courts, and would not in any event require
a discussion of state common law. Therefore, the discussion of direct liability in
Part III will concentrate on the capacity to control rule. For criticism of the
statutory rule and the indicia of ownership rule, see supra notes 110-28, 132-34
and accompanying text. For a defense of these rules, see P. BLUMBERG, supra
note 108, § 18.02, at 613-20.
318. See Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 350-51
(D.N.J. 1991) (holding that uniform federal law should be created to determine
parent corporation liability as "operator" under direct liability theory); United
States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. 15, 20 (D.R.I. 1989) ("Accordingly, a
uniform federal rule of decision should be applied in CERCLA cases involving
alter ego liability."), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S.Ct. 957
(1991); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(concluding that development of uniform federal rule for alter ego claims under
CERCLA was warranted); In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass.
1987) ("Thus, the court holds that the decision whether to disregard corporate
separateness for purposes of claims made under CERCLA is controlled by federal law."). But see CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., Nos. G89-10503
CA, G89-961 CA, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12143 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 1991)
(applying state law concerning piercing the corporate veil, following Anspec Co.
v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991));Joslyn Corp. v.
T.L. James & Co., 696 F. Supp. 222, 226 (W.D. La. 1988) (holding that determi-
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analysis will consider the arguments for and against uniform rules
of direct liability and piercing the corporate veil (including those
advanced in the CERCLA cases in favor of such a rule) in the
context of the broader issue of whether the federal courts should
adopt uniform federal rules to give the United States recovery
and enforcement rights against individuals other than those who
are expressly and unambiguously described in the statute or who
are otherwise liable under existing state common law.3 19
A.

Is There a Needfor Uniformity?

CERCLA cases grappling with the choice of law issue have
held consistently that a uniform federal rule of liability plays an
essential role in fulfilling the purposes of the statute. The court
in In reAcushnet River had no doubts about the need for uniformity
in CERCLA liability issues:
Congress did not intend that the ability of the executive
to fund the clean up of hazardous waste sites should depend on the attitudes of the several states toward parentsubsidiary liability in general, or CERCLA in particular.
The need for a uniform federal rule is especially great
for questions of piercing the corporate veil, since liability
under the statute must not depend upon the particular
state in which a defendant happens to reside.3 20
Other courts dealing with piercing the corporate veil under
CERCLA have agreed, relying on this same language.3 21
nation as to whether federal or state rule should apply to alter ego cases under
CERCLA was unnecessary because "federal and state alter ego tests are essentially the same" (quoting United States v.Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 690
n.6 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986))), aff'd sub nom. Joslyn Mfg.
Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017
(1991).
319. Notwithstanding the importance of the Kimbell Foods test in so many
areas of the law, no courts or commentators have attempted to collect and analyze the published opinions that have used the test. As a result, the courts (including the courts deciding the CERCLA cases) continue to use a number of
different criteria in ascertaining whether the elements of the test have been satisfied. The criteria differ markedly from case to case. In order to pursue a more
rigorous study of effects of the Kimbell Foods test on CERCLA liability, this Article sorts through the various cases that have applied the Kimbell Foods test in
some detail. To assist in analyzing this mass of cases, the Article groups the

cases into subcategories within the discussion of each element of the test. The
author developed the classification system specifically for this Article.
320. In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31. The court thought that the
need for a uniform rule was "true beyond peradventure." Id.

321. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 350-51 (D.N.J.
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Two cases that dealt with the issue ofjoint and several liability under CERCLA also relied on the need for uniformity. The
district court deciding United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.3 22 held that
CERCLA is and "must be uniform in character throughout the
nation.13 23 To support this holding, the court quoted then-Representative James Florio's speech in debate preceding enactment
of CERCLA: "To insure the development of a uniform rule of
law, and to discourage business [sic] dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws,
the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal com32 4
mon law in this area."
In United States v. A & F MaterialsCo. ,325 another district court
identified four reasons that compelled adoption of a uniform federal law ofjoint and several liability: the substantial federal interest in hazardous substances; the jurisdiction of the federal courts
and their role in interpreting federal statutes; the need to prevent
excessive dumping of hazardous substances in states with more
lenient liability laws; and the need to protect the Superfund from
''needless uncertainty and subsequent delay" caused by diverse
state laws.3 2 6 Both Chem-Dyne and A&F Materials, while not di-

rectly on point, appear to lend support to the position adopted in
In re Acushnet River, and have been cited on occasion in that
27
regard.3
Although the need for uniformity may have been obvious to
the authors of the Chem-Dyne and A & FMaterials opinions, as well
as the In re Acushnet River court, the reasoning is not nearly so
compelling when viewed in the context of other cases that have
applied the Kimbell Foods test. These cases reveal a number of different factors that courts have considered in attempting to determine whether there is a need for uniform federal law. For the
1991) (quoting In reAcushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31); Kayser-Roth, 724 F. Supp.
at 19-20 (same); Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1201-02 (same).
322. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
323. Id at 809.
324. Id. (quoting 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980)). Since his days as a member of the House of Representatives and his statements concerning CERCLA,
Florio has become the governor of New Jersey.
325. 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
326. l at 1255 (quoting United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802,
809 (W.D. La. 1983)).
327. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing ChemDyne), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804
F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting) (citing A & F
Materials).
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purposes of this discussion, these factors can be grouped into
four categories:
(1) the presence or absence of express or implied congressional intent that a uniform federal rule be
created;
(2) the effects that diverse state laws would have on federal rights;
(3) the effects that state laws would have on operations;
and
(4) the likelihood that a uniform law could actually be
created by the federal courts.
Taken together, these factors lend themselves to a more sophisticated analysis of the subject than that found in the CERCLA
cases.
1. Did Congress Intend that the Federal Statute or Program Be Applied

Uniformly?
The inquiry into the necessity of a uniform federal rule requires an initial determination of whether there exists any evidence of express or implied congressional intent to have the
statute in question applied uniformly throughout the nation. If
such intent is explicit, this would, of course, be entitled to great
weight.3 28 Even if congressional intent is not expressed in the
statute or the legislative history, however, it can sometimes be inferred from the statutory scheme.
Neither the CERCLA statute nor its legislative history contain any express indication of congressional intent concerning
choice of law on direct liability or piercing the corporate veil. 3 29
The In re Acushnet River opinion offers no authority in support of
its statement that Congress did not intend state laws to impair the
executive's cleanup capability. 330 The Chem-Dyne opinion cites
328. United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1967) ("Congress, of course, is the primary source of federal law, and the federal courts must

adhere to the intent of Congress whenever this intent is discernible.").
329. Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 351 (D.NJ.
1991) ("legislative history strongly suggests" development of uniform federal
rule). In contrast, certain contribution issues are expressly governed by federal
law. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1988) (claims regarding contribution shall be brought
in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and governing law shall be
federal law).
330. In reAcushnet River, 675 F. Supp. at 31. The court noted that the intent
of Congress was not that the executive "should depend on the attitudes of the
several states toward parent-subsidiary liability," but never referred to actual
language in the statute or legislative history. Id. The only potential justification
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CERCLA's legislative history as authority for its assertion about
the need for uniformity, but this citation deserves some close
scrutiny.3 3 1 The hasty passage of the statute left relatively little
legislative history for CERCLA,3 3 2 and none of that which does
33 3
exist deals with direct liability or piercing the corporate veil.
The record does, however, reflect extensive discussion on the issues of strict liability and joint and several liability. In fact, Representative Florio, quoted in Chem-Dyne, addressed specifically the
issue of joint and several liability- 3- 4 Earlier versions of the statute that the House of Representatives considered had contained
express language providing for joint and several liability. The
Senate deleted this language in its version, leaving the issue to
"traditional and evolving principles of common law." 3 3 5 Thus,
Representative Florio's statement that CERCLA would encourage
development of federal common law "in this area" falls within the
narrow context of a discussion ofjoint and several liability. There
is no evidence that Representative Florio or any other member of
Congress intended federal law to govern all aspects of CERCLA

liability.
The question remains, however, whether any grounds exist
for inferring congressional intent for a uniform rule of liability for
officers, directors and stockholders from the language of the statute. No such intent is readily apparent. Arguably, the CERCLA
statutory scheme implies that Congress did not intend to impose
uniformity on this issue, and, in fact, made uniformity impossible
by incorporating several elements of state law into the federal
statute. For example, CERCLA provides for the creation of a lien

in favor of the United States on real property subject to or affor this statement comes from a cite to Chem-Dyne, which refers to Representative
James Florio's speech preceding the enactment of CERCLA. See id
331. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (W.D. La.
1983).
332. CERCLA was enacted on December 11, 1980 in the last days of
the 96th Congress. The final version of the Act was conceived by an ad
hoc committee of Senators who fashioned a last minute compromise
which enabled the Act to pass. As a result, the statute was hastily and

inadequately drafted. The only legislative history on the compromise is
found in the floor debates.
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984)

(footnote omitted); see also Grad, supra note 7, at 1.
333. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,897-987 (1980); id. at 31,950-82. See generally
Grad, supra note 7.
334. 126 CONG. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio); see also id. at
30,932 (statement of Sen. Randolph); id. at 30,935 (statement of Sen. Stafford);
id. at 30,941 (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
335. Id. at 31,965 (statement of Rep. Florio).
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fected by CERCLA cleanup actions.-s 6 The priority of liens created under state law over the CERCLA lien, however, is governed
entirely by state law. 337 Similarly, a state law may set the degree
of cleanup that any federal remedial action of hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant must attain, if such state law is
more stringent than federal law. s" 8 Given the fact that state law

can affect the cost of a remedial action by raising the standard of
cleanup, and can also affect the priority of liens securing repayment of that cost, a good argument can be made that Congress
did not intend uniformity of liability under CERCLA.
The United States Supreme Court considered a similar argument in the non-CERCLA context in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v.

Beaver County.33 9 The case dealt with the issue of whether the
state common law definition of "real property" could be utilized
to determine whether a particular piece of machinery would qualify for a federal exemption from state taxation.3 40 The government argued that Congress intended that federal statutes should
operate uniformly throughout the country to prevent impairment
of federal programs.34 ' The Court responded to this argument
by noting that Congress had already injected a large amount of
diversity into the issue by permitting the states to tax real property belonging to the United States. Because the states and their
political subdivisions have different methods of assessing, collecting and refunding taxes, as well as different tax rates, the tax consequences for the United States would vary in each of the states
and political subdivisions, making uniformity impossible.3 42 In
lieu of a uniform rule, the Court opted for the use of "settled
state rules" with respect to real property. State rules would only
be used to the extent that such rules did not discriminate against
3 43
the United States or expressly conflict with the statute.
Applying the principles of Beaver County to CERCLA liability,
336. CERCLA § 107(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1)(1) (1988).

337. Id § 107(0(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(P(3).
338. Id § 121(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A).
339. 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
340. Id. at 206-07. The statute in question allowed states and local governments to impose various state and local taxes on "any real property" of the various governmental agencies involved, but did not permit taxation on personal
property. Id.
341. Id. at 209.
342. Id. (noting that if Congress had wanted to impose uniformity, it could
have provided for fixed payments instead of taxes).
343. Id at 210. For a discussion of what steps federal courts can take short
of creating federal common law even where particular state law would discriminate against the United States, see infra notes 559-75 and accompanying text.
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it appears that Congress, by letting state law govern the standards
of the cleanup and the lien priority, has made it impossible to
enforce liability with uniform consequences. 344 Just as the diverse methods of assessment, collection and refunding of taxes
found in the various states precluded uniform application of a
federal tax exemption, the diverse state cleanup standards and
lien priority rules make it extremely difficult to apply the rules of
CERCLA liability uniformly in each state. Given that the rights of
the United States against a corporation vary from state to state
with respect to liens and cleanup standards, both of which directly
affect recovery of money by the United States, what grounds remain to think that Congress intended that the treatment of such
corporation's officers, directors and stockholders in connection
with such recovery should be uniform? By injecting the diversity
of state law into the liability of individuals and corporations unquestionably covered by the statute, Congress has indicated that
the liability of officers, directors and stockholders of such corpo3 45
rations need not be uniform.
2.

What Effects Will Diversity of State Law Have on FederalRights?

Courts have sometimes identified certain rights of the United
States as so important that they must not be allowed to vary from
state to state. 346 The desire to limit legal diversity, as articulated
344. The issues governed by state law relate indirectly to the liability of
officers, directors and stockholders of responsible corporations, by helping to
determine the total cleanup cost and the value of the security held by the United
States for reimbursement. The argument would be stronger if state laws had a
more direct impact on the liability of those individuals. Even without such direct
impact on such liability, Congress's intentions are at best ambiguous.
345. A similar argument was made in Anspec Co. v.Johnson Controls, Inc.,
922 F.2d 1240, 1251 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This case reversed a lower court decision that had granted a successor corporation's motion
to dismiss a claim for CERCLA liability. In concurring with the court's holding
that state law of successor liability should govern rather than a uniform federal
law, Judge Kennedy stated that "in enacting CEROLA Congress deliberately left
room for the operation of state law, thus acknowledging that nationwide uniformity was not required on all liability issues." Id. He then identified two examples of CERCLA provisions that invoked state law. The first example was
§ 107(e), which concerns indemnification agreements among private parties that
are to be interpreted under state law. Id. The second example cited by Judge
Kennedy was § 113(0(1), which concerns the procedure for bringing claims for
contribution. This provision requires that such claims be handled under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in turn defer to state law on the issue of
the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued. Id.
346. For a discussion of cases in which the Supreme Court has identified
important federal rights, see infra notes 350-54 and accompanying text.
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in the In re Acushnet River,3 47 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.3 48 and
United States v. A & F Materials Co. opinions,3 49 has also been recognized by the United States Supreme Court on various occasions. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,3 50 the Supreme Court
expressed concern that state rules governing the negotiation of
commercial paper would, if applied to the United States, create
significant problems by subjecting the "rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty." 3'5
With similar reasoning, the Supreme Court several years
later held in United States v. StandardOil Co. 352 that federal law controlled the liability of a third party to the United States for tortious injury to a soldier.5 53 Although the Court acknowledged in
Standard Oil that state law may occasionally provide appropriate
rules of decision consistent with federal interests, it found state
law inappropriate in the case at bar. The Court remarked that it
could not understand "why the Government's right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a right, should
vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states,
simply because the soldier marches or today perhaps as often flies
35 4
across state lines."
347. 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass. 1987) (uniformity of law is essential to
effective environmental protection).
348. 572 F. Supp. 802, 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (CERCLA is federal program
that must be uniform throughout nation and states with lax environmental laws
must not be allowed to undermine federal goals).
349. 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill. 1984) ("[There are compelling
reasons for the development of a uniform federal common law in the area of
hazardous waste.").
350. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
351. Id. at 367. The Court discussed the need for a uniform federal rule
covering this form of federal financial transaction: "The issuance of commercial
paper by the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from
issuance to payment will commonly occur in several states." Id But see Mishkin,
supra note 109, at 830-32 (criticizing Clearfield Trust decision on grounds that
"either it provides only the illusion of uniformity, or it achieves its substancefor the government-by the process of passing the burdens on to private
shoulders").
352. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
353. Id. at 305 (following reasoning of Clearfield Trust as it relates to protection of federal interests through uniformity of laws).
354. Id. at 310. Despite deciding that federal law governed, the Court declined to create the new rule of liability sought by the United States. The Court
reasoned that the primary issue in this case pertained to federal fiscal policy,
which is more appropriately addressed through congressional action rather than
through judicial creativity. Id. at 311-17. This aspect of the StandardOil opinion
has generated heated criticism. See, e.g., Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 957-58 (1986) (arguing that StandardOil rule
serves no federal interest, because uniformity achieved by rejecting state law
only prevents United States from recovering under state law).
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In analyzing how the rights of the United States are affected
by the diversity of state laws, direct liability and piercing the corporate veil must be distinguished. The concerns about uncertainty and diversity raised in the In re Acushnet River opinion, as
well as in the other CERCLA cases previously cited, do not properly apply to direct liability.3 55 Traditional common law rules
pertaining to the direct liability of corporate officers and directors
for their torts are, for the most part, already uniform. Except for
the CERCLA cases, federal law and the laws of the states examined in Part II are consistent with respect to direct liability.35 6
As a result, the CERCLA cases that impose direct liability on corporate officers and directors have not identified any way in which
the rights of the United States would be threatened if traditional
rules were applied in imposing liability.357 The federal rights will
be treated uniformly, regardless of whether the new CERCLA
rules or the traditional rules are ultimately adopted.
The rules concerning piercing the corporate veil, on the
other hand, do vary from state to state. The argument that protection of the rights of the United States requires a uniform federal rule that disregards the corporate entity rests on a
fundamental misconception of the nature of this remedy. Even if
the federal government establishes a right of recovery against a
particular corporate stockholder for cleanup costs, it does not
necessarily follow that the federal government also has a "right"
against other stockholders of the same corporation, much less the
stockholders of other corporations in similar circumstances. The
remedy of piercing the corporate veil rests not on rights under
the law, but rather rests in equity.3 58 The United States cannot
355. For a further discussion of the In re Acushnet River, Chem-Dyne and A & F
Materials decisions, see supra notes 320-27 and accompanying text.
356. For a discussion of traditional federal and state direct liability laws, see

supra notes 179-202 and accompanying text.
357. For a discussion of the cases imposing direct liability under CERCLA,
see supra notes 40-134 and accompanying text. Several of the CERCLA cases
have cited as authority Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d
902 (1st Cir. 1980), in which an employee sued his employer's parent corporation and its officers for injuries he had received. Escude Cruz is a diversity per-

sonal injury case, governed by the law of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id

at 903-04. In discussing the tests used for piercing the corporate veil, the opin-

ion cited and relied on Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores, 261 F.2d 406, 408-09
(10th Cir. 1958), which was also a diversity case. Escude Cruz, 619 F.2d at 907.
The Escude Cruz opinion contained a survey of recent federal law governing direct liability of corporate officers, and concluded that if the law of Puerto Rico
were used, the decision would not be different from a decision following federal
law. Id.
358. For a discussion of state rules concerning piercing the corporate veil
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expect to experience consistent outcomes in piercing the corporate veil decisions, because uncertainty and diversity of result remain the hallmarks of equity. In this respect, the use of piercing
the corporate veil rules to recover environmental cleanup costs
should be distinguished from the facts of Clearfield Trust and Standard Oil. Cleatfield Trust involved the rights of the United States
against a party that had improperly collected a check drawn on
the United States Treasury.3 59 In Standard Oil, the United States
suffered from injuries to a soldier, and the issue was whether it
had a right to reimbursement from the party that had injured the
soldier.3 60 In both cases, adoption of the federal rule in question
would fix the rights of the United States for all future cases having
substantially similar facts. 36 ' Piercing the corporate veil, however, is different in that it is an equitable remedy.
A review of the fundamental distinction between rights at law
and rights in equity helps to make this point more clearly. A
court acting in equity often has discretion in deciding whether it
will accept jurisdiction of a case 3 62 and the manner in which it will
grant relief,3 63 The discretion of an equity court does, of course,
and the corresponding equitable remedies, see supra notes 231-73 and accompanying text. The district court in In re Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass.
1987) expressly recognized the importance of equity when it stated: "The equitable decision to pierce the veil is dependent upon the facts peculiar to each
case." Id. at 33.
359. 318 U.S. at 364-65. The Court reasoned that the issuance of commercial paper by the United States government is a constitutional function and thus
governed by federal law. Id. at 366.
360. 332 U.S. at 302-03. The Court followed the principles applied in
Clearfield Trust to conclude that federal, rather than state law, should govern. Id.
at 305.
361. Achieving consistency between court decisions affecting the United
States Treasury was particularly important in the Clearfield Trust decision, primarily because of the high volume of similar transactions involving United States
government paper. 318 U.S. at 367.
362. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (courts have
optional duty to grant jurisdiction for cases under Emergency Price Control-Act
of 1942); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943) (federal equity
courts may decline jurisdiction of case if "the exercise of (jurisdiction] may be
prejudicial to the public interest" (quoting United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352,
360 (1933)).
363. See Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1960) ("The exercise of the power of a federal court to grant equitable relief is a matter of discretion."), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Julius Kayser & Co. v. Rosedale
Knitting Co., 18 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Pa. 1937) (patent infringement claim),
aff'd, 98 F.2d 839 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 649 (1938). Flexibility in a
court's choice of remedies is an essential characteristic of equitable relief.
Equitable remedies ...

are distinguished by their flexibility, their un-

limited variety, their adaptability to circumstances, and the natural
rules which govern their use. There is in fact no limit to their variety
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have limits. Rules and precedents exist that must be followed.-3
The distinctive feature of equity, however, is that a court's decision to grant equitable relief is to be tailored to the circumstances
of each case, rather than by fixed and inflexible rules. 36 5 This focus on the specific facts of each case, and the flexibility of an equity court in applying equitable principles, runs counter to the
goals of uniformity and certainty.3 66 The District Court for the
3 67
District of Nevada in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.
put the issue in historical perspective:
The principles of equity evolved as a necessity in order
to obtain justice because the law by reason of its universality was deficient .... Equity depends essentially upon
the particular circumstances of each individual case.
and application; the court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case
and the complex relation of all the parties.

I J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EUTrry JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 109 (5th ed. 1941).
364. NLRB v. P*I*E* Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1990).
The P*I*E* court specifically recognized the limitations on the choices of an
equity judge: "[A] modern federal equity judge does not have the limitless discretion of a medieval Lord Chancellor to grant or withhold a remedy. Modem
equity has rules and standards, just like law, except that the ratio of rules to
standards is lower in equity than in law." Id. (citations omitted). The limits to
an equity court's discretion have long been recognized by courts and
commentators:
The cases, which occur, are various; but they are 'decided on fixed principles. Courts of Equity have, in this respect, no more discretionary
power, than Courts of Law. They decide new cases, as they arise, by the
principles, on which former cases have been decided; and may thus illustrate, or enlarge, the operation of those principles. But the principles are as fixed and certain, as the principles on which the Courts of
Common Law proceed.

I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 20, at 22-23 (6th ed. 1853) (quoting Bond v. Hopkins, 1
Sch. & Lef. 413, 428-29 (Ir. Ch. 1802)) (punctuation as quoted in Story differs
slightly from that used in Bond).
365. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329 (viewing flexibility in addressing unique needs
of each case as "essence of equity jurisdiction"); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937) (decision to refuse equitable relief is within
discretion of court; "Whether the decree will prove so useless as to lead a court
to refuse to give it, is a matter ofjudgment to be exercised with reference to the
special circumstances of each case rather than to general rules which at most are
but guides to the exercise of discretion.").
366. These equitable principles, sometimes called "maxims," are collected
in 1 J. STORY, supra note 364, § 64, at 70-83. These maxims include, inter alia:
"Equity follows the law"; "[w]here there is equal Equity, the law must prevail";
"he who seeks Equity, must do Equity"; "Equity delighteth in Equality"; and
"Equity looks upon that as done, which ought to have been done." 1d; see also 2
J. POMEROY, supra note 363, §§ 363-431 (also collecting maxims).
367. 440 F. Supp. 394 (D. Nev. 1977).
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That being so, there can be no establishedrules andfixed principles laid down for its application, without destroying its
36 8
very existence, and reducing it to positive law.
Because equity emphasizes justice over uniformity and certainty, the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil cannot
uniformly protect the rights of the United States as effectively as
the federal rules adopted in Clearfield Trust and Standard Oil. The
traditional state common law rules for piercing the corporate veil
require courts to examine the particular facts of the stockholder's
relationship with the corporation, and then to determine whether
injustice or inequity would result from enforcement of the statutory limits on stockholder liability in light of those particular
facts. 36 9 Not surprisingly, this has resulted in a plethora of factintensive cases from which easy generalizations are difficult to discern.3 70 Gases under the new CERCLA rules for piercing the corporate veil, however, can be no less fact-intensive, so long as the
courts recognize the inherent element of equity in such rules.
Uniformity and certainty are possible only if the issue is removed
from equity and replaced with a fixed rule of law (or perhaps a
large set of rules), something none of the CERCLA cases has yet
71
suggested.3
In summary, the arguments that uniform federal laws of liability of officers, directors and stockholders under CERCLA are
needed for the protection of federal rights from diverse state laws
do not stand up. In the area of direct liability, the traditional
common law is already uniform, although it differs from the new
368. Id. at 403 (insurer of airline that settled wrongful death action after
fatal crash, acting as subrogee, brought indemnification action against manufacturer of landing chart) (citing 1J. STORY, supra note 364, ch. 1 and 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § I (Chitty 1855)).
369. For a discussion of state common law rules for piercing the corporate
veil and statutory limits on stockholder liability, see supra notes 231-73 and accompanying text.
370. For a discussion regarding the potential of applying uniform rules to
piercing the corporate veil cases, see infra notes 418-24 and accompanying text.
371. But see Note, Parent Liability, supra note 301, at 999-1003 (advocating
replacing state equitable rules of piercing corporate veil with fixed uniform federal rule denying limited liability under CERCLA for all parent corporations).
In a sense, those CERCLA decisions holding stockholders liable under the direct
liability theories are removing the equitable heart from the issue of stockholder
liability without any basis in precedent or legal doctrine. Displacing equity with
a fixed rule, particularly without the benefit of statutory authority, is a step which
federal courts should be reluctant to take. Cf United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
332 U.S. 301, 313-17 (1947) (refusing to create new federal rule of liability requested by United States, on grounds that decision to create new form of common law liability favorable to United States was for Congress, not courts).
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CERCLA rules. Because the traditional common law of direct liability does not vary from state to state, new federal common law
cannot be justified on the basis of a need for uniformity. With
respect to piercing the corporate veil, the various federal and
state courts have created a vast number of different rules. Because this diversity of law follows directly from the equitable nature of the remedy, it is unlikely that any CERCLA rules for
piercing the corporate veil can ever provide uniform protection
for federal rights.
3.

What Effects Will Diversity of State Law Have on Operations of the
Federal Statute or Program?

The holding of In re Acushnet River 37 2 contains an implicit determination that adoption of the state liability rules would interfere with the federal government's operations under CERCLA"the ability of the executive to fund the clean up of hazardous
waste sites."3 7 3 Neither In re Acushnet River nor any of the other
CERCLA opinions, however, explains how this interference
would occur. Because the CERCLA cases offer no guidance on
the issue, it will be useful to review how other cases have analyzed
the issue of whether application of state law will interfere with a
federal program.
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.3 7 4 and its progeny, analysis of the effects of diverse state law on federal programs has typically examined two different factors. The first is whether carrying
out the mandate of the federal statute requires the application of
uniform laws.37 5 The second focuses on the nature of the busi37 6
ness transactions affected by the federal statute or program.
Unlike the first factor's analysis of the effects on the goals of the
United States, the second factor addresses the more practical ef372. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
373. Id. at 31. The opinion states that "Congress did not intend that the
ability of the executive to fund the clean up of hazardous waste sites should
depend on the attitudes of the several states toward parent-subsidiary liability in
general, or CERCLA in particular." Id.
374. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a discussion of the Kimbell Foods test, see
supra notes 308-16 and accompanying text.
375. For a discussion of the cases applying the Kimbell Foods test that are
concerned with whether or not the mandates of federal statutes require the ap-

plication of uniform laws, see infra notes 377-93 and accompanying text.
376. For a discussion of the cases applying the Kimbell Foods test that are
concerned with the effects a federal statute or program will have on the relevant
business transactions, see infra notes 394-410 and accompanying text.
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fects of a uniform rule. The discussion becomes more empirical
as the workings of the federal program or statute are examined.
a.

Is a Uniform Federal Rule Essential to Carry Out the
Mandate of the Federal Statute or Program?

The need for a uniform federal rule is most apparent in those
instances where a government department or agency must act
quickly and decisively in order to carry out its mandate. This is
illustrated by Gunter v. Hutcheson,377 in which the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that federal law provided the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with a defense to
state and common law fraud claims, where such claims were asserted in connection with notes acquired by the FDIC in a
purchase and assumption transaction.3 78 In justifying the need
for a uniform rule, the court noted that the FDIC had to be able
to act with exceptional speed in order to fulfill its mandate of
choosing the most cost-efficient alternative to deal with a failed
bank.3 79 The court concluded that by adopting a uniform federal
rule, the FDIC could make the proper choice between liquidating
the bank or entering into a purchase and assumption transaction.
The court considered this the most efficient approach because it
believed the FDIC would not otherwise have time to investigate
the various state laws that might be implicated.38 0 A subsequent
377. 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
378. Id. at 869-70. A purchase and assumption transaction, the court explained, is the FDIC's alternative to liquidating the assets of a failed bank and
paying off the depositors. It is usually preferable to a liquidation because it is
quicker and it protects confidence in the banking system. Purchase and assumption transactions usually have to be done overnight to preserve the going concern value of the bank, which is then sold to investors who can open it for
business the next day. Id. at 865.
379. Id. at 869-70. The court applied the Kimbell Foods test, and by applying
federal law, sought to protect the FDIC's ability to act quickly when dealing with
failed banks and to ensure the FDIC's ability to execute its statutory mandate.
Id
380. Id. at 869. The court found the need for quick and efficient transactions as the critical factor distinguishing the case at bar from the holding in Kimbell Foods:
[T]he nature of the FDIC as insuror [sic] for a variety of banks across
the country and the necessity for overnight decisions in dealing with a
failed bank requires a uniform federal rule governing the FDIC's rights
.... Subjecting the FDIC to the additional burden of considering the
impact of the possibly variable state law on the rights involved could
significantly impair the FDIC's ability to choose between the liquidation
and purchase-and-assumption alternatives in handling a bank failure.
Id.; see also FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159-60 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
944 (1985) (applying federal common law to action by FDIC against guarantor
to recover on note acquired as part of purchase and assumption agreement);
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case elaborated on this threat to the FDIC's mission by pointing
out that if state law governed, the FDIC would be required, prior
to any purchase and assumption transaction, to make a detailed
examination of all of the failed bank's assets. 381 This examination
would be necessary to enable the FDIC to locate all possible
transfer restrictions and review all applicable state laws in order
to insure compliance. Because of the time constraints created by
the examination, the FDIC could not possibly decide on the most
382
efficient course of action, as it was required to do by law.
In contrast, the FDIC was not successful when it sought the
protection of a uniform federal common law rule to obtain priority over stockholders of a failed bank in suits against third parties.
In FDIC v. Jenkins,38 3 the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Gunter on
the ground that the FDIC's evaluation of the value of potential
lawsuits against third parties did not present the same need to act
quickly and decisively that existed when the FDIC was evaluating
38 4
a failed bank's assets prior to a purchase and assumption.
When discussing factors that discouraged the court from applying
a federal common law rule, the court noted that "the Federal Deposit Insurance Act does not compel the FDIC to pursue claims to
restore the deposit insurance fund against third parties who may
have harmed a failed bank."385 The court then discounted the
FDIC's argument that its need to maximize recovery to the deposit insurance fund created an overriding need for a federal rule.
The court stated that although such a rule might be "convenient"
for the FDIC to have, it would have to come from Congress, not
38 6
the court.
FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1516-18 (1lth Cir. 1984) (following

Ganter analysis and applying federal common law in FDIC suit against insurer for
funds due debtors of two banks of which it was appointed receivers).
381. FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 865 F.2d 1134, 1139 (10th Cir. 1988) (FDIC
action to enforce letter of credit extended by defendant to failed bank despite
state law classifying letter of credit as non-transferable asset).
382. Id Due to the variances in state laws and the lengthy process required
to analyze a failed bank's assets, the court was "convinced that there is a need
for a nationally uniform rule allowing FDIC/Corporation to acquire the nontransferable assets of a failed bank in the course of a P[urchase] and
A[ssumption]." Id.
383. 888 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
384. Id. at 1546.
385. Id. After weighing various factors, the court determined that a uniform federal rule was not necessary to govern claims against third parties involved in the failure of a bank. The court noted that recovery of funds from
these parties was not a paramount goal of the federal loan program and therefore was less demanding of a federal common law rule. Id.
386. Id.; see also FDIC v. Braemoor Assocs., 686 F.2d 550, 553-54 (7th Cir.
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The federal labor laws also illustrate how rules used primarily in litigation contexts do not have the same need for uniformity
that exists with respect to the day-to-day operations of a federal
program or statute. Although uniform federal law has been held
essential to the collective bargaining process in order to achieve
the "overriding federal policy of industrial peace and productivity," 3 8 7 the same need for uniformity is not present when the collective bargaining process has broken down and the action has
moved to the courtroom. In UA W v. Hoosier CardinalCorp.,s388 the
Supreme Court clearly expressed the distinction between the collective bargaining process and subsequent court actions as it explained its adoption of state statutes of limitation for the federal
labor laws:
The need for uniformity, then, is greatest where its absence would threaten the smooth functioning of those
consensual processes that federal labor law is chiefly
designed to promote-the formation of the collective
agreement and the private settlement of disputes under
it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come into
play only when these processes have already broken
down. Lack of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in any important way the achievement
of any significant goal of labor policy.3 8 9
Liability under CERCLA is distinguishable from the transactions described in Gunter, because the federal government does
not have the overriding need under CERCLA to make quick and
uniform responses. CERCLA authorizes the President of the
United States to investigate and take the necessary steps for re1982) (holding that state law governed suit by FDIC in its capacity as assignee of
failed bank to recover money advanced to third party in breach of bank officer's
fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
387. Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir.
1979). The court observed that the policy of "industrial peace and productivity
is best effectuated if collective bargaining agreements are interpreted and enforced in a uniform manner." Id. The court noted the Supreme Court's consis-

tent call for a unified national law covering labor contracts:
The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of
free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal

scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process
thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy.
Id. at 1110 (quoting Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369

U.S. 95, 104 (1962)).
388. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
389. Id. at 702.
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moval or remedial action after the release of hazardous substances.390 The decision to act in a particular case requires a
prior finding that the state in which the release occurred will cooperate in the action. 39 ' The statute sets forth numerous factors
for the President to consider in deciding upon remedial action,
including the total short-term and long-term costs of the actions,
the effects of the hazardous substances on the environment and
their risk to human health.3 92 CERCLA requires the President to
choose the action "that is protective of human health and the environment, that is cost effective, and that utilizes permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies or resource recovery
technologies to the maximum extent practicable."39 3 The statute
does not require a prior determination as to whether any officers,
directors or stockholders will eventually be held personally liable
for damages not recoverable from the offending corporation.
The issue of personal liability will not come up until the trial, during which time the government would presumably have had an
opportunity to master the intricacies of state law. This negates
the need for extremely rapid turnaround as discussed in Gunter.
Unlike the free and voluntary collective bargaining process under
the federal labor laws, the CERCLA liability issues arise at a time
when the administrative process has broken down, and litigation
has become necessary to establish liability for the cleanup costs.
Liability of officers, directors and stockholders should therefore
be governed by the reasoning in Jenkins and Hoosier rather than
Gunter. Accordingly, CERCLA does not require a uniform rule to
carry out the federal mandate.
b. Is a Uniform Federal Rule Required by the Nature of the
Transactions Contemplated by the Federal Statute or
Program?
The second part of the analysis concerns whether inconsistent state laws would adversely affect the operations of the federal
program. The emphasis of the analysis shifts to how the program
actually works, rather than whether the goals of the legislation
can be met. If the federal program or statute requires individual
negotiations at the local or state level, then there is less need for a
uniform federal rule because the persons charged with imple390.
391.
392.
393.

CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988).
Id. § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c).
Id. § 121(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a)-(b).
Id. § 121(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
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menting the program or statute will have ample opportunity to

learn the unique aspects of the local laws.3 94 In the alternative, if
the program involves a high volume of standardized nationwide
procedures and forms, then uniformity becomes more important
8
to the day-to-day operations.

95

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.396 was concerned with the
FHA and SBA programs, which operated at the local level. The
Supreme Court, in deciding Kimbell Foods, considered its prior de-

cision in United States v. Yazell. 397 In Yazell, the Court had upheld

the application of state law to defeat a lien the United States gov-

ernment had acquired through a loan made by the SBA. 398 The
Kimbell Foods Court noted that the loan transactions of both the
SBA and the FHA, like the loan transaction in Yazell, were individually negotiated, thus undermining the government's assertion
that undue hardships would be placed on agencies dealing with
diverse state laws.8 99 The Court further pointed out that both the
SBA and the FHA regulations regularly incorporated state law
and required their employees to keep apprised of new develop-

ments in that law. Additionally, the loans were made in local
lending offices by employees who were familiar with state law. 40 0
394. For a brief overview of court decisions presenting factors to be considered when analyzing the need for uniform federal law, with emphasis on those
situations not requiring uniform federal law, see infra notes 396-402 and accompanying text.
395. For a discussion of cases in which courts found a need for uniform
federal law, see infra notes 403-10 and accompanying text.
396. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
397. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
398. Id. at 357. Specifically, the Yazell Court upheld the Texas law of coverture, which prevented the United States government from enforcing a lien on
the separate property of a woman. Id. The Court rejected the government's
arguments that federal common law should override the Texas law, reasoning
that the government had individually negotiated the loan to the woman and her
husband in great detail, and that an express provision in the loan documents
stated that Texas law would apply. Id. at 345-46. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the officials who negotiated the contract on behalf of the SBA were well
aware of the Texas law of coverture, and that the SBA had not advised any of the
borrowers that the state law defense would not apply. ld. at 346. The Court
stated that of the prior cases in which a federal rule had been created, none had
involved individually negotiated contracts, and added "[t]his Court's decisions
applying 'federal law' to supersede state law typically relate to programs and
actions which by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout
the Nation." Id. at 354.
399. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729-30. The key to the Court's decision was
the observation that the current agency procedures were detailed and thorough,
and thus precluded the need for the level of efficiency and speed that had been
deemed necessary by the Gunter Court for purchase and assumption transactions. Id. at 732.
400. Id. at 732. By discussing the role of the local employees, the Court
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The Court then rejected the government's arguments that application of state rules would delay loan processing, by pointing out
that each loan application had to receive rigorous individual scrutiny in any case. 40 1 The Court concluded that because application
of various state laws would not burden loan processing, a uniform
40 2
federal law was not warranted.
Courts have found, however, that certain government programs do require uniform federal law. In Marine Midland Bank v.
United States, 40 3 for example, the United States Court of Claims
created a uniform federal rule to govern the priority of certain
liens of the United States created in connection with federal procurement programs over liens of general creditors. 40 4 The federal rule was created in lieu of adopting the lien priority rules
was responding to the government's allegations that the adoption of state laws
would create a burden on the agencies:
Thus, the agencies' own operating practices belie their assertion
that a federal rule of priority is needed to avoid the administrative burBy using local
dens created by disparate state commercial rules ....
lending offices and employees who are familiar with the law of their
respective localities, the agencies function effectively without uniform
procedures and legal rules.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429 (6th Cir.
1967). The Carson court held that federal law governed the liability of a livestock
merchant for conversion of property in which the United States had a security
interest. Id. at 435. It distinguished Yazell on the grounds that the conversion
was not a "peculiarly local" matter, but instead concerned "the extent of liability
to be imposed when government property is tortiously mishandled in a commercial situation, a situation in fact involving an interstate transaction." Id. at 434.
For a post-Kimbell Foods case applying state law on very similar facts, see United
States v. Public Auction Yard, Billings, Mont., 637 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1980).
The court in Public Auction Yard stated: "Kimbell Foods established that while federal law governs these secured transactions, the content of the federal rule is
determined by reference to non-discriminatory state law." Id. at 615.
401. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 732-33 (because each loan application receives "individual scrutiny," agencies should be able to compensate for different
state priority rules in actual loan transactions).
402. Id. at 733. The significance of administrative convenience in determining the need for uniformity under the Kimbell Foods test was underscored in
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Sherred Village Associates, 708 F.2d 804, 810-11
(1st Cir. 1983). Chicago Title involved the adoption of state laws that gave
mechanics' liens priority over federal mortgage liens. Id. at 813. The government pointed out that the state laws concerning mechanics' liens were much less
uniform than the state laws governing priority of liens and personal property at
issue in Kimbell Foods. Id. at 810. The court held, however, that the loan program in this case was sufficiently like the loan programs in Kimbell Foods to justify
adoption of state law. Id. at 811. In reaching this conclusion, the Chicago Title
court relied on the existence of local field offices, the references to local law in
the agency's regulations and the extensive individual scrutiny that each loan received. Id.
403. 687 F.2d 395 (Ct. Cl. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1037 (1983).
404. Id. at 404. The government's security interest was created pursuant to
the "title vesting" clause contained in federal procurement contracts as required
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articulated in the various state enactments of Article Nine of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The court contrasted the local negotiation procedures cited in Kimbell Foods with the facts of the case

at bar, and concluded that a uniform rule of decision was necessary. Unlike the SBA and FHA loan programs at issue in Kimbell
Foods and Yazell, the Marine Midland court observed, government
procurement does not take place in small regional offices, and
procurement practices are not directly related to the individual
state practices. 40 5 In addition, the existence of "extensive and detailed regulations for federal procurement to promote standardization and uniformity throughout the federal system" further
impelled the court to adopt a uniform rule. 40 6
In United States v. Pisani,40 7 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that the administration of Medicare required a uniform federal rule of piercing the corporate veil. 408 The Pisani
court cited as the pivotal factor in its decision the need for uniform and prompt recovery of Medicare overpayments to ensure
the continued performance of the Medicare program. 40 9 The
Pisani court distinguished the operating procedures of the Medicare program from the procedures mentioned in the Yazell and
Kimbell Foods cases on the grounds that the doctors received the
Medicare reimbursements under a uniform statutory program
that required the government to make payments to the providers
of health services on a regular basis, with a subsequent audit to
make any necessary adjustments. The court reasoned that if nonuniform state law were applied in reimbursement recovery actions, the government might not be able to recover from providers residing in states that had a restrictive test for disregarding
by the Defense Contract Financing Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 163 (1981). Marine
Midland, 687 F.2d at 398.
405. MarineMidland, 687 F.2d at 404 (Kimbell Foods "left open" potential for
developing uniform rules, "especially where state practices would not be affected by such a uniform federal rule").
406. Id. ("[I]t is clear that Kimbell Foods' resort to state laws would not be
appropriate in this case, as contrary to evident congressional intent and established federal practice.").
407. 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1981).
408. Id. at 86 (government brought action against physician to recover
Medicare overpayments to physician's solely-owned corporation).
409. Id. The court noted that the government had to make interim payments quickly to health service providers in order to encourage them to treat
Medicare patients. Id. If the government had to investigate the actual costs and
financial conditions of each provider before making the disbursement, the interim payments would be delayed and providers might not be as willing to offer
Medicare services. Id.
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the corporate entity. 4 10

The procedural characteristics of the Medicare and federal
government procurement programs that necessitated uniform
federal rules are not present in CERCLA. CERCLA does not require standardized forms or contracts. No payments are made on
a regular basis. No volumes of regulations have been created to
govern the liability of officers, directors and stockholders. An attempt to hold officers, directors or stockholders of a corporation
liable for the cleanup costs of a hazardous waste release does not
constitute a standardized decision requiring uniformity, given the
potentially broad range of circumstances surrounding each incident. Instead, CERCLA cases will certainly involve intense negotiation or litigation and receive rigorous individual scrutiny.
Because of the size and complexity of the issues involved, liability
under CERCLA cannot be standardized by a uniform government
program.
4. Are the Federal Courts Able to Handle the Statute or Program

Uniformly?
The fourth consideration in determining the need for a uniform federal law is whether federal courts could achieve uniformity in their decisions if permitted to create a federal common law
on the issue. This consideration, like those discussed above, has
not been addressed in any of the CERCLA liability cases. Cases
that have addressed the potential development of a federal common law in other contexts have come to different conclusions,
based on principles that can be applied to the area of CERCLA
liability.
Generally speaking, the impracticality of a uniform federal
common law results from the improbability of general agreement
among the twelve circuit courts. The United States Supreme
Court is the only forum that can create true uniformity, and such
uniformity is unlikely to be forthcoming given the present
caseload of the Supreme Court. 4 11 Courts have recognized this
410. Id. at 87 (further noting that it was unacceptable to allow "rights of the
United States . . . [to] change whenever state courts issue new decisions on

piercing the corporate veil").
411. Mishkin, supra note 109, at 813. Although written in 1957, Professor
Mishkin's article describes issues that still hold true for the present court system.
Professor Mishkin succinctly described the problem:
[S]uch complete uniformity may be most unlikely as a matter of common law development: the only court in a position to assure that degree of uniformity-the United States Supreme Court-is so burdened
with its present work that it is highly improbable that it could undertake
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difficulty.
Powers v. United States Postal Service4 12 involved a dispute between a private landlord and the United States Postal Service concerning the landlord's right to terminate a lease for nonpayment
of rent. 41 3 Judge Posner, writing for a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, found unpersuasive the
various government arguments in favor of a uniform federal
rule.4 14 Posner directly challenged the practicality of a uniform
federal landlord-tenant law, noting that the federal courts are ill4 15
suited to provide such a law.

The majority opinion written by Judge Randall for the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.,4 16 which declined to create a federal common law rule in
connection with asbestos litigation, utilized reasoning similar to
that of the Powers court. After discussing numerous issues relateffectively to develop detailed substantive rules for any area we are here
considering. Yet the argument for "uniformity" is made in a wide variety of contexts without any reference to this aspect of reality.
Id. (footnote omitted).

412. 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982).
413. Id. at 1042.
414. Id. at 1045-46. After analysis, Judge Posner believed that uniformity
of the law and certainty of rights and obligations favored selection of state law
rather than federal law. Id. at 1045.
415. Id. Judge Posner saw the problem as inherent in the federal court
system:
It is not to be expected that the federal courts would do a very good job
of devising a model code of landlord-tenant law, since they have very
little experience in landlord-tenant matters; and though eventually
some body of law would emerge it would not in all likelihood be a uniform body, because there are twelve federal circuits and the Supreme
Court could be expected to intervene only sporadically.
Id at 1046. Judge Posner ultimately stated that the case at hand did not require
a choice between federal and state law. Id. His conclusion was that the "overriding federal interest ... [was] certainty of right[s] and obligation[s] flowing
from conformity to known law," and that this interest was best served through
adopting state law. Id.
416. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Jackson, a former shipyard
worker diagnosed with asbestosis, brought a strict liability action againstJohnsManville Corporation, whose asbestos product was used in the shipyard in which
Jackson worked. Id. at 1316. Thejury awarded punitive damages toJackson for
his injuries, as was permissible under Mississippi law. Id. at 1317. On appeal,
Johns-Manville argued that "punitive damages should not be recoverable as a
matter of law in the context of asbestos litigation" because large punitive damages would limit the ability of future plaintiffs to recover for their injuries. Id. at
1321. It was unclear whether punitive damages would be available under federal
common law. Id. at 1322. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless declined to replace the state law, asserting that "[ajny effect state law recoveries would eventually have on the government's ability to obtain needed
materials is far too indirect to justify the imposition of federal common law." Id.
at 1325.
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ing to the choice of law, Judge Randall noted that a decision to
create new federal law would apply only within the jurisdiction of
the Fifth Circuit. She opined that this would only create further
41 7
problems of inequities and forum shopping among the circuits.
Although some unity exists among the circuits with respect to
direct liability (at least outside of the environmental area), achieving uniformity with respect to piercing the corporate veil would
be especially problematic. As numerous commentators have acknowledged, including those who advocate a uniform federal rule
of piercing the corporate veil, existing federal law on the subject
presents a m6lange of different rules and factors. 4 18 The diversity

of federal rules can be traced directly to the fact that piercing the
corporate veil is an equitable remedy. 4 19 No single rule can cover
all of the fact situations traditionally encompassed under the umbrella of piercing the corporate veil. 4 20 Some commentators have

found that the concept of piercing the corporate veil is economically and doctrinally deficient. 42 1 Others, however, see the issue
417. Id. at 1326. A problem the court identified was that the availability of
larger damage awards outside the Fifth Circuit would not be affected by any rule
the Fifth Circuit adopted:
Unless and until the Supreme Court imposes a similar federal common
law on the country as a whole, any federal substantive rules fashioned
by us would only exacerbate the alleged inequities among claimants,
with punitive and certain types of compensatory damages being available outside the circuit but not within. Such a result, in turn, would
encourage a massive effort at forum shopping to bring suits outside the
circuit.
Id.
418. For a discussion of the diverse state piercing the corporate veil laws
and their ability to protect federal interests, see Note, supra note 232, at 1246,
1253-55 and Note, supra note 109, at 857-64.
419. For the In re Acushnet River court's statement noting the equitable nature of piercing the corporate veil, see supra note 358 and accompanying text.
420. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, supra note 204, at 210 (discussing piercing
corporate veil of subsidiary corporations and noting that "there is no one
formula which can be successfully applied to the tort cases. The formula varies
with the facts of each case."). But see Krendl & Krendl, supra note 204, at 6-7
("Obviously somewhat different policy considerations are involved in [the many
different factual scenarios], but a common set of rules and equitable principles
are usually applied to all of them.").
421. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 301, at 619-20. Professor Landers takes a
particularly harsh view:
Devoid of any consistent doctrinal basis, the cases themselves defy any
attempt at rational explanation. This confusion has apparently been
produced by a failure to identify what is at stake in a veil piercing case:
the very principle of limited liability for the stockholders. As a result,
the typical veil piercing case is an exercise in cataloging a number of
factors in order to reach a normative conclusion that piercing is or is
not appropriate.
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted).
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as going beyond the mere incompetency of courts or bad
economics:
We believe that "piercing the corporate veil" is only a
general term under which are subsumed a multitude of
fact situations. No useful general statement can be made
about such situations except that, despite the strong
public policy in favor of preserving corporations, there
are situations in which equity will require that the corporate form be disregarded. 422
Thus, the existence of so many formulations of the doctrine in the
federal common law is a natural result of the equitable approach.
As noted, a second problem that further reduces the possibility of developing a uniform federal law of piercing the corporate
veil is the great disparity among the twelve circuits. If the chances
of getting the right cases before the United States Supreme Court
428
to develop a viable federal landlord-tenant law are remote,
then it is even less likely that the Court will address piercing the
corporate veil in a way that will resolve the differences among the
circuits. Even the Supreme Court would face the problem of how
to fit a "multitude of fact situations" into a simple formulation
that can be applied uniformly. 424 Because of the amorphous and
fact-intensive nature of this equitable remedy, the adoption of a
single rule will not resolve the issue.
Consequently, the search for a uniform rule of piercing the
corporate veil under CERCIA is likely to be frustrpted by the diversity of the twelve circuit courts, as well as by the equitable nature of the remedy. As a practical matter, this aspect of CERCLA
is likely to remain unsettled notwithstanding the proliferation of
new rules created by federal courts in the name of uniformity.
Numerous CERCLA cases have proclaimed that a uniform
rule of liability of officers, directors and stockholders under
CERCLA is essential. Under closer scrutiny, however, the need
for such uniformity appears far less compelling. As the preceding
422. Krendl & Krendl, supra note 204, at 58. The authors also noted that
the failure to formalize the veil-piercing rules "is not the fault of the judges or
the commentators but is an inherent problem in this area of the law." Id.
423. See Powers v. United States Postal Serv., 671 F.2d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir.
1982) (citing federal courts' lack of experience with landlord-tenant matters as
hinderance to ability to create effective federal law).
424. For two pairs of commentators' views on the fact-sensitive nature of
piercing the corporate veil, see supra note 420 and accompanying text.
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discussion has illustrated, the arguments for this need for a uniform rule are subject to a number of serious defects. The argument that Congress intended such a uniform rule of liability relies
on a limited statement in the legislative history of CERCLA relating to the issue of joint and several liability and stretches that
statement to advocate uniformity in all areas of the statute, ignoring the presence in the statute of provisions that expressly invoke
state law. The CERCLA cases asserting the need for a uniform
rule also reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the equitable
nature of the remedy of piercing the corporate veil. Because this
remedy is essentially a use ofjudicial discretion to achieve justice
within a specific factual context, it cannot provide uniform protection of federal rights, and may never be handled uniformly by the
twelve circuit courts. Finally, a uniform rule of liability of officers,
directors and stockholders is not necessary to carry out the operations of the statute, because the issue of liability is neither one
that must be resolved by the federal government on an expedited
schedule prior to commencing remedial actions, nor one that can
be addressed on a routine procedural basis. Thus, with respect to
this portion of the Kimbell Foods test, no need has been shown for
a uniform federal rule to supplant the existing state rules of
liability.
B.

Will State Law FrustrateSpecific Objectives of the Federal Statute
or Program?

The second element of the Kimbell Foods test requires the
court to determine "whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs." 4 2 5 The

CERCLA liability cases have allotted little serious discussion to
this element. The opinion in United States v. Nicolet, Inc. ,426 after
quoting In re Acushnet River,4 2 7 referred to "the very real risk that
the application of state laws [concerning alter ego claims] would
425. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). The
Court concluded that if state law frustrates the objectives of a federal program,
then special rules must be developed in order to protect the federal interests.
Id.
426. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989). For a further discussion of Nicolet,
see supra notes 63-65, 135-50 and accompanying text.
427. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). For a further discussion of In re
Acushnel River, see supra notes 152-55, 320 and accompanying text. For the In re
Acushnel River court's statement concerning the need for uniformity in CERCLA
cases, see supra note 320 and accompanying text.
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frustrate the objectives of the federal [CERCLA] program." 4 28
The Nicolet opinion did not further discuss the specific risk, however. The United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.4 29 opinion, which determined that the issue of joint and several liability under CERCLA
required a uniform federal rule,-does offer some insight into the
nature of the risks. 430 The Chem-Dyne court declared that the purpose of CERCLA was "to complement existing federal regulations by providing emergency funds for the clean-up of inactive
or abandoned hazardous waste sites as well as illegal releases,
such as 'midnight dumping,' located across the nation in virtually
every state." 431 Accordingly, the court held that adopting state
law would frustrate this purpose by "encouraging illegal dumping
'43 2
in states with tax liability laws."

Serious analysis of frustration of objectives pursuant to the
Kimbell Foods test requires a more thorough treatment of the sub-

ject. The test for determining whether state law will frustrate the
objectives of a federal program should be broken down into three
separate elements. First, the court must identify the specific
objectives of the statute or program. Second, the court must ascertain whether the objectives are in fact federal, rather than
merely national. Finally, the court must determine whether state

law will actually frustrate the objectives, or will simply cause the
United States to lose money. The following discussion details
each of these elements.
1.

What Are the Objectives?
In cases that apply the Kimbell Foods test and actually attempt

428. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202. The court thus concluded that a uniform
federal rule should be developed to govern alter ego claims under CERCLA. Id.
429. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
430. Id at 808-10. The court distinguished CERCLA as a federal program
that must be uniform throughout the nation in order to succeed. Id. at 809.
Therefore, the court concluded, federal rules of decision must be developed in
order to achieve uniformity in the program. Id. An important factor behind this
conclusion was the belief that states passing lenient laws would provide safe
havens for businesses dealing in hazardous substances. Id. The court noted that
the government must be able to effectively enforce its environmental programs
in every state if it is to be able to protect the federal interest. Id. Furthermore,
the court stated that "the delineation of a uniform federal rule of decision is
consistent with the legislative history and policies of GERCLA and ... no compelling local interests mandate the incorporation of state law." Id.
431. Id. at 809 (quoting 126 CONc. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Florio)). The court identified CERCLA as a federal program that "by [its] nature... must be uniform in character throughout the nation." Id.
432. Id. (quoting 126 CoNo. REC. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep.
Florio)).
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to identify the objectives of the relevant federal statute or program, there is a noticeable tension between broad, abstract social
goals and more concrete fiscal objectives. The resolution of this
tension often has a direct impact on whether the court will determine that the objectives of the program are at risk of being "frustrated" by state law. Characterizing the goals of a statute or
program solely in monetary terms creates a bias toward adopting
federal rules. If protection of the federal purse is paramount,
then a court should reject any state rule that would increase costs
borne by the United States in favor of a federal rule more sympathetic to the federal purse. To the extent that a court considers
social/non-monetary objectives of a federal statute or program,
however, it can incorporate state rules that advance such objectives, even if those rules result in added costs to the United
States. Of course, a court may well adopt a federal rule to help
achieve some social objective. A number of courts have in fact
done so. Nonetheless, because monetary objectives generally
weigh heavily against the opportunity for adopting state law, it is
not surprising that the federal government often argues vigorously to phrase the objectives in strictly financial terms so as to
maximize the possibility that the court will apply a favorable fed43 3
eral law.
Cases articulating broad social goals generally focus on the
long-term effects of a statute or program. For example, the cases
that created federal common law defenses for the FDIC in
purchase and assumption transactions held that a uniform federal
rule was necessary to "permit the FDIC to promote the stability of
and confidence in our nation's banking system." 43 4 In United
States v. Haddon Haciendas Co.,4 s5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit identified the objectives of the loan program created under the National Housing Act (NHA) in social terms. It
433. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 733-35
(1979) (government argued that application of state law to SBA lending program would undermine ability to recover loans and therefore conflict with program objectives); United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1983)
(FHA argued that adoption of state law in mortgage foreclosure proceeding
would result in increased operating costs which would defeat federal policy and
goals of lending program).
434. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 748 (3d Cir.
1985) (FDIC action to recover debt). For a further discussion of protecting federal interests in FDIC purchase and assumption transactions, see supra notes
377-86 and accompanying text.
435. 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976). Haddon Hadendas involved a suit
brought by the United States against a limited partnership, seeking to foreclose
on a note insured under the National Housing Act (NHA). Id. at 779.
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explained that "[t]he purpose is to deter the exploitive management of federally-insured projects and the resulting substandard
and slum-like housing conditions that the NHA was designed to
eliminate." 43 6 The court further noted that it was not in the best
interest of the program to allow state laws designed to protect
debtors to be used to encourage investment in sub-standard
housing.43 7 To avoid both frustrating the objectives of the loan
program and allowing state laws to operate against the program's
best interest, the court adopted a federal rule. 43 8 In United States
v. Pisani,4 39 the circuit court identified two specific objectives of
the Medicare program that would be frustrated by adoption of
state piercing the corporate veil laws: providing prompt reimbursement to providers of medical services so as to encourage
them to treat Medicare patients, and limiting such reimbursement
to the reasonable costs of their services.4 40 In Pisani, therefore, as
in Haddon Haciendasand the FDIC purchase and assumption cases,
the court adopted federal rules to prevent frustration of the socially-oriented objectives that had been identified. 441
In contrast to the cases that espouse social goals, a number of
other cases have identified the objectives of federal programs
strictly in monetary terms. Long before the Kimbell Foods opinion
436. Id. at 784. The Haddon Haciendas court distinguished its case from
other cases, such as Yazell, purporting to protect a federal financial interest. Id.
at 783. The protection of federal interests in some loan programs, such as those
created under the NHA, is not achieved by concentrating solely on the financial
objectives of the program. Id. at 784. In some cases, said the court, the federal
interest in the social outcomes of a financial program is as important as the fiscal
health of the program. Id As the Haddon Haciendas court noted, "[t]he federal
housing program is not furthered by insuring investments in housing stock declining in standards of decency, safety and sanitation." Id
437. Id at 784-85 (court's primary concern was to discourage "profiteers"
from "hanging on" to NHA projects and not maintaining them).
438. Id at 785. California state law maintained a debtor-protection policy
that did not permit post-foreclosure damage actions. Id. The Haddon Haciendas
court, however, asserted that to prevent investors "from hanging onto projects
after losing the ability to maintain them," the government must be allowed to
bring post-foreclosure damage actions. Id.
439. 646 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1981). For a further discussion of Pisani,see supra
notes 407-10 and accompanying text.
440. 646 F.2d at 86.
441. Id. at 86-88. These three cases did adopt a federal rule despite articulating non-monetary objectives. It is interesting to note that in each of these
cases adoption of the federal rule to help meet the "social" goals outlined
therein would at the same time work to the economic advantage of the federal
government. For a discussion of other cases in which recognition of non-monetary objectives contributed to adoption of state law rules, see infra notes 448-57
and accompanying text.
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was handed down, United States v. Sommerville44 2 created a federal
rule to hold liable the auctioneer of livestock covered by a recorded FHA security agreement. 443 In rejecting a state rule of
liability, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit identified the
major concern in fiscal terms, holding: "Protection of the [federal] purse is paramount." 444 Other courts have also cited the
goal of protecting the integrity of the Treasury in cases sustaining
the choice of federal law to govern suits by the government for
445
indemnification from third parties for torts against soldiers;
rights of redemption when the federal housing authority has foreclosed on a mortgage that it had guaranteed; 446 and the priority
of mortgages held by the Department of Housing and Urban De44 7
velopment with respect to loans made under the NHA.
Some courts have directly addressed the balance between the
fiscal interests of the government and other objectives of a federal
442. 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964). The
government sued an auctioneer to recover the value of livestock in which it had a
financial interest pursuant to an FHA security agreement, even though the auctioneer had no prior knowledge of the government's lien upon the livestock. Id.
at 714.
443. Id. at 716-17. Pennsylvania state law would not impose liability upon
the auctioneer for the livestock because the auctioneer did not have knowledge
of the government's lien on the livestock. Id. On the other hand, "federal policy" would impose liability under such circumstances. Id. at 717. The court asserted that "[a]n independent federal rule of decision must be applied when a
genuine federal interest would be subjected to uncertainty by application of disparate state rules." Id. at 714-15 (footnote omitted).
444. Id. at 716. The court feared that varying state laws threatened the
United States with financial loss:
The FHA would have to frame its loan program to suit the policies of
particular states as evidenced by their respective laws. The United
States, as a party-plaintiff would be able to protect itself from financial
loss in one state but not in another. Protection of the purse is paramount here and is paramountly federal. Whether the United States can
maintain a suit on an FHA loan must depend on uniform federal
policies.
Id.; see also United States v. Carson, 372 F.2d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1967) ("In cases
affecting government money and the credit of the government .. federal law
should apply." (quoting United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963))).
445. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1947). For
further discussion of Standard Oil, see supra notes 352-54, 360 and accompanying
text.
446. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 364-66 (9th
Cir.) (state redemption statutes do not apply to FHA foreclosure proceedings on
guaranteed mortgage), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
447. United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[I]n
any consideration of remedies available upon default of a federally held or insured loan, federal interest predominates over state interest.").
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program. In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 448 the government
argued that the application of state law to the FHA and SBA lend-

ing programs would undermine its ability to enforce repayment of
loans, thereby conflicting with the objectives of those programs.
It then compared recovery of dollars loaned under those programs to the collection of taxes, which it said would clearly be
covered by uniform federal law. 4 49 The Supreme Court, however, distinguished loan repayment from tax collection, holding
that tax liens, which were essential to insure sufficient money to
pay federal debts and which required uniform federal rules, were
unlike liens for the recovery of money advanced under a "care-

fully circumscribed" loan program. 450 Because the objectives of
the SBA and FHA programs were identified in terms of assisting
deserving borrowers, the Court could adopt state rules concerning lien priority, even though the United States would as a result
451
suffer a higher risk of nonpayment.
Several years after the Kimbell Foods decision, the Ninth Circuit performed a similar balancing of fiscal and social objectives.
United States v. Ellis4 52 concerned the application of a state law that

granted redemption rights to a borrower after foreclosure on real
448. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a further discussion of Kimbell Foods, see
supra notes 308-16 and accompanying text.
449. Kimball Foods, 440 U.S. at 733-34. The government argued that there
is minimal distinction between dollars collected for taxes and dollars collected

from loan repayments. Id. Therefore, it believed similar federal rules should be
fashioned to provide the same protection for the collection of loans as the federal tax laws provide for the collection of taxes. Id. at 734. Disagreeing, the
Court stated that "[t]he overriding purpose of the tax lien statute ... [was] to
ensure prompt revenue collection," unlike the SBA and FHA lending programs

which do not require prompt action. Id at 735.
450. Id. at 734. The Court asserted that the tax liens required greater
protection:
The importance of securing adequate revenues to discharge national
obligations justifies the extraordinary priority accorded federal tax liens

through the choateness and first-in-time doctrines. By contrast, when

the United States operates a moneylending institution under carefully

circumscribed programs, its interest in recouping the limited sums advanced is of a different order. Thus, there is less need here than in the
tax lien area to invoke protective measures against defaulting debtors

Id.

in a manner disruptive of existing credit markets.

451. Id. at 734-38. The Kimbell Foods Court made an important distinction

between the United States as involuntary creditor when taxes are unpaid, and
the voluntary nature of the SBA and FHA lending programs. Id. at 736. It was

the Court's position that the SBA and FHA programs place the government in a

similar position to private lenders. Id. It concluded that the "special status" for
which the government was arguing through the development of federal laws was

unnecessary to protect the Treasury in its capacity as lender. Id. at 737.
452. 714 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1983).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

106

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991]

CERCLA

LIABILITY

1473

property.453 The government had argued that because the loan
was made under the FHA program, federal law should override
the redemption rights granted under state law. It alleged that the
state rule would add to the operating costs of the government and
thereby "defeat the federal policy of maintaining a credit fund
available to farmers at reasonable rates." 454 The court disagreed,
asserting that an increase in the program administration costs,
which might result from adoption of a state law, did not necessarily require adoption of a federal rule. 455 The court held that the
objective of the program was "to support the farming segment of
the economy, and, particularly relevant here, to help ease the financial burden on farmers when they encounter financial difficulty. ' '456 The court then held that the state law regarding
redemption rights would not impair this federal objective, and
might even advance it.457
The search for the objectives that underlie CERCLA begins
with the statute and its legislative history. Although the statute
itself does not contain a statement of purpose, the legislative history provides some insight into the objectives to be achieved by
CERCLA. Senator Randolph, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, described the following
453. Id. at 957. The FHA sought to foreclose on a mortgage that expressly
waived redemption rights, despite conflict with state law. Id.
454. Id. at 955. The Washington redemption law allowed debtors to repur-

chase foreclosed property one year after foreclosure. Id. The government ar-

gued that its costs would increase because the possibility of redemption would
discourage bidding. Id. Additionally, under the Washington law the government would possibly have to purchase and hold properties for the one year redemption period before it could successfully put them up for bid. IdL
455. Id. The court noted that other courts, such as Kimbell Foods and Yazell,
had come to a similar conclusion. "The fact that increased costs may result from
the adoption of state law regarding debtor and creditor rights is not controlling.
Both the Supreme Court and this court have adopted state law despite added
costs to loan programs when state law did not jeopardize other federal interests." Id.
456. ld at 956. See generally H.R. REP. No. 986, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36,
reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1106, 1106-22.
457. Ellis, 714 F.2d at 956. The court opined that "[s]tatutory rights of
redemption give the mortgagor power to force the sale price close to true market value." Id.; see also United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir.
1979). Crain involved an action by the federal government to foreclose on a
mortgage and recover funds owed on an SBA loan. 589 F.2d at 998. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit asserted that the -[a]doption of ... state law
defenses [would] not adversely affect either of the federal policies involved." Id.
at 1000. The Crain court identified "two federal interests ... implicated in enforcing SBA loan contracts: protection of the federal fisc and the congressional
purpose in enacting the Small Business Act." Id. at 999 (footnote omitted).
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objectives of the Senate bill that eventually was enacted as
CERCLA:
First, to make those who release hazardous substances strictly liable for cleanup costs, mitigation, and
third party damages. Thus' it assures that the costs of
chemical poison releases are borne by those responsible
for the releases.
Second, the bill would establish a broad Federal response authority, and a fund of $4.1 billion over 6 years
to clean up and mitigate damages where a liable party
does not clean up or cannot be found.
Third, the bill would provide an opportunity
through the courts, and a more limited opportunity
through the fund, for victims to receive prompt and adequate compensation for losses and injuries.
Fourth, the bill would provide that the fund be financed largely by those industries and consumers who
profit from products and services associated with the
4 58
hazardous substances which impose risks on society.
Others have interpreted the purposes of CERCLA in various
ways. The opinion in United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.45 9 declared
that the purpose of the statute is to provide funds for the cleanup
of various hazardous substance release sites. 4 60 The First Circuit
in Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,461 identified
two somewhat different objectives:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be
immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and
effective response to the problems of national magnitude
resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Con458. 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
Although Senator Randolph was discussing the purposes of an earlier version of
the bill, each of the four stated objectives are consistent with the bill that eventually passed.
459. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a further discussion of the
Chem-Dyne decision, see supra notes 322-24, 429-32 and accompanying text.
460. 572 F. Supp. at 809. For a further discussion of this aspect of the
Chem-Dyne decision, see supra notes 429-32 and accompanying text.
461. 805 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986). Dedham Water Company filed-an action under CERCLA against a company whose operations had polluted Dedham's water source. Id. at 1075. Dedham failed, however, to comply with the
60-day statutory notice requirement. Id. at 1076. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held, based on the legislative intent behind CERCLA, that Dedham
did not have to comply with the notice requirement. Id. at 1082.
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gress intended that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs

and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
462
they created.
According to the district court in Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal,
Inc.,463 the principal goal of CERCLA is "decisive action to begin
remediation of the nation's major hazardous waste sites."' 46

The

court then identified as a "fundamental policy" of CERCLA that
responsible private parties bear the cost of such remediation,
465
rather than taxpayers.
Imposing liability on those responsible for releases of haz-

ardous substances is undoubtedly an essential objective of
CERCLA. Unfortunately, merely identifying imposition of liability on responsible parties as an objective of CERCLA does not
provide much help in determining whether state rules should be
adopted. The difficulty arises in that the rules of liability that are
462. Id. at 1081 (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982)); see also Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
761 F. Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1991). The Mobay court observed that imposing
liability on corporate parents under the capacity to control rule "serves the
broad remedial purpose underlying CERCLA to facilitate the fast, efficient
cleanup of hazardous waste sites" by placing the risk on "those who elect to
invest in a corporation, share in its profits and control its activities." 761 F.
Supp. at 354.
463. 761 F. Supp. 345 (D.NJ. 1991). Mobay owned an environmentally
polluted site. To recover cleanup costs, it brought suit against several companies that had previously been involved with the site. Id. at 348. The court arrived at two primary holdings based on CERCLA's sweeping remedial goals.
First, it permitted Mobay to proceed against a parent corporation that had been
actively involved in the management of its subsidiary, which was the actual
owner of the site. Id at 354. Second, the court held that a party may only escape CERCLA liability pursuant to an assumption agreement where the agreement either explicitly calls for the assumption of environmental liabilities by the
other party, or is so broadly worded as to encompass all liabilities of any type.
Id. at 358 & n.15. Since Mobay had only assumed explicit, non-environmental
liabilities from the prior owner of the site, Mobay was not deemed to have assumed all CERCLA liability and could proceed against the prior owner. Id. at
358.
464. Id. at 349. The court quoted legislative history of CERCLA that described the goals as
an inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites in a systematic manner,
establishment of priorities among the sites based on a relative danger, a
response program to contain dangerous releases from inactive hazardous waste sites, acceleration of the elimination of unsafe hazardous
waste sites, and a systematic program of funding to identify, evaluate
and take responsive actions at inactive waste sites to assure protection
of public health and environment in a cost-effective manner.
Id. n.3 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 25, reprintedin
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6128).

465. Id. at 349.
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chosen will directly affect identification of "responsible" persons
under CERCLA. This creates an element of circularity. To illustrate, assume that Corporatibn X is responsible for a release of
hazardous substances. The president of Corporation X has actively participated in the management of the corporation, or perhaps even the facility from which the release issued. Suppose
further that the president did not actively participate in the activity
that led to the release; the activity occurred without her knowledge. Whether or not the president is "responsible" for the release would therefore depend upon whether the court uses state
direct liability rules or the capacity to control rule used in certain
CERCLA cases. 4 6 6 If the objective of the statute is to hold all
responsible persons liable, then to the extent that the president is
"responsible," a state law that allows her to escape liability will
frustrate this objective. By hypothesis, however, she is not "responsible" unless the court has rejected state law in favor of the
capacity to control rule. Therefore, any proof that the state rules
frustrate CERCLA objectives must come from some other objective of the statute.
The argument that the economic defense of the Superfund is
a significant objective of CERCLA, the protection of which requires adoption of a federal rule of decision to maximize recovery
against individuals who might not otherwise be liable under traditional state law, is also problematic. No such objective is set out
in either the statute or its legislative history. Although CERCLA
does instruct the President of the United States to take into account numerous factors before deciding on any removal or remedial action, the ultimate prospect of recovery from the
responsible party or, in the case of a corporation, its officers, directors and stockholders, is not among the factors listed.46 7 The
legislative history provides some clues to the objectives of the
statute, but does not support advocates of the economic defense
argument. Nothing in the statute or the legislative history suggests that keeping a large balance in the Superfund is of special
significance.
466. The president in the hypothetical would satisfy the capacity to control
test, and therefore would be liable if this test were used. For discussion of the
capacity to control theory of direct liability, see supra notes 42-96 and accompa-

nying text. Since the president did not actively participate in the release of the
hazardous substances, however, she would escape liability under the traditional
common law. For a survey of California, New York and Texas law concerning

the liability of corporate officers and directors, see supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
467. See CERCLA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (1988).
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Notwithstanding the absence of express language in the statute of the legislative history identifying the economic defense of
the Superfund as a priority of CERCLA, it could be argued that
because the Superfund is essential to the operations of the President under the statute, it must at least be an implied objective of
CERCLA that the Superfund be maintained at maximum levels.
If adoption of state rules risks depleting the Superfund, then a
federal rule increasing the number of potentially liable persons
should instead be created. 468 The problem with this "implied objective" argument is that it assumes that the risk of financial loss
should fall not on the United States, but rather on stockholdersdespite the fact that stockholders are less likely to be in a position
to bear it.
Concern regarding the added financial burdens to the United
States from the adoption of state law has often been subordinated
46 9
to the more important social objectives of the federal program.
Here the discussions in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 470 and
United States v. Ellis47 1 provide ready instruction. In Kimbell Foods,
the Supreme Court distinguished between collecting general revenues from taxes and recovering monies advanced under a federal loan program, and held that the latter did not encompass
objectives that need to be protected from state laws. 472 Monies
advanced from the Superfund, like loans under the SBA and FHA
programs, are limited funds advanced under a "carefully circumscribed program. ' 473 Therefore, the federal government should
have no special claim in CERCLA cases for extraordinary meas468. See generally Note, Parent Liability, supra note 301, at 1002 (arguing that
parent corporation's potential ability to escape liability under state law undermines CERCLA statutory scheme by delaying or reducing recovery of funds on
which federal government depends for cleanup and restoration).
469. For a discussion of decisions emphasizing social objectives of a program over monetary objectives, see supra notes 434-41 and accompanying text.
470. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a further discussion of Kimbell Foods, see
supra notes 308-16 and accompanying text.
471. 714 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1983). For a further discussion of Ellis and its

analysis of the social objectives of a federal program, see supra notes 452-57 and
accompanying text.
472. 440 U.S. at 734-35. For a discussion of the Kimbell Foods Court's com-

parison between collecting tax revenues and recovering federal loans, see supra
notes 448-51 and accompanying text.
473. 440 U.S. at 734. Although the Superfund is certainly a part of the

federal purse, the money available for the Superfund comes in large part from
various excise taxes on hazardous substances levied specifically for use in the
cleanup of hazardous substance disposal facilities. For a discussion of the
Superfund and the relevant authorizing statutes, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
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ures to protect the federal purse. The government has no more
right to such extraordinary measures than it had in the context of
recovery of monies advanced from the SBA and FHA programs.
The financial objectives of CERCLA, like those of the SBA and
FHA programs, should be subordinated to the non-monetary
objectives of the statute.
The holding in Ellis also sheds some light on this issue. In
Ellis, the circuit court squarely rejected the government's arguments that protection of the FHA credit fund was essential to permit the program to continue making loans and that added
operating costs jeopardized the ability of the program to perform. 47 4 Added costs to the credit fund that resulted from the
adoption of state law redemption rights would not defeat the objective of the program, the court reasoned, because maintaining
the credit fund was not the objective; it was a means to an end.
The "end" was to provide assistance to farmers, and adoption of
state law would not interfere with this objective. 4 75 The same
logic applies to the argument that protection of the Superfund is
essential to permit the President to respond to future releases of
hazardous substances. Maintaining the Superfund is not the objective; it is a means to achieve the objective of coping with hazardous substance releases. It follows, therefore, that while the
adoption of state law might frustrate one of the means of achieving CERCLA's objective, it would not necessarily frustrate the
statute's actual objective.
In summary, identification of the objectives of CERCLA has a
direct impact on the determination of whether to adopt state law
rules for liability of officers, directors and stockholders. CERCLA
cases and legislative history have variously cited as objectives of
the statute the prompt remediation of hazardous waste sites, the
imposition of liability on "responsible" parties, and the need to
fund and maintain a healthy Superfund for remediation and for
compensation of victims. The courts then derive arguments to
show that a federal rule is essential to avoid the frustration of
these objectives. As discussed above, however, reference to the
concept of "responsible" parties in choosing between federal and
474. 714 F.2d at 955 (noting that previous decisions from both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court "have adopted state law despite added costs to loan
programs when state law did not jeopardize other federal interests").
475. Id. at 955-56. The court showed that it was unwilling to accept any
government argument that attempted to confuse the true objectives of a program with factors affecting, and even inconveniencing, the operation of the program. Id. at 956.
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state law is useless, because ascertaining who is "responsible" will
require a prior determination of whether to adopt federal or state
rules. Furthermore, the objectives relating to maintaining an economically viable fund for implementation of the statute, while not
insignificant, do not lead inevitably to the adoption of federal
rules of decision. Courts in analogous situations have
subordinated concerns as to the costs of programs to the nonmonetary goals that can be achieved without the aid of new federal rules. Therefore, the determination whether adoption of
state law rules of liability for officers, directors and stockholders
would frustrate the objectives of CERCLA requires a fresh look at
the remediation objective and the Superfund viability objective to
ascertain if they are in fact federal, rather than merely national,
and if they would be frustrated by the state rules. It is to this
inquiry that we now turn.
2. Are the Objectives Really Federal?
Once the actual objectives of a federal statute or program
have been identified, the next step requires a determination
whether such objectives are in fact federal in scope, or merely national. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.47 6 and NationalAudubon

Society v. Department of Water477 clearly illustrate the distinction between federal and national goals.
In Johns-Manville, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that state law governed the appropriateness of awarding specific types of damages in asbestos litigation. 478 The court rejected
the defendant's argument that a uniquely federal interest existed
in assuring compensation to persons injured by asbestos and in
maintaining government asbestos suppliers. 479 In rejecting the
defendant's argument, the court provided guidance concerning
the nature of the uniquely federal interest requirement:
"Uniquely federal interests" are not merely national interests, and the existence of national interests, no matter
476. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985).
477. 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988).
478. Johns-Manville, 750 F.2d at 1323, 1327. Specifically, the court found
that the availability of punitive damages, mental anguish damages and damages
for cancer as a proper future consequence of asbestos exposure was not an appropriate issue for the creation of a federal common law. Id. at 1327.
479. Id. at 1324. The defendant's rationale was that the interests of both
the government and the injured parties would be significantly served by creating
federal rules restricting the types of damages recoverable in asbestos litigation.

Id.
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their significance, cannot by themselves give federal
courts the authority to supersede state policy ....It is
well established instead that to be "uniquely federal"
and thus a sufficient predicate for the imposition of a
federal substantive rule, an interest must relate to an articulated congressional policy or directly implicate the
48 0
authority and duties of the United States as sovereign.
In NationalAudubon Society, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also provided a definition of "uniquely federal interests."
The court defined such interests as those that exist "only in such
narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations
of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of states or our relation with foreign
nations, and in admiralty cases. ' 4 1 The court then held that because the Clean Air Act provided that each state should have primary responsibility for its own air quality, it did not involve a
uniquely federal interest. 482
The identity of the parties involved in the litigation also affects whether the objectives will be viewed as federal in nature.
Many courts have held that a dispute among private parties does
not implicate federal interests to an extent that gives rise to a
"federal objective." 483 The courts' treatment of cases concerning
480. Id. at 1324-25 (citations omitted). In dicta, the court recognized the
desperate need for federal legislation in the field of asbestos litigation. Id. at
1327. The court stated, however, that "Congress' silence on the matter...
hardly authorizes the federal judiciary to assume for itself the responsibility for
formulating what essentially are legislative solutions." Id. But see Beverly v.
Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 937 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that federal law rules were
needed for National Flood Insurance Act because of, inter alia, "national scope"
of program).
481. National Audubon Society, 869 F.2d at 1202 (quoting Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)).
482. Id. at 1203. The court found, in effect, that the Audubon Society
could not rely on the federal common law of nuisance to state its air pollution
claim. Id at 1200; cf. Powers v. United States Postal Serv., 671 F.2d 1041, 1045
(7th Cir. 1982) (declining to adopt federal law governing lease of real property
by United States Post Office, in part because "there is nothing distinctive about
the lease of premises for a local post office. It is not different from the leasing of
commercial space by any large nationwide enterprise.").
483. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
640-647 (1981) (declining to create federal rule of contribution among antitrust
wrongdoers); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34
(1956) (declining to create federal rule to govern issues of good faith and lack of
knowledge or notice in conversion suit between private parties with respect to
United States bonds); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459
(9th Cir. 1986) (declining to create federal rule to govern interpretation of releases and contribution agreements among private parties with respect to
CERCLA liability); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993-
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private parties' rights of contribution provides a good example.
In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radliff Materials, Inc.,484 the United
States Supreme Court declined to create a federal right of contribution among antitrust defendants. 48 5 The Court recognized that
there is a federal interest in private enforcement of the antitrust
laws. It nevertheless reasoned that because contribution does not
actually implicate the duties of or distribution of power within the
federal government, it "does not implicate 'uniquely federal interests' of the kind that oblige courts to formulate federal com'4 8 6
mon law."

Courts have similarly held that contractual agreements apportioning CERCLA liability between private parties were "essentially tangential to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability
provisions," and, therefore, governed by state law rather than
federal law. 4 8 7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.48 8 took special note of the fact
that if state law were applied, the federal government would retain rights to full recovery and could still recover from any of the

private parties. State law would affect only the determination of
who among the private parties ultimately had to pay, which did
48 9
not impact any federal objective.
95 (2d Cir. 1980) (declining to create federal common law right of action in suit
by United States armed forces veterans against manufacturers of herbicides used
by United States during Vietnam War), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). The
court in In re "Agent Orange" summarized its position succinctly: "Since this litigation is between private parties and no substantial rights or duties of the government hinge on its outcome, there is no federal interest in uniformity for its
own sake." 635 F.2d at 993 (footnote omitted). But see Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-13 (1988) (creating federal law rule regarding
defenses that may be asserted by United States defense contractors for design
defects in military equipment); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 568 (5th
Cir. 1985) (holding that federal common law "government contractor" defense
applied in product liability suit by member of armed forces against military
contractor).
484. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
485. Id. at 646. The Court pointed out that regardless of the strength of
the arguments in favor of or opposed to contribution, "this is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve." Id.
486. Id. at 642 (citations omitted). The Court recognized the implication of
"a federal interest in the sense that vindication of rights arising out of these
[antitrust statutes] supplements federal enforcement and fulfills the objects of
the statutory scheme." Id. This interest was simply not sufficient to constitute a
federal interest. Id.
487. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459. The court noted that "Congress seems to
have expressed an intent to preserve the associated body of state law under
which agreements between private parties would normally be interpreted." Id.
at 1458.
488. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
489. Id. at 1459. The court recognized that because the government would
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The social and economic objectives of CERCLA are, at least
insofar as the United States government is concerned, federal,
and not merely national. Congress has charged the federal government, in its capacity as sovereign, with enforcing the liability
provisions contained in the statute.490 Unlike the Clean Air Act at
issue in National Audubon Society, CERCLA does not leave to the

states primary responsibility for hazardous substances in their jurisdictions. Although the statute does call for cooperation between the President and the states on a number of issues, 49 ' the
ultimate responsibility for deciding on the need for removal or
remedial action, and on the particular action to be taken, rests
with the federal government. 492 The rights and obligations of the
United States that CERCLA implicates are unquestionably federal, rather than national.
The issue is not so clear, however, when third parties become
involved. Consider, for example, a hypothetical situation in
retain full rights to recovery, application of state law to interpret agreements
would not frustrate CERCLA objectives or implicate federal interests. Id. But see
Wiegmann & Rose Int'l Corp. v. NL Indus., 735 F. Supp. 957 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(holding that federal law, rather than state law, governed whether "as is" clause
in deed between private parties would release grantor from liability under
§ 107(a) of CERCLA).
490. CERCLA §§ 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1988). CERCLA
states, in part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a
release or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to
act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange
for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at any time.. . or take
any other response measure consistent with the national contingency
plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health
or welfare or the environment.
Id. § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
491. See, e.g., id. § 104(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)-(d). The statute directs
the President to "consult with the affected State or States before determining
any appropriate remedial action to be taken pursuant to the authority granted
under subsection (a) of this section." Id. § 104 (c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2). In
addition, state cleanup standards may under certain circumstances be used to
establish the minimum level of cleanup that the federal government must attain.
Id. § 121(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d).
492. Id. §§ 104, 121, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9621. The President must "promulgate regulations providing for substantial and meaningful involvement by
each State in initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions to be
undertaken in that State." Id. § 121(0, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0. If the state objects
to the federal plan, it can intervene, as of right, through the court system. Id.
§ 121(0(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(0(2). The statute allows the President, however,
to "conclude settlement negotiations with potentially responsible parties without State concurrence." Id.
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which CERCLA would impose joint and several liability on several corporations for a hazardous substance release, but the government declined to name Corporation X in its suit against the
other corporations. This situation poses the question of whether
the named defendants may then sue the officers, directors and
stockholders of Corporation X for contribution under the
CERCLA liability standards, or whether they are confined to
traditional state law remedies because no federal interests are
present. No reported case has yet addressed this issue.
The opinions in Texas Industries and, more particularly,
Mardan suggest that a federal court should adopt state law to govern the liability of individuals in such a situation. The rationale
that state law should be utilized is based on the notion that because the chosen rule would affect only private parties, it would
be "tangential to the enforcement of CERCLA's liability provisions. ' ' 493 The application of state law would, however, greatly
disturb the concept of uniformity with respect to CERCLA liability. Under the legal rules articulated in Texas Industries and
Mardan, liability of the officers, directors and stockholders of a
corporation would depend on whether the corporation is being
sued by the United States directly, or by some other responsible
party whom the United States has sued. The federal government
has discretion concerning the responsible corporations against
which it will file suit.494 Given the power of the government in
this respect, it is the individual officers, directors and stockholders, rather than the government, who bear the full brunt of the
lack of uniformity. The diversity and uncertainty that the officers,
directors and stockholders face results not only from the varying
state laws, but also from the discretion vested in the federal government as to which of the responsible corporations it might seek
to hold liable. Whether officers, directors and stockholders are in
a better position than the United States to bear the burden of
495
such diversity seems dubious, at best.
493. Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459 ("Such [releases] cannot alter or excuse the
underlying liability, but can only change who ultimately pays that liability.").
494. See generally United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1255-57 (S.D. I1. 1984) (responsible corporations may be jointly and severally
liable under CERCLA; cautioning moderate approach to such liability); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("The
term joint and several liability was deleted from the express language of the
[CERCLA] statute in order to avoid its universal application to inappropriate
circumstances;"joint and several liability will nonetheless be imposed where two
or more persons cause a single and indivisible harm).
495. See Mishkin, supra note 109, at 830-33. Professor Mishkin wrote that
the use of federal law in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
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The dichotomy between those federal interests underlying
CERCLA that implicate the United States as sovereign and others
in which the United States has no interest creates a paradox for
those who seek uniformity in CERCLA liability. The essence of
this paradox is that even if frustration of the federal interests
would justify adoption of "uniform" federal rules of liability, state
law would still be an appropriate choice for resolving liability issues arising in contribution contexts among private parties. This
leads to the anomalous possibility of federal courts' employing
two different liability standards to the various parties with respect
to a single CERCLA violation. Thus, although adoption of a uniform federal rule of liability of officers, directors and stockholders
may reduce diversity in one respect (by creating a single standard
of liability for cases of government enforcement) it could increase
diversity within a single case by imposing a federal rule on some
potentially responsible parties and not others.
3.

Are the Federal Objectives Really Frustrated?

After identifying the federal objectives of a United States
statute, it is necessary to examine whether the objectives would
be frustrated by the application of state law. In applying this inquiry to CERCLA, the cases traditionally cite as potential frustration the possibility that individual states would create safe havens
for polluters by imposing rigid limited liability rules. 496 One

commentator argues that state limited liability rules would allow
stockholders to escape liability, thereby impairing the government's ability to keep the Superfund replenished and undermining effective governmental response to environmental
problems. 497 He adds that state rules providing limited liability
to stockholders would promote overly risky activities such as the
placement by corporate parents of hazardous substance operations in poorly capitalized subsidiaries without proper
controls.

4 98

In evaluating the claims that CERCLA objectives will be frus(1943) "can have one of two possible kinds of result: either it provides only the
illusion of uniformity, or it achieves its substance-for the Government-by the
process of passing the burdens onto private shoulders." Mishkin, supra note
109, at 832.
496. See, e.g., A &FMaterials, 578 F. Supp. at 1255 ("[A] uniform rule of law
will prevent excessive dumping in states with more lenient laws.").
497. Note, Parent Liability, supra note 301, at 1002 ("[P]rompt and effective
government responses depend crucially on the availability of funds-the tool
most needed for cleanup and restoration.").
498. Id. at 1002-03 (state limited liability rules would discourage parent
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trated by the application of state law, it is important to remember
that "Congress acts ... against the background of the total corpus

juris of the states." 499 Furthermore, a finding that a state rule
would frustrate the objectives of a federal statute or program requires more than a mere showing that the United States would
lose the litigation in question.5 0 0 There are three general areas of
inquiry relevant to determining if frustration exists: (1) whether
the adverse effects alleged to follow from the state rule are remote or speculative; 50 1 (2) whether the burden imposed by state
law on the federal statute or program will be material; 50 2 and
(3) whether the United States will retain the ability to protect its
interests in some way other than through state law. 50 3
a.

Is the Frustration Too Remote or Speculative?

The cases applying the Kimbell Foods test consistently feature
passionate claims by the United States that adoption of a state
rule would have dire consequences for the federal statute or program in question. 50 4 In nonenvironmental contexts, federal
corporations from overseeing hazardous waste disposal carried out by their
subsidiaries).
499. Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (quoting
H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435
(1953)); accord Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (in field of corporate
law, "congressional legislation is generally enacted against the background of
existing state law; Congress has never indicated that the entire corpus of state
corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is
based upon a federal statute" (citations omitted)); see also FDIC v. Braemoor
Assocs., 686 F.2d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 1982) (absence of "ready-made" federal law
and lack of "explicit statutory or constitutional direction" support presumption
that courts should generally apply state law to federal statutes), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 927 (1983).
500. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). The Supreme
Court continued: "If success of the [litigation] were the only benchmark, there
would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would
then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially
irrelevant." Id.
501. For a discussion of whether the frustration of CERCLA objectives
through adoption of state law is too remote or speculative to justify a federal
law, see infra notes 504-20 and accompanying text.
502. For a discussion of whether the adoption of state law would frustrate
federal objectives or merely create a small burden, see infra notes 521-58 and
accompanying text.
503. For a discussion of whether the United States can protect itself if state
law were adopted in cases involving CERCLA liability, see infra notes 559-75
and accompanying text.
504. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977); Chicago Title
Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Miree, see infra notes 505-10 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Chicago Title, see infra notes 511-14 and accompanying text.
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courts have rejected the government's claims. One ground for
rejecting the government's contention is that the ill effects alleged to result from the state rule are simply too remote from the
objectives of the statute or program tojustify creation of a federal
rule. At other times, the courts have held that insufficient evidence exists to prove that the predicted ill effects will in fact result
from adoption of the state rule, and that mere speculation is not
enough to justify a federal rule.
The United States Supreme Court ruled on the remoteness
issue in Miree v. DeKalb County.5 05 The case presented the ques-

tion of whether state law would govern a claim against the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), by persons injured in an airplane
crash, under maintenance contracts between the FAA and the airport owners. 50 6 The Court held that the use of state law to determine whether the injured parties were third party beneficiaries of
the FAA contracts threatened no substantial federal interests. 507
To reach this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the outcome of
the litigation would not directly affect either the United States or
the federal Treasury, and would not burden operations of the
United States in connection with FAA grants. 508 The government
then argued that it had a cognizable federal interest in regulating
and promoting air travel, and that adoption of state law would
frustrate this interest. 50 9 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It instead held that the federal interest in air travel identified by the government was too remote and too speculative to
justify creating a federal rule in what was essentially a matter of
505. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
506. Id. at 27-29. Petitioners were survivors of persons who were killed in
the crash, and sought, as third-party beneficiaries of the contracts, to impose
liability on the county. Id. at 26.27. The contracts restricted the use of the land
in the vicinity of the airport to purposes compatible with normal airport operations. Id. at 27. The petitioners claimed that the county breached the FAA contracts by maintaining a garbage dump adjacent to the airport. Id. The
petitioners further asserted that the crash had been caused by the ingestion into
the aircraft of birds that were swarming from the dump. Id.
507. Id at 29. In its holding, the Court distinguished the facts of the case
from those in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Miree,
433 U.S. at 29. The Court noted that the application of federal law in the case at
bar "would promote no federal interests even approaching the magnitude of
those found in Clearfield Trust." Id.
508. 433 U.S. at 29-30. The Court concluded that "[sjince only the rights
of private litigants are at issue" in the case at bar, federal interests would not be
burdened by the application of state law. I. at 30.
509. Id. at 31. The Court stated that, even assuming the importance and
correctness of this federal interest, "the issue of whether to displace state law on
an issue such as this is primarily a decision for Congress," which had chosen not
to take any action. Id at 32.
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local concern, and applied state law. 510
In cases in which the adverse consequences alleged to follow
from the adoption of a state rule are not remote, but are sufficiently related to the federal interests at issue, courts have sometimes been skeptical of whether such consequences will actually
occur. Such skepticism was evident in Chicago Title Insurance Co. v.
Sherred Village Associates.5 1 ' The government argued that state law
rules of lien priority for mechanics' liens should not be adopted in
cases involving mortgages insured by or assigned to the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD).51 2 The government was concerned that the adoption of
5 13
state law would precipitate the demise of the entire program.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissed this argument. It found that the government had submitted insufficient
evidence to show that the "HUD program would collapse if the
linchpin of absolute federal priority were removed," and that
51 4
state law should therefore govern.
Claims about the drastic effects that may result from adopting state law to determine the liability of officers, directors and
stockholders under CERCLA should be examined in light of the
Miree and Chicago Title cases. CERCLA liability cases differ from
the factual settings of Miree and Chicago Title in that CERCLA liability cases involve the enforcement by the United States of federal law and the recovery of federal funds. 51 5 The United States
does have a strong federal interest in enforcing the remediation
of hazardous waste sites and preventing the creation of "safe
havens" for polluters. It also has a strong federal interest in
preventing exhaustion of the Superfund. Thus, the effects al510. Id. at 32-33. The Court noted that "[alpart from the highly abstract
nature of [the federal] interest, there has been no showing that state law is not
adequate to achieve it." Id. at 32 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63, 71 (1966)).
511. 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1983).
512. Id. at 811. The mechanics' lien, under Maine law, would have been
entitled to priority over the federal mortgages, because the contract from which
the mechanics' lien arose had been executed before the government had recorded its mortgage. Id. at 807.
513. Id. at 811. The government "envision[ed] a domino-like progression
of calamities" if a state rule of decision was adopted to govern this federal program. Id.
514. Id. The Court was unpersuaded by the government's argument that if
government mortgages were subordinated to subsequent mechanics' liens,
"[t]itle insurance companies [would) be unwilling to write lien coverage for
HUD projects." Id.
515. For a discussion of the legal principles behind CERCLA, see supra
notes 7-23 and accompanying text.
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leged by the government, if true, would have an acute impact on
the objectives of CERCLA.
Even though the predicted consequences are not too remote,
there has not been sufficientevidence produced thus far to indicate that the consequences will actually ensue. None of the
CERCLA opinions refer to testimony or other evidence to support the claims that state liability rules will, in fact, interfere with
federal cleanup efforts, or create "safe havens" for polluters or
threaten the Superfund. Furthermore, none of the commentators
who advocate creating federal law have offered evidence for their
516
arguments that state law would frustrate the federal objectives.
The arguments rest on mere speculation, which the Miree and Chicago Title courts held insufficient to support the creation of a federal rule.
Development of the evidence needed to support or contradict the government's claims concerning the consequences of
adopting state law would require empirical studies, and is beyond
the scope of this Article. 517 Several reasons for the lack of evidence on the frustration issue suggest, however, that it would be
exceptionally difficult, or even impossible, for the United States
to meet its burden of proof and secure a federal rule.
First, the argument that polluters would flock to "safe haven"
states would be extremely hard to defend, because no such safe
havens currently exist. Each of the fifty states currently recognizes common law exceptions to limited liability of officers, direc516. See, e.g., Note, Parent Liability, supra note 301, at 1002-03. The arguments presented in the note are supported primarily by references to the literature of modem economic theory, purporting to show the economic inefficiency
of limited liability for parent corporations. Id. at 1002 nn.90-96. At the risk of
underestimating the efficacy of such economic arguments, it should be noted
that the issue of limited liability is still in controversy in the economic literature,
and the debate is so far inconclusive. See generally Landers, supra note 301 (advocating significant curtailment of limited liability protection); Posner, The Rights of
Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 499 (1976) (responding to
Landers, and defending limitations on liability by using economic approach);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89
(1985) (defending both limited liability and piercing corporate veil in light of
economic analysis).
517. One example of evidence that could be presented in this regard is
general data concerning government expenditures for cleanup costs, and the
government's general success in recovering such expenditures from responsible
parties. These data would be useful in ascertaining whether the viability of the
Superfund is actually currently injeopardy. It would also be useful, in determining whether state liability law would adversely affect CERCLA, to calculate the
incremental amount of money that has been recovered from officers, directors
and stockholders to date that would not have been recovered under traditional
state rules.
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tors and stockholders. 51 8 It is possible, of course, that one or
more states could abolish the extant exceptions in the future.

Given the long history of these exceptions and their ubiquitous
character, however, there is little reason to believe they will cease.
Moreover, it is difficult to believe that any state would long toler-

ate being a known "safe haven" for polluters or otherwise interfere with enforcement of CERCLA 5 19 Regardless of who pays
for the cleanup, the state's environment and its citizens would
sustain significant damage. 520 For these reasons, the government

may have great difficulty meeting its burden of showing the alleged frustration of CERCLA objectives to be more than speculative, and thus the courts should not create a federal rule of
liability.
b.

Does Adoption of State Law Frustrate Federal Objectives or

Merely Create a Small Burden?
In cases where the United States is able to prove that the
adoption of state law will adversely affect federal objectives, the
next question is whether this in fact creates a significant conflict
with federal objectives, or merely adds a small burden to the operations of the federal program. A brief survey of cases that have
examined the sufficiency of the burden on federal objectives will
assist in analyzing this question with respect to CERCLA.
State rules that impose nondiscriminatory procedural practices on federal programs do not usually frustrate the objectives
of the programs unless the practices create substantial compli518. For cases recognizing direct and indirect liability for corporate directors, officers and stockholders in each of the 50 states, see supra notes 191 and
233.
519. Section 104(c) of CERCLA requires the President to take steps to involve states in the cleanup. These steps include a requirement that a state in
which a spill has occurred pay a portion of the costs of the remedial action.
CERCLA § 104(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c) (1988). Thus, one would expect the executive and legislative branches of any state that had become a "safe haven" to
take steps to loosen the limits on liability in order to decrease the state's potential financial obligation.
520. Judge Kennedy made this argument in Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In
Anspec, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted a state law rule of
liability in a CERCLA case. Id.at 1246. Judge Kennedy, in concurrence, discounted the possibility that, absent a uniform federal rule, states would compete
to create safe havens for pollutors. He noted that the states "have a substantial
interest in protecting their citizens and state resources," adding that most states
have counterparts to CERCLA and "share a complimentary interest with the
United States in enforcement of" such laws. Id. at 1250 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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ance problems. In Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,521 for example, the Supreme Court held that a provision of state law
relating to the proper form of conveyances should govern conflicting private claims to oil and gas leases on property owned by
the United States and issued under the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920.522 The Court first noted that the Mineral Leasing Act contained nothing expressly inconsistent with the state law in question. 5 23 It then held that the state law provision in question did
not interfere with transfers of federal leases. The state law merely
required that such transfers be made in writing, and thus did not
present a significant conflict sufficient to require the creation of
5 24
new federal law.
In Dupnik v. United States,5 25 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit refused to create federal common law to override
an Arizona notice procedure that was required prior to foreclosure. 52 6 Although adoption of the state law resulted in an unfavorable result for the SBA in the case at bar, the court ruled that
compliance with the notice requirement would not generally
place an undue burden on SBA operations.5 27 The adoption of
state law would, at most, cause an administrative inconvenience
5 28
for the SBA.
521. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
522. Id at 69-72. Under Louisiana law, which the Court eventually found
to be controlling, mineral lease contracts could only be conveyed by a written
instrument. Id.
523. Id. at 69.
524. Id. at 68-72. The Court terminated its inquiry after finding that the
application of state law would pose "no significant threat" to federal objectives.
Id. at 68. It declined to make further inquiries concerning the strength of the
state interest in having its own law govern or the feasibility of creating a judicial
substitute. Id. at 68-69.
525. 848 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1988).
526. Id. at 1485. The Arizona statute at issue voided redemption rights that
were not preserved by a notice of intent to redeem property within six months of
the foreclosure sale. Id. at 1477. The federal SBA contended that a federal statute giving the SBA the right to redeem within one year of a foreclosure sale
preempted the Arizona statute. Id. at 1479. The SBA had given notice more
than eleven months, but less than one year, after the foreclosure sale. Id. at
1477-78. Therefore, the notice was timely under federal law, but not under Arizona law. Id. at 1478. The court held that the federal statute did not demonstrate congressional intent to preempt the Arizona statute, and then declined to
create a federal common law to exempt the SBA from the Arizona statute. Id. at
1485.
527. Id. at 1483; cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 8487 (1987) (possibility that state anti-takeover statute would delay some tender
offers held insufficient to conclude that statute is preempted by federal securities
laws).
528. Dupnik, 848 F.2d at 1483. The court explained:
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Several courts have found that minor financial burdens created by state law also do not frustrate the objectives of federal
programs in most cases. In Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders,52 9 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided that "the interests
of the United States in the determination of the amount of compensation a private licensee must pay a landowner in a condemnation proceeding under Section 21 [of the Federal Power Act] are
not sufficient to warrant displacement of state law on that issue." 5 3 0° Similarly, in United States v. Ellis,53s the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit held that increased costs, which would result
to the United States from adoption of a state law concerning redemption rights after foreclosure, were not inconsistent with the
FHA loan program.5 3 2 The court recognized the FHA loan program as a "form of social welfare legislation" for farmers, the
purpose of which was to support farming and ease the financial
burden on farmers in financial difficulty.5 33 Creating the federal
rule requested by the government would have had the effect, the
court noted, of giving the United States "the unchecked powers
of a credit bidder at [a] foreclosure sale." 53 4 The court commented that such an effect might defeat the purpose of helping
farmers through financial difficulty, and declined to create a fed53 5
eral rule.
The federal interest at stake here is convenience in being freed from
the shackle of a state notice procedure. Our previous decisions indicate
that convenience normally is not sufficientjustification to create a uniform federal rule rather than to adopt state law. Moreover, we previously have adopted state procedures as federal law even though the
SBA's failure to comply with those procedures can extinguish its rights.
Id (citation omitted).
529. 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981).
530. Id. at 1118. The court noted that the Federal Power Act was concerned with maximizing hydroelectric development, reducing energy costs and
minimizing the government's cost to exercise its right to acquire a project once
the license term has expired. Id. at 1120. The state law, however, was concerned only with "the narrow question of the determination of the amount of
compensation a licensee must pay a landowner." Id. at 1121. As a result, the
state law neither nullified federal objectives nor created a conflict precluding the
application of state law. Id.
531. 714 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1983).
532. Id. at 955. The government specified that if the state law right of redemption were applied, it would incur costs in that bidding would be chilled at
foreclosure sales and the United States would be required to purchase the property and hold it during the redemption period. Id.
533. Id. at 955-56. The court found that this "overriding federal purpose is
not adversely affected, and may even be advanced, by adopting state law." Id. at
956.
534. Id. at 956.
535. Id. at 956-57.
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Quantification of the additional procedural or financial burdens that would result from the adoption of a state rule requires53 a6
long-term perspective. In Powers v. United States Postal Service,
for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the possibility that a state. landlord-tenant rule might in53 7
crease the costs of leases to the United States Postal Service.
Judge Posner pointed out that protecting the low rent paid by the
Postal Service with a federal rule would not save the government
any money in the long run, because landlords would in the future
seek compensation at the inception of each lease in the form of
higher rents. 538 Thus, the court found that the purported increase in cost was not a rationale for applying federal common
law.

53 9

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Crain54° also considered possible. burdens on federal policy in
holding that the state law doctrine of equitable subrogation
should be adopted in a case where the United States had sued to
recover on a personal guarantee of an SBA loan. 5 41 The court
536. 671 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1982).
537. Id. at 1044. The state law permitted a landlord to terminate a lease for
failure to pay rent. Id. at 1046. The Postal Service had withheld $1600 for costs
it incurred to repaint the leased premises when the landlord refused to repaint
at his expense. Id. at 1042. If the landlord were permitted to terminate the
lease, the Postal Service would lose the benefit of a fixed rent negotiated in
1964. Id. at 1044. As a result, application of the state law would result in an
increase in cost to the federal program. Id. The court recognized that the case
was an issue of first impression in that no court above the district court level had
addressed the question of which law governs the interpretation of Postal Service
leases. Id.
538. Ia at 1044. Judge Posner explained:
Knowing that they would have fewer rights under federal leases than
state law (if applicable) would have given them, Indiana landlords
would in the future drive harder bargains with the Postal Service. Concretely, the more difficult a lease is to terminate, the higher will be the
rent demanded by the landlord; there will be no net saving to the tenant in the long run.
Id
539. Id. The court also looked to other considerations, such as the value of
uniformity obtained by applying federal common law and the fact that a federal
common law of landlord and tenant did not exist, in its determination that state
law was to be adopted. Id. at 1045. As the court noted, while federal courts
have the power to create federal common law, they are not bound to do so,
especially where state law would provide equivalent or better rules of decision.
Id. at 1043.
540. 589 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1979).
541. Id. at 1000. The doctrine of equitable subrogation relieves a loan
guarantor of liability if a creditor does not act to protect the value of security
given by the primary debtor. Id. In the case at bar, the defendant loan guarantors argued that the SBA had allowed the primary debtor's collateral to be dissipated. Id. at 998. If this were found to be true, the SBA could be barred from
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observed that although the United States might lose under state
law in the Crain case itself, there would not be any overall adverse
effect on the federal program. 542 In fact, the court reasoned, recognition of state law provisions protecting guarantors would
make it easier in the future for the SBA to find guarantors for its
loans, thereby facilitating the federal objectives. 543
The United States Supreme Court used the long-term economic outlook to rule out adoption of a state rule in a recent case.
The facts in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 544 involving a wrongful death action against an independent contractor who built a
Marine helicopter that crashed, resembled those in Miree v.
DeKalb County, 545 in which the Supreme Court had adopted state
law. 546 The Boyle Court, however, by taking the analysis one step
further than it had in Miree, found long-term federal interests.
The Boyle Court noted that if tort suits could be brought under
state law against independent contractors doing business for the
United States, there would be an adverse effect on the United
enforcing any obligation against the defendant guarantors. Id. at 1000. The

equitable doctrine could be applied even though the SBA loan guarantee form
specifically provided that the SBA could proceed directly against the guarantors
upon default of the primary debtor without first pursuing its rights against the
primary debtor. Id. at 998, 1001. If the court allowed the defense of equitable
subrogation, the SBA could only recover against the defendant guarantors upon
a showing that the guarantors had waived the defense. l- at 1001.
542. Id. at 1000. The court noted that the doctrine of equitable subrogation would not jeopardize the government's ability to enforce loan repayment,
but would simply require the government to look to the primary debtor's collateral first. Id.
543. Id. The court reasoned that by protecting guarantors, it would be easier to find private guarantors. Id. These private sureties relieve the SBA of a
measure of financial risk it would have to take on in their absence. Id.
544. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
545. 433 U.S. 25 (1977). For a discussion of the facts and the Court's anal-

ysis in Miree, see supra notes 505-10 and accompanying text.
546. Miree, 433 U.S. at 26.

Boyle stemmed from a helicopter crash that resulted in the death of the helicopter's United States Marine copilot. 487 U.S. at 502. The decedent's per-

sonal representative sued the manufacturer of the helicopter for defective
design and repair. Id. at 503. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, but the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that, under federal law, the manufacturer was protected by the military contractor defense. Id.
(citing Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414-15 (4th Cir.
1986)).
Boyle and Miree both concerned claims based on aircraft crashes involving a
breach by a party to a federal contract. The Boyle court distinguished Miree, however, by noting that the Miree petitioners sought to enforce a contractual duty
imposed by the government contract. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 508. In Boyle, by contrast, the petitioners sought to enforce a state-imposed duty of care that was
,#precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract" to manufacture helicopters only pursuant to the government specifications. Id. at 509.
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States.5 47 The Court deduced that the long-term impact would
be negative because contractors would likely increase their prices
to cover their liability, thereby passing on the financial burden of
such suits to the United States and resulting in significant addi48
tional costs. 5
It is doubtful that the additional procedural and financial
burdens that the United States would incur if state law liability
rules were applied in CERCLA cases rise to the level necessary to
constitute frustration of the federal objectives of CERCLA. This
doubt increases when the long-term effects of the federal and
state rules are considered. From a procedural standpoint, the evidentiary requirements of traditional state rules for liability of officers, directors and stockholders are undeniably much more
demanding on the federal government than the evidentiary requirements of the federal CERCLA rules.5 49 Byjettisoning traditional state requirements such as a showing of active participation
in the tortious action for direct liability and complete domination
and inequity for piercing the corporate veil, the federal government is relieved of the burden of presenting a great deal of evidence. The government's case is much easier to prove, from a
procedural standpoint, if the courts use federal rules. 550
Notwithstanding the apparent procedural benefits available
to the government under the federal rules, proponents of creating federal rules concerning officer, director and stockholder liability have not demonstrated that the additional procedural
burden arising from state rules would frustrate CERCLA objectives. Each state has rules that provide a workable means for im547. 487 U.S. at 511-12. The Court reasoned that:
The financial burden ofjudgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United
States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices
to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Governmentordered designs.
Id.
548. Id.
549. Compare Lowendahl v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 154-57, 287
N.Y.S. 62, 72-76 (requiring finding of complete control, use of control to commit fraud, and injury resulting from fraud for stockholder to be held liable for
acts of corporation), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936) with United States
v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (requiring only finding that parent corporation was familiar with, had capacity to control and
benefitted from subsidiary's waste disposal practices for parent corporation to
be held liable).
550. See generally Wallace, supra note 25, at 873-74 (heavy burdens of proof
in piercing corporate veil cases would add to already considerable burden of
proof required in CERCLA cases).
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posing liability on officers, directors and stockholders of
corporations, subject to the limitations and defenses built up over
many decades of corporate law. 55 1 Both state courts and federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction are frequently required to
apply traditional state common law rules.5 52 Nothing in these
many cases indicates that in CERCLA cases the United States
would be unable to comply with the state rules or that compliance
would be burdensome to the federal cleanup effort. There has
been no manifestation that any of the state rules discriminates
against the United States. It is not material that the United States
may not be able to meet the extra burdens of state law in a particular case. Although it would be significant if the United States
could not meet the increased burden of making a substantial evidentiary showing in many or most cases, such a conclusion seems
55 3
completely unwarranted.
Furthermore, no evidence indicates that the additional financial burdens that may arise from adoption of state rules of liability
would frustrate the CERCLA objectives in maintaining a viable
Superfund. The objectives of the statute should not be interpreted solely in economic terms. 554 The economic price of applying state liability rules would be an increase in the costs of
enforcement and an increase in nonrecoverable disbursements
from the Superfund. The mere fact that these costs will be higher
under state rules than under federal rules does not prove that
state law frustrates the federal objectives. It simply shows that
some of the financial burden resulting from cleanup costs would
be shifted from officers, directors and stockholders of corporations to the United States. In fact, because taxes on hazardous
551. For cases recognizing direct and indirect liability for corporate directors, officers and stockholders in each of the 50 states, see supra notes 191 and
233.
552. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 70, §§ 41-48.10 (expansive list of federal and state cases concerning different aspects of the "disregard of the corporate entity").
553. For example, the court in United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 15 (D.R.I. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 24 (lst Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
957 (1991), recited a number of facts that would be relevant in making a federal
piercing the corporate veil determination. Id. at 20. In framing the federal rule
for piercing the corporate veil in CERCLA cases, the court noted that the federal
common law borrowed heavily from state law. Id. In fact, "courts confronting
this choice of law issue have observed that the distinction between state law and
a federal rule of decision is of little practical difference." Id. (citing In re
Acushnet River, 675 F. Supp. 22, 33 (D. Mass. 1987)).
554. For a discussion and rejection of the argument that the economic defense of the Superfund is a significant objective of CERCLA, see supra notes 46775 and accompanying text.
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substances constitute the primary source of funds for the
Superfund, 5 55 it is arguable that the financial burden would shift
not to the United States government, but rather to hazardous
substance-related industries.
The argument that the additional burdens that state law
would impose on the United States are not sufficiently serious to
frustrate the CERCLA objectives becomes even stronger when
the consequences of the state rules, and the CERCLA alternatives, are examined from a long-term economic perspective. The
state rules of liability may allow some officers, directors and stockholders to escape liability and thereby add to the drain on the
Superfund. The federal rules developed in the CERCLA cases,
however, will start in motion a chain of events that may also affect
both the cost of enforcing CERCLA and the viability of the
Superfund. A detailed discussion of the economic effects of state
and CERCLA rules of liability is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it is clear that expanding the exceptions to limited
liability of officers, directors and stockholders will significantly
impact the costs of removal and remedial actions and the viability
of the Superfund. 5 56 This impact, which has largely been ignored
in the cases and by advocates of the CERCLA rules, could make
the federal rules even less attractive when compared to the traditional state law.
Further examination may reveal long-term adverse effects of
the CERCLA rules on those industries that use, store or transport
hazardous substances. For example, it has been pointed out that,
in general, eliminating the limited liability of corporate parents
would create a "perverse incentive" for "corporate dis-integration" in order to minimize liability accruing to the parent from a
subsidiary corporation. 557 This would put potential victims of
555. For a discussion of the various sources of money for the Superfund,
see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Representative Florio noted during the House debate prior to passage of the statute that CERCLA would raise
87.5% of the necessary funding from the industry tax, and 12.57o from general
revenues. 126 CoNG. REc. 31,964 (1980).
556. CERCLA contains a statutory limitation on the liability of "response
action contractors" for work performed under certain circumstances in connection with the cleanup of facilities. CERCLA § 119(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a)
(1988). Such persons may also be entitled to indemnification by the United
States. Id. § 119(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9619(c). Under certain circumstances, however, the contractor's liability will not be limited. Id. § I19(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9619(a)(2) (imposing liability on contractor in instances of negligence).
Therefore, even officers, directors and stockholders of response action contractors will have substantial concerns about their liability under CERCLA in certain
situations.
557. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 516, at 111.
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torts in a worse position than they currently stand, because
smaller non-integrated corporations are less likely to carry insurance than are larger multi-leveled enterprises. 5 58 An increase in
uninsured and underinsured corporations engaged in handling or
cleaning up hazardous substances would presumably have a negative impact on the Superfund, as well as on federal remediation
efforts. The consequences of the new rules created by federal
courts in CERCLA cases must be evaluated and incorporated into
the analysis when determining whether a federal rule is justified.
In summary, despite claims in the CERCLA cases that adoption of state law rules of liability of officers, directors and stockholders would frustrate objectives of the statute, the claims have
not been substantiated with persuasive evidence. It is clear that
the traditional state rules impose evidentiary and financial burdens on the federal government that are mitigated under the federal rules. No showing has been made, however, that these
burdens rise to the level of frustration of CERCIA objectives,
particularly when the long-term effects of the state rules and the
CERCLA rules are examined. Absent some evidence of frustration, the case for creating new federal rules has not been made.
c.

Can the United States Protect Itself?

The third consideration in determining whether adoption of
state law would frustrate the federal objectives of a program or
statute examines whether the United States would retain any
means through which to protect its interests if state law were
adopted. Several cases have held that the potential adverse impact of state laws upon federal objectives was mitigated by other
opportunities available to the United States to protect its interest.
Usually this protection is in the form of precautions that the government can take in the ordinary course of the program in question prior to the onset of litigation. Examples of actions the
government can take to protect its interests, so that state law will
not have a completely adverse impact, include negotiating
favorable terms in a procurement agreement 559 or mortgage as558. Id.
559. In re Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 620 F.2d 767, 772-73 (10th Cir.
1980). In Murdock, the court adopted the state enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in lieu of a federal procurement contract clause which would have
given the government a priority claim to the disputed steel in question. Id. at

772. The court held that the state commercial code did not frustrate the objectives of government procurement programs, because "the government is capable of protecting itself within the framework of state commercial law." Id. The
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signment contract. 560
Even when no opportunity exists for the United States to take
advance precautions, the government often has one ultimate
weapon available to insure that its interests will not suffer unfairly
upon adoption of the state rule--the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. In Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,5 6 1 the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of the right to be
heard in federal court.5 62 The case concerned a dispute over
whether changes in the course of a river that affected land owned
or possessed by the United States or an Indian tribe were avulsive
or accretive.5 63 By applying the Kimbell Foods test, the Court determined that the application of state law would not frustrate federal interests. 56 4 The Court reasoned that because the federal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue in question,
"[a]dequate means are thus available to insure fair treatment of
tribal and federal interests. '5 65 Thus, even when the potential
court reasoned that the government was able to take precautions by negotiating
specific contract terms through its superior bargaining position. Id at 772-73.
560. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 811
(Ist Cir. 1983). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit pointed
out that Housing and Urban Development (HUD) required that an initiating
lender warrant that a mortgage assigned to HUD is prior to all other liens. Id. If
HUD were to enforce the warranty requirement, the risk of a prior lien would
shift to the lender. The lenders could easily protect themselves with title insurance. Id. As a result, lenders under the HUD program did not need a rule of
absolute federal priority of government mortgage liens to protect themselves
from prior liens (in the case at bar, a mechanics' lien). Id. For a discussion of
Chicago Title, see supra notes 511-14 and accompanying text.
561. 442 U.S. 653 (1979).

562. Id. at 670. The Court stated: "It is rudimentary that 'Indian title is a
matter of federal law and can be extinguished only with federal consent' and that
the termination of the protection that federal law, treaties, and statutes extend
to Indian occupancy is 'exclusively the province of federal law.' " Id at 670-71
(quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974)).
563. Id. at 660. Iowa residents had been dispossessed by the Omaha Indian
Tribe, assisted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. at 659-60. The dispossessed
parties filed suit, alleging that the changes in the course of the river at issue had
eroded Indian land on the west side of the river, and new land that formed on
the eastern, Iowa side belonged to the east-bank riparian owners, not the Tribe.
Id. at 660. The United States government and the Tribe contended that the
river's movement had been avulsive, and that the shift in the river's location to
the west had not affected the boundary of the reservation. Id.
564. Id. at 673-74. In considering the dispute, the Court saw no need to
create a general body of federal common law to decide the issue. Id. at 673.
The Court determined that state law was to be borrowed as the federal rule of
decision. Id
565. Id. at 674. In addition, the Court regarded as important that this is an
area in which the states have a substantial interest in having their own law resolve such disputes. Id. The Court reasoned that private landowners rely on
state real property law and that their expectations should not be upset. Id. The
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exists for frustration of government objectives, courts may still
adopt state law upon a showing that the United States retains ample opportunity to protect itself.
Although the government does not typically have any opportunity to negotiate protection of federal interests prior to
CERCLA recovery or enforcement actions, such actions will be
heard in federal courts. 566 As in the Wilson case, federal jurisdiction provides the federal government with a significant advantage
in the protection of federal interests. Since federal courts control
the process of adopting state law rules, the United States will always be able to turn to the federal courts to assure protection of
the federal interests reflected in CERCLA-and to prevent frus56 7
tration of the federal objectives of the statute.
The weapon of exclusive federal jurisdiction helps the United
States protect its interest and prevent frustration of its objectives
primarily because of the ability of the federal judiciary to reject
particular state laws that are inconsistent with the federal interests. The federal judiciary is able to do this even after state law
has in general been adopted to supply the rule of decision. In
De Sylva v. Ballentine,5 68 the Supreme Court adopted state law to
provide the definition of the word "children" for purposes of
construing rights under the federal Copyright Act. 56 9 The Court
Court opined that if a federal rule were applied, reasonable expectations could
be upset whenever landowners live adjacent to land in which the United States
has a substantial interest. Id
566. CERCILA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988) ("[T]he United States
district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all controversies
arising under this chapter, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the
amount in controversy.").
567. It is arguable that Congress, by granting exclusive jurisdiction over
CERCLA matters to the federal courts, was showing its intent to have only federal rules apply. This argument is based on the fact that state law, if adopted,
would be applied without any opportunity for state courts to ever hear the specifics of a CERCIA-type case. Cf Mishkin, supra note 109, at 819 (opining that
in cases heard exclusively by federal courts, if "state law is adopted, it must of

necessity be applied without any possibility of state court consideration of the
precise type of case").
This argument is easily answered, however, by noting that the state law
rules of liability for officers, directors and stockholders are employed regularly
by federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Thus, the federal courts hear-

ing CERCLA liability cases would be intimately familiar with the state law rules if
they were asked to apply the state rules.
568. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
569. Id. at 580-81. The Court noted the special importance of its ability to
apply state law in this context, citing the fact that the pertinent "statute deals
with a familial relationship [and] there is no federal law of domestic relations,
which is primarily a matter of state concern." Id. at 580.
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reserved the right, however, to exclude definitions that it found
unacceptable:
This does not mean that a State would be entitled to use
the word "children" in a way entirely strange to those
familiar with its ordinary usage, but at least to the extent
that there are permissible variations in the ordinary con57 0
cept of "children" we deem state law controlling.
Seventeen years later, the Court reaffirmed this principle in
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.57 1 The Court first declined, as unnecessary, the government's argument that federal
law should govern all acquisition of land by the United States.57 2
It then refused to adopt Louisiana law governing conveyances of
mineral rights reserved in land conveyed to the United States, on
the grounds that this particular state statute would frustrate the
objectives of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.5 73 Although
the Court did not apply state law to the transaction in question, it
made clear that it was not creating a new federal rule.574
The right of the federal courts to reject aberrant state rules,
while maintaining a general policy of following state law, provides
a powerful tool for making sure that states do not create "safe
havens" for escaping CERCLA liability or otherwise create significant drains on the Superfund. In the event that the common law
rule of any state precluded the liability of officers, directors or
stockholders even when the individual actively participated in the
tortious activity or engaged in conduct that would otherwise sat570. Id. at 581.
571. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
572. Id. at 595. The Court disagreed with the government: "We find it

unnecessary to resolve this case on such broad terms." Id.

573. Id. at 594-99, 601-03. The Court held that "[t]o permit state abrogation of the explicit terms of a federal land acquisition would deal a serious blow
to the congressional scheme contemplated by the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act." Id. at 597. The state statute in question would have rendered mineral

rights on two land parcels imprescriptible. Id. at 584. The United States had
acquired the parcels pursuant to the Migratory Bird Conservation Act as part of
a local wildlife refuge. Id. at 582. By the terms of the act, at the end of a given
period, all mineral rights reserved to prior owners terminated and complete fee
title vested in the United States. Id. at 582-83. Respondents, as prior owners of
the two land parcels, argued that state law prohibited any extinguishment of the
reservation of mineral rights. Id. at 584. In fact, in reliance on the state law, the
respondents had made various arrangements disposing of their mineral rights.
Id. Nevertheless, the Court refused to apply state law. Id. at 597.
574. Id. at 603-04. The Court simply rejected the state law in question because it was "plainly not in accord with the federal program." Id. at 604. Ac-

cordingly, the Court decided the cases as if the law never existed. Id.
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isfy the traditional piercing the corporate veil rules, a federal
court may reject that rule, while at the same time leaving in place
the rules of liability of the other states. In this way, federal interests may be protected with the least amount of intrusion into state
57 5
law matters.
Therefore, the ability of the federal government to use the
federal courts as a weapon against particular state laws is a final
blow against the argument that adoption of state liability rules
would frustrate the federal objectives of CERCLA. If the United
States can employ the federal courts to reject any state law that
demonstrably interferes with its ability to enforce the provisions
of the statute or that creates a safe haven for polluters, then the
federal objectives of CERCLA will not be frustrated by the hypothetical possibility that such offensive state laws may someday
exist.
The foregoing discussion has questioned the proposition
that adoption of traditional state law rules of liability of officers,
directors and stockholders will frustrate the federal objectives of
CERCLA. The analysis began by examining the various objectives found in the legislative history or ascribed to the statute by
courts and commentators. From this review two objectives were
ultimately identified as relevant to the inquiry: the identification
and remediation of major hazardous waste sites throughout the
country, and the protection of the Superfund as a source of funding for these cleanup efforts by recovering from responsible parties. The analysis then looked at various arguments raised in the
CERCLA cases and by various commentators aimed at showing
that these objectives could not be attained if state law were
adopted, and found these arguments generally unpersuasive.
Claims that adoption of state law would lead to the creation of
"safe havens" for polluters and would quickly exhaust the
Superfund were shown to be too speculative to meet the eviden575. See generally Broad, FederalCommon Law: ProtectingState Interests, FED. B.
J., Spring-Summer 1978, at 1, 3 (describing how federal courts can prevent
choice of certain state rules without foreclosing selection of other state rules or
taking rulemaking power away from states); Field, supra note 353, at 963-73
(comparing state law that applies by federal choice with state law that applies
pursuant to Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and describing how
former remains under control of federal courts). Mr. Broad identifies two compromise approaches that the Supreme Court has used to minimize federal intrusion into state law: creation of a federal "floor" or "ceiling" that may prohibit
certain substantive law alternatives, but otherwise would leave the state free to
set governing standards; and adoption of particular aspects of state law that supplement the overall federal legal framework. Broad, supra, at 2-6.
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tiary standards established in other cases. In addition, the procedural and economic difficulties that incontrovertibly would result
from adopting state law were found to be minor burdens not rising to the level of frustration. In fact, because the economic
objectives are properly subordinated to the remedial objective of
the statute, the financial burdens that may arise from adopting
state law must be discounted significantly. Finally, in the event
that a particular state law does frustrate the remedial goal of
CERCLA or threatens to drain the Superfund, the federal government will still have recourse to have that state law rejected, without disturbing the adoption of the remaining state laws.
C.

Will the Adoption of a Uniform Federal Rule Disrupt Commercial
Relationships?

The third and final element. of the Kimbell Foods test is the
consideration of whether the adoption of a uniform federal rule
of decision would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on
existing state law. 57 6 In the In re Acushnet River 577 opinion, the
court stated that adopting a federal rule of decision would not
frustrate commercial relationships based on state law because
piercing the corporate veil "involves the rights of third parties
external to the corporation. Shareholders generally are entitled
to rely on the law of the incorporating state solely with regard to
the internal affairs of the corporation. '578
One commentator has similarly argued that although the law
of the state of incorporation should regulate the internal affairs of
a corporation, the law of the forum should govern external affairs.579 The commentator noted that application of the law of
the state of incorporation to external affairs could pose problems
if the litigation involved several different corporations in an integrated corporate structure, each having a different state of incorporation. 580 These arguments essentially suggest that officers,
576. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979).

577. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987).
578. Id. at 31. For a further discussion of In re Acushnet River, see supra notes
152-55 and accompanying text.
579. Note, supra note 109, at 862-63. The commentator refers to this argument as the "internal affairs doctrine." He states that this doctrine governs despite the wide variations among jurisdictions and the possibility that the
standards of the state of incorporation may have little connection to the corpo-

rate law of the forum state. Id.
580. Id. at 863 ("It is difficult to argue for the preservation of a state's corporate law when litigation involves several members of a corporate family, each
incorporated in a different jurisdiction." (footnote omitted)).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss6/2

136

Dennis: Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: T

1991)

CERCLA LIABILITY

1503

directors and stockholders of a corporation can have no reasonable or legitimate expectations that the law of the state of incorporation will protect them in CERCLA liability cases.
In non-CERCLA liability cases, courts have held that disruption of commercial relationships predicated on state law may occur in several different ways. The first way in which courts have
examined disruption considers actions taken prior to the creation
of the uniform federal rule, and recognizes the difficulties created
for entities who thought they would be governed by traditional
state law. In United States v. Brosnan,58 1 the United States Supreme
Court declined to create a federal rule to protect federal tax liens
from being extinguished in state foreclosure proceedings.582 The
Court recognized that uniformity might be beneficial to the interests of the United States, but then addressed the possible adverse
effects of adoption of a federal rule: "Long accepted nonjudicial
means of enforcing private liens would be embarrassed, if not
nullified where federal liens are involved, and many titles already
secured by such means would be cast in doubt." 583 The Court
concluded that it would be "more harmonious with the tenets of
our federal system and more consistent with what Congress has
already done in this area" to forego creating a new federal rule
and instead allow the state law to continue governing the foreclo584
sure proceedings.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Sierra Club v.
Hode1585 similarly refused to replace state standards for certain
roads with a new federal standard. 586 The court rejected the proposed federal standard in part because a new federal standard
would require thousands of rights of way across the country to be
remeasured and marked.5 87 The court also noted that over the
years numerous property relationships have developed around
581. 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
582. Id. at 241-42. The Kimbell Foods Court cited Brosnan as authority for
the third element of the Kimbell Foods test. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729 n.24.
583. Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 242. The Court recognized the importance of the
objective of uniformity in that federal tax liens form part of the machinery for
the collection of taxes. Id. at 241. At the same time, however, the Court realized
that Congress' regulation of such liens implicates complex property relationships regulated by state law. Id. at 242.
584. Id. at 242.
585. 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
586. Id. at 1083. The facts of the case involved an environmental group's
action against federal and county officials, seeking to enjoin the county's plan to
improve a road that ran through federal land. Id. at 1073-74.

587. Id. at 1082. The court regarded adoption of this federal standard as
having little practical value, and predicted that it would cause "an administrative
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state-defined rights of way, and that substitution of a federal standard would disturb the expectations of all such parties. 588
A second line of cases analyzing the disruption that would
occur to commercial relationships with the creation of a new federal rule has focused on the effects that the federal rule may have
on actions taken after the federal rule has become well known.
Typically, the problem arises because the federal rule grants to
the United States some special rights that are not available to
others. For example, in In re Murdock Machine & Engineering Co.,589
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to create a
special priority for liens held by the United States in government
procurement contracts. 590 The special right would have arisen
solely as a result of the government's interest in the property,
even if such interest were not known to the general public. The
federal government, under the requested right, would have had
priority over liens created in favor of other parties under the Uniform Commercial Code. 59 ' The court viewed this secret lien as
disruptive of the marketplace, due to the increased investigation
that a seller would have to undertake in a transaction by forcing
him to determine if the United States were involved. 592 State law
duststorm that would choke the [Bureau of Land Management's] ability to manage the public lands." Id.
588. Id. at 1082-83; see also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,
674 (1979) (purchasers of real property rely on state real property law; reasonable expectations should not be upset by virtue of land's proximity to Indian
reservation or other property in which United States had interest).
589. 620 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1980).
590. Id. at 772. In Murdock, a seller of steel to a government contractor
reclaimed a shipment of steel after the contractor filed for bankruptcy. Id. at
769. The government asserted a superior right to the steel under a title-vesting
clause in its procurement contract with the contractor that gave the government
title to all materials as of the date of the contract. Id. The government argued
that no creditor should be allowed to obtain a lien against any public work to
which the government had taken title without the government's prior consent.
Id. at 770.
591. Id. at 769.
592. Id. at 772. The Court declared that this added burden on commerce
was not justified:
In our view, if the government is allowed greater rights in the marketplace than others, then in every sale, including those between private
parties, it becomes for the seller relevant, and perhaps critical, to probe
whether the government is somehow secretly involved. Once government involvement is discovered, the peculiar legal effect of such involvement as it bears on the seller's risks must be ascertained. ...
Mindful of the burdens of time and expense such investigations would
impose on our nation's commerce, and the injustice which would result
by dealing government "wildcards" to businessmen at random, we are
not inclined to create a special commercial law for the government's
benefit.
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was therefore applied.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit articulated a similar concern in Dupnik v. United States,5 9 3 and proceeded to adopt
state redemption procedures as the governing federal common
law. In Dupnik, the SBA, as junior lienholder on a property sold
at foreclosure sale, failed to comply with state law redemption notice procedures. 59 4 The court declared that the notice provision
was designed to protect the redemption rights of all lien creditors. Therefore, the court reasoned that if it relieved the SBA of
the notice requirements for redemption after foreclosure, the result would be a disruption of the expectations of lien creditors. 59 5
Thus, the court declined to create a federal rule that would relieve the SBA of its duties.
The third way in which courts have found disruption of commercial relationships is in the uncertainty created by the infusion
of a new federal law. In Mardan Corp. v. C. G. C. Music, Ltd.,596 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit described two ways in
Id. But ef. United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir.
1976) (federal rule allowing post-foreclosure actions for damages was not unduly intrusive on state's laws protecting debtors, because protection afforded by
state laws to debtors would be supplied in substantial measure by federal rule
and by other aspects of federal program).
593. 848 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1988).
594. For a further discussion of the facts of Dupnik, see supra notes 525-28
and accompanying text.
595. Dupnik, 848 F.2d at 1484. But see Ayers v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth.,
908 F.2d 1184, 1191-93 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to adopt state law and regulations governing default notices and foreclosure procedures for use in connection with federal Housing and Urban Development program), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1003 (1991). The Ayers court distinguished United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) and United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800
F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1986) on the basis that both cases had taken into account the
disruption that creation of a new federal rule would have on third parties, such
as creditors of the defendants, who were depending on state law to govern their
business dealings. Ayers, 908 F.2d at 1191. In distinguishing those two cases,
the Ayers court held that where the matter concerned only the United States and
federal program participants and there were no other third parties who would
normally rely on state law, as in the case at bar, the rationale of Kimbell Foods and
Dunlap was not controlling. Id. at 1191; accord United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d
284, 289-91 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir.
1981).
Ayers is distinguishable from the issue of CERCLA liability of officers, directors and stockholders. The relevant CERCLA question to be answered by either
the state or federal rule is whether the officers, directors and stockholders of a
responsible corporation are third parties or whether they are liable for the
cleanup costs. Moreover, the commercial relations affected by the rules created
in the CERCLA cases will affect others who are without question third parties,
such as creditors of corporate parents and other stockholders of responsible
corporations.
596. 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
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which a federal rule governing CERCLA releases would result in
confusion and uncertainty for commercial relationships predicated on state law:
One, buyers and sellers would face greater confusion
about which body of law to turn to. Two, the creation of
a federal rule, as opposed to incorporating a ready-made
and fully fleshed out body of state law, would, during the
development of that federal rule, leave parties very un5 97
certain about what rule governed CERCLA releases.
Therefore, the court declined to create a uniform federal rule of
decision to govern settlements among private parties over contribution rights in CERCLA liability disputes, opting instead to

adopt existing state law. 598
The federal rules of direct liability and piercing the corporate
veil articulated in the CERCLA cases will disrupt the commercial
relationships in each of the three ways identified in existing jurisprudence. First, although the state laws are not exactly settled,
they have never gone quite as far as the position adopted in the
CERCLA cases. The state law rules typically require evidence of
some link between the harm that has occurred and the actions or
wrongful omissions of the officer, director or stockholder who is
potentially liable. 599 The CERCLA cases have generally dispensed with this link.60 0 Therefore, a stockholder who has in-

vested in a corporation prior to the advent of the new CERCLA
rules, believing that his liability would be limited except in alter
ego situations, now would find himself potentially personally liable under the CERCLA rules simply by virtue of his participation
in management of the corporation. He would not have contemplated or evaluated potential liability of this nature prior to investing in the corporation.
As in Kimbell Foods, the new federal rule of expanded indirect
liability for stockholders in CERCLA cases will thwart the ability
of a stockholder to evaluate the risk before investing. Further597. Id. at 1460. Therefore, the Mardan court refused to fashion a federal
rule because it would undermine the stability of the state law which would usually govern commercial transactions. Id.
598. Id.
599. For a discussion of the state law requirement of a connection between
the harm and the conduct of the officer, director or stockholder, see supra notes
274-75, 295-96, 300 and accompanying text.

600. For a discussion of the CERCLA cases' failure to require a connection
between the harm and the conduct of the officer, director or stockholder, see

supra notes 276-78, 297-99 and accompanying text.
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more, creditors who finance a parent corporation will now have to
concern themselves with the parent's liability for damages incurred by the subsidiary. This represents a risk they did not have
to consider when they originally priced and made loans to the
parent.
With respect to liability expectations, the district court in In
re Acushnet River 60 1 missed the issue entirely. The In re Acushnet
River court opined that, because only the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the state of incorporation, stockholders
did not expect that the law of that state would govern liability to
third parties, and therefore the application of a federal rule concerning stockholders' liability to third parties would not interfere
with settled expectations. That the law of the state of incorporation governs the internal relations between a corporation and its
stockholders, as the In re Acushnet River court noted, holds no significance here. It is true that the law of the forum state, not that
of the state of incorporation, governs direct liability and piercing
the corporate veil. The fact remains, however, that officers, directors and stockholders do enter into commercial relationships with
third parties through the vehicle of the corporation, and that
these relationships have been predicated on state laws, including
laws of the states where they are doing business, that date back
long before the enactment of CERCLA. Thus, for example,
although a stockholder may look to the law of the state of incorporation to determine his rights vis-a-vis the corporation, a mountain of precedent points to the law of the state in which the
corporation is doing business when issues of his liability to third
parties are raised. 60 2 This precedent, as well as the law of the
state of incorporation, provides the foundation on which the commercial relations are built.
Some commentators have questioned the usefulness of the
precedent that dictates that the law of the forum state be applied
in determining the liability of an officer, director or stockholder
to a third party. 60 3 One distinguished critic of traditional piercing
the corporate veil doctrine, Professor Blumberg, has argued
601. 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). For the In re Acushnet River court's

statements concerning disruption of commercial relationships, see supra note
578 and accompanying text.
602. For a discussion of cases concerning indirect liability under state law,
see supra notes 231-73 and accompanying text.
603. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, supra note 108, § 2.04.4, at 61 ("The deficiencies in 'piercing the veil jurisprudence' make reference to state law undesirable
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forcefully that courts should not necessarily apply decisions concerning the piercing doctrine in one field of law to other areas of
the law. 60 4 The problem, according to Professor Blumberg, is
that any case involving the statutory liability of a parent corporation should be controlled by the specific objectives and policies of
the statute in question-not by principles from common law torts
or contracts. 60 5 Universal principles, he argues, should be eschewed in favor ofjudicial interpretation of the scope of the statutes. In the case of federal statutes, the task of judicial
interpretation falls squarely within the province of the federal
courts.

60 6

Professor Blumberg's admonition against using, in statutory
contexts, piercing the corporate veil rules developed in other areas of the law underestimates the flexibility of piercing the corporate veil as an equitable remedy. As noted in connection with the
need for uniformity, equity depends "upon the particular circumstances of each individual case."6 0°7 This aspect of the doctrine
destroys the possibility of achieving uniformity. It provides, on
the other hand, precisely the quality that makes piercing the corporate veil a powerful tool with universal application across all
604. Id. § 2.02.2, at 40 ("[The conceptual standards of entity law are fre-

quently regarded as universal principles and applied indiscriminately across the
entire range of law.").
605. Id. Professor Blumberg refers to such arbitrary application of law as
"unacceptable." He states that "[i]n any area of law, the particular objectives
and policies of the area under consideration should control." Id.
606. Cf. id. § 2.03, at 47-58. The statutory interpretation method of expanding liability of stockholders favored by Professor Blumberg, absent some
clear expression of congressional intent, would still frustrate reasonable commercial expectations in the CERCLA context. An express statutory provision
imposing liability on officers, directors or stockholders puts such persons on
notice of their potential risks, thus allowing them to plan their business relationships. It is true that even if such legislation does not exist at any given time,
Congress can always amend its statutes or enact new legislation which extends
liability to parties not previously included. Amendment or enactment, however,
would usually happen slowly. Accordingly, the public could track the legislation
as it approaches enactment and reassess its potential liability.
Statutory interpretation that creates liability after the legislation has been
enacted, on the other hand, expands the period of time during which business
relations are at risk. A court could create a new interpretation at any time, without the opportunity for input or prior warning that is available in the legislative
process. Therefore, unleashing the federal courts to resolve questions of
CERCLA liability purely through statutory interpretation, as advocated by Professor Blumberg, greatly increases the potential for disruption and weighs in
favor of applying state law.
607. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 440 F. Supp. 394, 403
(D. Nev. 1977) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the differences between
flexible equitable principles and the goal of uniformity, see supra notes 362-71
and accompanying text.
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areas of law. In its equity jurisdiction, a federal court has the
power to take into account the objectives and policies of the particular statute in question. At the same time, however, the court
may consider other important factors, such as the conduct of the
individual whose liability is at issue.608 Questions of justice can
be treated on an individual basis.
Creation of a new federal rule of liability for officers, directors and stockholders would therefore result in significant disruption of commercial relations that have previously developed
under the governance of traditional state law rules of liability.
The disruption would arise from the fact that a much higher level
of risk of liability radiates out to affect others such as lenders who
deal with such individuals and corporations.
Commercial relationships would also be disrupted with respect to actions taken after the CERCLA liability rules have been
adopted. To the extent that the courts give the United States
greater rights than other creditors in reaching the assets of a corporate stockholder, a potential post-CERCLA-rules creditor of
that stockholder would have to investigate corporations in which
the stockholder owned substantial stock. It would be necessary
for the creditor to make such an appraisal in order to determine if
the United States could possibly have a claim against the stockholder for CERCLA liability. Thus, under CERCLA liability rules
granting enhanced rights to the United States, a bank making a
loan to a corporate parent would have to conduct an environmental investigation of all of the subsidiaries of that parent in order to
ascertain the likelihood of any CERCLA liability that may flow
608. See P.

BLUMBERG,

supra note 108, § 2.03, at 49. Joseph Story elo-

quently described the power of equity to take into account a wide range of
considerations:
[Courts of Equity] may adjust their decrees, so as to meet most, if not
all, of these exigencies; and they may vary, qualify, restrain, and model
the remedy, so as to suit it to mutual and adverse claims, controlling
equities, and the real and substantial rights of all the parties. Nay,
more; they can bring before them all parties interested in the subjectmatter, and adjust the rights of all, however numerous; whereas, Courts
of Common Law are compelled to limit their inquiry to the very parties
in the litigation before them, although other persons may have the
deepest interest in the event of the suit. So that one of the most striking and distinctive features of Courts of Equity is, that they can adapt
their decrees to all the varieties of circumstances, which may arise, and
adjust them to all the peculiar rights of all the parties in interest ....
I J. STORY, supra note 364, § 28, at 27-28. Therefore, a court can resolve both
the rights of the United States and the rights of the defendants in a piercing the
corporate veil case. The current CERCLA rules and the statutory interpretations favored by Professor Blumberg lack this flexibility.
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through to affect the parent. The difficulties posed by such a scenario are enhanced because of the number of problems that even
a thorough environmental investigation cannot uncover. Even
worse, the parent's creditor would have no way to predict environmental disasters that could befall one or more of the subsidiaries after the creditor makes the initial loan.
Ultimately, the new CERCLA rules will require the creditor
to factor into its costs the risks of CERCLA liability not only to
the parent corporation, but also to the subsidiaries. Under traditional rules, the maximum loss that the parent corporation could
suffer would not exceed the amount that the parent invested in
the subsidiary, absent some basis for piercing the corporate veil.
Under the CERCLA rules, however, this exposure would expand
greatly as the traditional safeguards are abandoned. Under the
traditional state rules, the creditor could further protect itself by
imposing covenants on the corporate parent and monitoring its
behavior. Under the uniform federal rule, however, the potential
for exposure of the corporate parent would exist even if the parent has acted properly and no element of injustice or inequity is
present. Thus, the commercial relationships predicated on traditional state piercing the corporate veil and direct liability laws
would be disrupted on an ongoing basis, as creditors would be
forced to analyze the cost of potential liability of corporate parents to the United States.
Finally, new federal rules of liability would create a tremendous amount of confusion and uncertainty about whether federal
or state law governed. In situations with multiple parties and numerous contribution and indemnification claims growing out of
the government's claim, it would be extremely difficult to determine which rule ought to regulate the various aspects of the litigation. 6 09 Furthermore, as discussed in connection with the need
for uniformity, the federal circuits will not agree on the liberal
environmental rules for quite some time. This is particularly true
in light of the great diversity that presently exists in the area of
federal piercing the corporate veil law. 61 0 In the interim, corporate officers, directors and stockholders must continue to create
and maintain their commercial relations, without knowing
609. For a discussion of the multiplicity of parties and claims the government can invoke in CERCLA litigation, see supra notes 8-12, 493-95 and accom-

panying text.
610. For a discussion of the diversity among the circuit courts concerning
the federal doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, see supra notes 418-24 and
accompanying text.
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whether the existing state law or a much different federal law will
apply.
In summary, the third element of the Kimbell Foods test also
weighs in favor of adoption of state liability rules for officers, directors and stockholders. The analysis of this part of the test
shows that substituting a new federal rule for the existing state
law would adversely affect commercial relationships that have developed, and will in the future develop, under such state law. The
cases and commentators advocating the creation of a federal rule
have consistently underestimated the disruptive effects of changing the law. They have tended to minimize the reliance that officers, directors and stockholders, and creditors, employees and
others with a stake in the viability of the corporation, have placed
on the state laws governing the corporation's place of business.
Anyone working for, investing in or extending credit to a corporation (or to a corporation's officers, directors or stockholders)
will certainly have a substantial body of expectations concerning
the law of liability, based on long traditions and precedent. By
injecting a new federal rule of CERCLA liability to accompany
traditional state law, the CERCLA cases create havoc for these
expectations. Accordingly, the third element of the Kimbell Foods
test also supports adoption of state law liability rules.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the attempts by the federal courts to link the
CERCLA rules of liability for officers, directors and stockholders
to common law precedent, the CERCLA rules represent judicial
lawmaking that transcends the present state of the law. The
evolution in the law that has taken place thus far, coupled with the
continuing need for money to resolve the problem of environmental dangers, provide good reason to presume that the evolution any process will continue. The power of the federal courts to
create new law in interpreting federal statutes is not, however,
unlimited. The penchant of the federal courts for creating new
federal rules to fill in the gaps of a federal statute should occasionally be curbed in favor of adopting the existing background of
state law. The liability of officers, directors and stockholders
under CERCLA presents such an occasion.
State law on the liability of officers, directors and stockholders has received tremendous criticism. The rules of liability, particularly with respect to piercing the corporate veil, are difficult to
formulate and apply. At times, no doubt, courts have applied the
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traditional laws unevenly. The traditional laws, however, will certainly keep growing as courts continue to struggle with the issues.
The critical question is how this development of the law should
take place. May federal courts, in their allotted function of creating federal common law in federal question cases, attempt to fix
or replace the rules of liability? Or are the federal courts relegated to the role of following state courts on this issue, except for
extraordinary circumstances?
In the case of CERCLA, federal courts have answered this
question by asserting hegemony over the state courts. This is
perhaps in recognition of, or frustration with, the almost incomprehensible cost of remedial action and the comprehensibly finite
amount of government resources available for the job. The federal courts have fashioned new rules for use in deciding liability in
this small corner of the law.
The right of federal courts to take this initiative, however, as
some CERCLA opinions have recognized, is governed by the
holding of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. The three-part test set
out in Kimbell Foods provides a balancing test by which the federal
judiciary is to decide whether to subordinate its role in the growth
of particular areas of law not expressly committed to them by statute. In the case of liability of officers, directors and stockholders
under CERCLA, the test dictates that this area is best left to the
state courts. Existing state laws of direct liability and piercing the
corporate veil, with all of their latent defects, remain powerful
tools to make officers, directors and stockholders answerable for
their actions. Improvements to this law should reflect general
changes in attitudes toward corporations and the individuals who
own and work in them, not localized attempts to perfect federal
statutes.
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